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Abstract
This thesis attempts to provide a better understanding of the role of inward for-
eign direct investment (FDI) and the productivity relationship by providing both a
theoretical and empirical contribution to the existing literature.
Chapter 2 studies how inward FDI can affect economic growth. We extend a
leader-follower endogenous growth model and highlight theoretically the endogene-
ity of FDI in a regression on growth, where FDI acts as a bridge linking technol-
ogy transfer to firms’ adaptation activities, which enable developing countries to
catch-up with developed countries. We empirically test the main predictions of our
theoretical model and we find positive and statistically significant effects of FDI on
the relative level of GDP per capita.
The subsequent chapter investigates whether current measures of vertical link-
ages capture the spillover effects from multinational firms to domestic firms. We
construct measures of vertical linkages at the firm-level to include the differences
in firms’ sourcing and supplying strategies within an industry and to better mea-
sure vertical spillovers derived from multinational activities. Our newly constructed
measures show how the differences in sourcing and supplying activities across firms
determine the advent of vertical spillovers.
In chapter 4, we exploit alternative mechanisms through which the productivity
of domestic firms rises. Our empirical findings suggest that the presence of foreign
ownership alters firms’ core product competences, skewing firms’ production towards
i
their most profitable product lines and then raising firms’ productivity. However, the
presence of foreign ownership also increases product market competition by reducing
markups across all product lines, and this effect further alters firms’ production
towards their core varieties.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Objectives
I do not see how one can look at figures like these without seeing them as representing
possibilities. Is there some action a government of India could take that would lead
the Indian economy to grow like Indonesia’s or Egypt’s? If so, what exactly? If
not, what is it about the “nature of India” that makes it so? The consequences for
human welfare involved in questions like these are simply staggering: Once one starts
to think about them, it is hard to think about anything else. – (Lucas Jr, 1988, p.
5). These words were spoken by Lucas in his 1985 Marshall Lecture at Cambridge
University, and this statement led subsequently to a large expansion of the economic
growth literature.
For an economics researcher, growth theory is one of the important ways to
understand more about the changes in our real world. In thinking about economic
growth, a question that is always present and cannot be neglected is: “Why are
some countries rich and some poor?” According to Hall and Jones (1999), output
per worker in the United States was more than 35 times higher than output per
worker in Nigeria in the last three decades. How to explain this enormous difference
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in standards of living across countries? This is the starting point which motivates
this thesis.
To answer this question, we should first go back to the 1950s, to when Solow
built up theories that helped to clarify the physical capital accumulation process
and suggested that exogenous technological progress was the driving force which
could explain economic growth. In 1966, Nelson and Phelps (1966) emphasized that
what really mattered for a country’s outputs were the current services of tangible
capital goods, the current number of workers performing each of these jobs and
the current educational attainments of each of these job-holders, implying that the
absorptive capability of a poor country limited its growth process. However, these
models were unable to explain why long-run growth rates differ across countries.
Motivated by this limitation, the new growth theory (better known as endogenous
growth theory) approach began with models of long-run growth. Grossman and
Helpman (1991a) and Barro and Sala-i Martin (1997) thus introduced models that
explained the growth rates in developing countries via the creation and adaptation
of new technologies which were already prevalent in the rich nations.
While technology diffusion can take place through several different channels, for-
eign direct investment (henceforth, FDI) by multinational corporations is one of
the important channels that can introduce productivity gains, technology transfers,
and new production processes to developing countries, as highlighted by Borensztein,
De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) and Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2004).
The presence of FDI in developing countries has been increasing with time. Alfaro
et al. (2004) suggest that around the world in developing countries, FDI contributed
more than half of all private capital flows. Many policymakers in developing coun-
tries have increased their efforts to attract FDI. However, the contribution of FDI
to economic growth remains unclear in the literature, as the empirical findings are
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still ambiguous. Therefore, to what extent FDI may increase productivity, thereby
bringing new products or processes into dimensions at both the country and firm
levels, has long been debated. This debate is what motivates the theory development
and empirical analysis in this thesis.
The first and foremost objective of this thesis is to understand the mechanism
through which FDI increases a firms’ productivity, thus contributing to economic
growth, and then to further reconcile the benefits of FDI in the empirical literature.
The argument is that there are knowledge spillovers which occur from FDI, yet the
level of human capital, the capacity to adopt new technologies, the level of technol-
ogy needed to imitate production processes, and the differences between countries’
economic performances may all restrict the potential benefits from FDI. For exam-
ple, the results provided in Hall and Jones (1999) suggest that differences in the
stock of human capital and the total factor productivity (TFP) are the important
elements of the production function. They find that differences in per capita capital
stocks in the two countries contributed to the income differences by a factor of 1.5,
while Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), among others, suggest that the potential corre-
lation between FDI and human capital may determine the process of productivity
growth. To tackle such possible variations that may exist between FDI-human cap-
ital and FDI-TFP, we consider the endogeneity of FDI and depart from the models
of Romer (1990) and Barro and Sala-i Martin (1997). We highlight the fact that
the relative levels of country efficiency (human capital and TFP) contribute to the
decision of the firm in the developed country to engage in FDI in the developing
country and then provide consistent empirical findings.
The second objective of this thesis is to propose a new way of measuring vertical
linkages and refine the productivity spillovers from multinational firms at the firm
level. Many developing countries strive actively to attract FDI and desire its positive
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externalities (or productivity spillovers) to be distributed over domestic industries
and firms. Further, they hope that domestic firms benefit from foreign firms in
terms of knowledge, technology, and even management skills once the multinational
firms attempt to purchase input materials from domestic firms, or domestic firms
try to purchase inputs materials from multinational firms operating in their country.
Establishing linkages where the positive externalities exist from multinational firms
has become an important exercise in the FDI empirical literature. Nevertheless,
most of the recent literature finds no evidence of within-firm productivity spillovers
and finds inconsistent evidence of vertical linkage spillovers. For example, Javorcik
(2004) and Newman, Rand, Talbot, and Tarp (2015) find an insignificant effect of
horizontal spillovers and negative effects of forward linkage spillovers on firms’ per-
formances, while Gorodnichenko, Svejnar, and Terrell (2014) find that the effect of
forward linkage spillovers is positive but insignificant. Similarly, spillovers through
backward linkages are sometimes confirmed as positive (Newman et al., 2015), while,
at other times, they are less significant (Gorodnichenko et al., 2014). Why are dif-
ferent spillover effects observed in different studies if such positive linkage spillovers
exist? To investigate this question, we focus on how the literature has constructed
measures of productivity spillovers. We try to relax the assumptions applied in the
existing literature, where the differences in firms’ sourcing and supplying behaviours
are assumed to be constant across firms, which may potentially affect the identi-
fication in both forward and backward linkage spillovers. Thus, we construct new
measures of vertical linkages and try to control for the difference in sourcing and
supplying behaviours across firms and then provide evidence showing the robustness
of our proposed measures.
While much attention has been given to searching for the linkage spillovers on
firm productivity and the macro-effect of FDI in growth, there are potential mecha-
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nisms that may shed light on the positive externalities of FDI in terms of firms’ pro-
ductivity that have been much less emphasized in the FDI literature - the alteration
of firm’s core product competences and the tougher product-market competition. As
highlighted in the trade literature, countries with greater openness to foreign markets
have been shown to raise firms’ productivity (Bernard, Redding, & Schott, 2011).
A recent study also emphasizes that multinational firms transfer superior technolo-
gies through new products and innovations in processes (Guadalupe, Kuzmina, &
Thomas, 2012). In the literature regarding multi-product firms, changes in a firm’s
production structure through changes in its product range and product scale play
an important role in determining the firm’s aggregate productivity gains. For exam-
ple, Eckel and Neary (2010) suggest that a firm’s productivity increases when they
concentrate on their core product lines, whilst Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano (2014)
suggest that a firm’s productivity declines discretely when they increase product va-
riety. Tougher market competition is also predicted theoretically to increase firms’
core product competences through markups (Bernard et al., 2011; Eckel & Neary,
2010; Mayer et al., 2014). Such mechanisms through firms’ product varieties and
the relationship with multinational firms may potentially dominate the productiv-
ity gains of firms in the host country. Therefore, it is important that we establish
these mechanisms empirically so that we can better understand the sources behind
productivity gains from multinationals. This is the third and final objective of this
thesis.
1.2 Overview of the Thesis
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the extended endogenous
growth model which endogenizes FDI, and it derives a set of theoretical predictions
that help us to address the potential endogeneity of FDI and to identify the benefits
5
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of FDI. Following Chapter 2, the second essay presented in Chapter 3 relaxes the
assumptions applied in the existing studies on the identification of vertical spillovers
through vertical linkages, and it builds new measures of vertical linkages that will be
used to find evidence of vertical spillovers. Then Chapter 4 utilizes a unifying empir-
ical framework to show how multinational firms raise domestic firms’ productivity
through product range and market competition.
A common feature of the three essays in this thesis is that they try to emphasize
the importance of FDI in productivity and put much effort into mitigating potential
biases in terms of the omitted variables and endogeneity in the estimation. The first
and third essays use a two-stage least squares estimator to overcome the endogeneity,
while, in the first essay, system-GMM is also employed in a comparison. Due to data
limitations, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation is used frequently throughout
the second and third essays with all sector, country, and time fixed effects controlled
for, while, in the first essay, the fixed-effect estimator is mainly used.
Though the econometric identification is similar across the three essays, this the-
sis uses three distinctive datasets from chapter-to-chapter. In the second chapter,
starting with cross-country panel data drawn and combined from the World Develop-
ment Indicator (2016), World Bank National Account Data, Penn World Table 6.3,
UNCTAD, and Barro and Lee (2015). The panel data cover the period 1977-2007
and contain information on 67 countries. In chapter 3, we then use pooled, firm-level
survey data drawn from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
conjoined with World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Sur-
vey (BEEPS) datasets. Chapter 4 uses the cross-sectional, firm-level survey data for
the period 2006-2016 across 112 developing countries drawn from the World Bank
Enterprise Survey.
The rest of this section provides an overview of each essay in the thesis.
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1.2.1 Chapter 2 Overview
This chapter derives a new theoretical model based on the framework of Romer
(1990) and Barro and Sala-i Martin (1997). The objective is to show that FDI itself
in the growth system is endogenous and the differences in human capital and tech-
nology between the countries are the potential factors that attract larger amounts
of FDI and therefore trigger the growth effect of FDI. By taking the differences into
account, this chapter reconciles the conflicting findings in the FDI-Growth nexus,
which is its main contribution to the literature.
In terms of the model set-up, by extending the leader-follower model developed
by Romer (1990) and Barro and Sala-i Martin (1997), the chapter analyses a case in
which firms in the leader country engage in innovation activities, while firms in the
follower country engage in imitation activities, and FDI is not allowed. Then the
chapter incorporates FDI, along with firm’s adaptation activities and the possibility
of FDI flowing from developed into developing countries. Multinational firms can
adapt their technologies subject to a cost and local firms can no longer imitate
(for simplicity). The chapter explores the role played by technological differences
(differences in initial TFP and human capital levels across countries in attracting
FDI and in the innovation activities of multinational firms).
Our empirical results show that the positive effects of FDI occur when the en-
dogenous determination of FDI is addressed properly. In other words, the positive
effects of FDI on the host country’s growth are affected by the extent of the differ-
ences in the levels of efficiency between the leader and the follower countries. The
implications of this chapter are simple yet important. It shows that the empirical
strategies used in the existing literature to estimate the growth effect of FDI do not
account adequately for the endogenous determination of FDI, which may obstruct
researchers in identifying the benefits obtained from FDI.
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1.2.2 Chapter 3 Overview
This chapter investigates the measures the effects of FDI vertical linkages on do-
mestic firms’ productivity. We reconstruct FDI backward and forward linkages at
the firm level and refine the spillover effects originating from multinational firms
and flowing to domestic firms. This contributes to the literature on measuring the
spillover effects of FDI vertical linkages.
By relaxing the assumption that domestic firms supply inputs to downstream
multinational firms at the same proportions they do to local firms, this chapter re-
constructs backward linkage at the firm level. Then, by relaxing the assumption
that domestic firms purchase inputs from upstream multinational firms with the
same intensity as they do from local firms, the forward linkage is also constructed
at the firm level. In addition, we compare the results from using the existing stan-
dard measures and the results from using our reconstructed measures to see how
the differences in firms’ sourcing and supplying behaviours matter to the empirical
findings.
The findings show that the differences in sourcing and supplying activities are
crucial for identifying vertical spillovers. Using a broad, firm-level dataset across 32
emerging countries, the results suggest that the existing standard measures on both
backward and forward linkages could lead to biased spillover effects, and no empirical
evidence for the linkage spillovers are found in our data. In contrast, our proposed
measures of forward linkages show both negative and positive effects of spillovers on
firms’ productivity to be significantly important. The measure of backward linkage
also identifies successfully the economic importance of the backward spillovers on
firms’ productivity.
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1.2.3 Chapter 4 Overview
Chapter 4 focuses on the mechanisms through which the presence of foreign owner-
ship can raise domestic firms’ productivity. The contribution of this chapter is that
it utilizes the intuition from the theory of multi-product firms which links FDI to a
firm’s core product competence empirically.
This chapter presents a set of testable hypotheses that describe the mechanisms
through which the within-firm productivity improvement occurs via foreign owner-
ship. By focusing on the case of a firm’s core product competence and markups,
the two factors act as two important channels that link the within-firm productivity
improvements to the presence of foreign ownership.
Based on cross-sectional firm-level data, this chapter discovers that the presence
of foreign ownership skews firms’ production towards the core varieties, while we find
that the presence of foreign ownership exhibits a positive and statistically significant
effect on firms’ core product competences and that this positive effect contributes
ultimately to firms’ productivity. Furthermore, this chapter documents empirically
that the product market competition increased by the presence of foreign owner-
ship reduces the markups across all product lines and this effect further alters the
distribution of firms’ core product competences.
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Chapter 2
Endogenous Growth Effects of
FDI: Theory and International
Evidence
2.1 Introduction
Economists and policymakers in many developing economies believe firmly that at-
tracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is the key to the economic convergence pro-
cess, as inward FDI is expected to bring capital stock, advanced knowledge, know-
how, employee training, and management skills to these countries (e.g., Borensztein
et al., 1998; Alfaro et al., 2004). These potential benefits from FDI are viewed as
important, particularly for in terms of their contributions to improving economic
development. The technology transfers resulting from FDI are also expected to
close the technology gap and help developing economies catch up to the developed
economies.
While the question of whether the aforementioned benefits from FDI (i.e., the
growth effect of FDI) are guaranteed has been discussed for a long time, the em-
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pirical evidence remains oddly inconclusive. On the one hand, in focusing on the
development of domestic financial markets in mediating the flow of imported capital
to enhance growth, Durham (2004) finds that FDI does not have a direct positive
effect on growth but that its effect is contingent on the absorptive capacity of host
countries, while Alfaro et al. (2004) find that FDI alone plays an ambiguous role
in growth regression and the gains from FDI are dependent on a well-developed
financial market. In addition, Campos and Kinoshita (2002) attempt to address
potential within-region and within-period variations; yet, because they treat FDI as
exogenous in the model, the growth effect of FDI remains unclear. On the other
hand, there is the literature based on the endogenous growth theory, where the role
of FDI in the process of technology diffusion is testable. However, based on this
theoretical framework, Borensztein et al. (1998) find that FDI has no impact on
growth rates and further confirm that the benefits from FDI are restricted by the
absorptive capability of the country receiving FDI. They also raise doubts on the di-
rect benefits of FDI in developing countries. One recent study by Jude and Levieuge
(2017) even remarks that “FDI flows were particularly encouraged by the govern-
ment in developing countries, leading to an increasing share of FDI in total capital
flows. However, the empirical evidence on the growth-enhancing effect of FDI is less
conclusive”. The inconsistent empirical findings seem to prevent researchers from
understanding what the role of FDI in economic growth is.
Since most inward FDI flows from developed economies to developing countries,
the growth effect of FDI through transferred knowledge may be determined by the
initial differences in countries’ abilities. In the leader-follower endogenous growth
theory (Romer, 1990; Barro & Sala-i Martin, 1997), the growth rate of developing
countries depends on which technologies that are transferred (i.e., the number of
intermediates) from developed countries can be adopted and implemented, associat-
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ing firms’ innovations in the leading country and firms’ adaptations in the follower
country. The initial efficiency in terms of the differences in human capital and TFP
between the leader and follower countries is the key to influencing firms’ decisions
in innovation and adaptation activities. It indicates the differences in countries’
abilities to hinder and prevent FDI from generating a positive growth effect1. As
existing studies do not consider this mechanism, it may be possible that they may
have looked for the growth effect of FDI in the wrong context, which may explain
why the inconsistent findings have emerged.
Therefore, this chapter exploits the mechanism of country’s efficiency linked to
FDI, using country-level panel data from 1977 to 2007. First, we derive a theoretical
model based on the frameworks of Romer (1990) and Barro and Sala-i Martin (1997)
to show the bi-directional relationship between FDI and growth. Based on our
extended leader-follower endogenous growth framework, through which FDI is linked
to the innovation and adaptation activities determined by countries’ abilities, we
show that the relative levels of human capital and technology are the potential
factors that can trigger the growth effect of FDI on GDP per capita. We then test
our model predictions on whether FDI generates a growth effect on the relative
level of GDP per capita empirically. By considering the initial differences between
the countries, our analysis reconciles the empirical findings in existing FDI-growth
literature. To the best of our knowledge, the use of relative level of abilities predicted
by our theoretical model in estimating the growth effect of FDI has not been explored
in the FDI literature. This, therefore, stands as the main contribution of the chapter.
The findings can be summarized as follows. The empirical results show that
FDI takes place on the relative level of GDP per capita between the leader and
follower countries, and there is clear evidence showing that the positive effect of
1Also note that a country’s abilities may be associated with local policies, environments and
infrastructures, which may raise concerns regarding a heterogeneous FDI-growth relationship
(McCloud & Kumbhakar, 2012).
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FDI occurs when the endogenous determination of FDI is addressed properly. In
other words, the positive effect of FDI on the relative level of GDP per capita is
affected by the extent of the differences in the abilities between the leader and the
follower countries. Moreover, by having a direct link with countries’ abilities, FDI
and GDP per capita, it mitigates potential bias in the estimation. A simple, but
important, implication from our findings is that the empirical strategies used in the
existing literature to estimate the growth effect of FDI do not account adequately
for the endogenous determination of FDI. The results suggest that the assumptions
that FDI is exogenous and countries’ abilities are constant may obstruct researchers
in their search for the benefits from FDI in a cross-country analysis.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 presents an
overview of relevant studies; Section 2.3 presents the theoretical model and measure-
ments for key variables, and outlines the empirical strategy; and Section 2.4 provides
information on the data. The results are presented in Section 2.5, and Section 2.6
presents the conclusions.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 The Benefits from FDI
There has been a long-standing interest in why FDI is important for developing
countries, and the answer is straightforward. FDI is expected to be a channel for
developing countries to access international knowledge, such as know-how, advanced
intermediates, and management skills, through multinational firms - these items are
crucial for stimulating productivity and economic growth. For example, Javorcik
(2004) explains that FDI can generate potential externalities through different sup-
ply chain linkages that connect foreign and domestic firms. Foreign firms may pro-
13
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vide technical assistance to domestic firms, allowing them to access foreign resources
through the linkages. Foreign firms are also linked to the transfer of superior tech-
nologies and are known to be responsible for the world’s innovations (Borensztein
et al., 1998). In addition, workers’ mobility between firms is also linked to FDI
as a channel for international knowledge transfer from multinationals to domestic
firms (Girma, Go¨rg, & Pisu, 2008). These benefits from FDI have been described
intensively in the recent literature.
Over time, the focus has shifted towards estimating the growth effect of FDI
linked to trade (Makki & Somwaru, 2004; C. Wang, Liu, & Wei, 2004), absorptive
capacities and institutions or financial markets (Hermes & Lensink, 2003; Durham,
2004; Alfaro et al., 2004) in developing countries. However, the growth effect of
FDI cannot, or at least only to a very limited degree, be identified by these links
alone due to the fact that the existing endogeneity of FDI associated with countries’
abilities is not addressed properly in the literature. To better clarify this statement,
in the leader-follower endogenous growth model in Barro and Sala-i Martin (1997),
innovation is only undertaken by the leader nation, while imitation is only under-
taken by the follower country. The growth effect from FDI may take place because
the follower can improve their production efficiency by copying a number of interme-
diates that were innovated and used in the leader country. The growth rate of the
follower country may thus be improved. Yet, initial differences in technology across
nations may hinder the follower country from obtaining the growth effect through
FDI, as the leader country may not transfer knowledge efficiently if the existing level
of technology is not high enough in the follower country. This concept has not been
emphasized in the FDI-growth literature.
Instead, most studies focus on analysing the relationship between FDI and
growth and find inconclusive results. For instance, by extending the assumption
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under which the fixed set-up costs in the process of technology adaptation men-
tioned by Barro and Sala-i Martin (1997) depend negatively on the ratio of the
number of foreign firms operating in the host country, Borensztein et al. (1998) find
an insignificantly positive effect of FDI on growth and conclude that the benefits
from FDI only occur when the host country has reached a minimum threshold in
its stock of human capital. On the other hand, B. Xu (2000) uses a model devel-
oped by Barro and Sala-i Martin (1997) to examine the technology diffusion and
productivity-enhancing effects from multinational firms. Xu argues that the benefits
of FDI include the growth and competition effects. Using the measures of multi-
nationals’ expenditures on royalties and the license to distinguish the two effects
from FDI, the author finds that the benefits from FDI on technology diffusion and
productivity gains depend on a threshold level of human capital in the host country.
By contrast, Campos and Kinoshita (2002), who utilise 25 Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean and former Soviet Union transition countries from 1990 to 1998, find positive
effects of FDI on growth rates and suggest that the threshold level of human capital
is not necessary in triggering the benefits from FDI, while, by using 66 develop-
ing countries from 1974 to 2004, Makki and Somwaru (2004) report a weak, but
significant, positive association between FDI and growth. In a more recent study,
Iamsiraroj (2016), who uses data on 124 countries over the period 1971-2010, con-
firms that the benefits from FDI in developing countries do not necessarily depend
on the threshold requirement.
In addition to the above studies, the benefits from FDI may be distorted by
a learning-by-watching effect2. New knowledge transferred from the leader nation
does not impact growth directly because the new knowledge requires some time to be
adapted and absorbed. The host country’s abilities will be improved whilst absorb-
2Local firms may be able to raise the quality of human capital and improve managerial skills
by learning and interacting with foreign firms through FDI (Bengoa & Sanchez-Robles, 2003).
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ing knowledge, and this improvement effect will ultimately enhance productivity.
As noted by Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003), this learning effect from leader to
follower country can take place through FDI, whereby the advanced technologies
implemented by the leader nation spill over into the host country. Focusing on the
relationship between FDI and growth and departing from a theoretical framework,
Walz (1997) suggests that the benefits of FDI may be accompanied by the interre-
gional spillovers of knowledge from developed to the less-developed countries. By
assuming that technology is transferred via international capital movements from
the North to the South, J. Y. Wang (1990) in a theoretical model shows that the
income gap would be reduced with an increase in the growth rate of human capital.
Well-known early studies also include Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Benhabib
and Spiegel (2005), which document the potential relationship between human cap-
ital and the growth rate in the host country.
Since the existing findings are inconclusive and no study has attempted to exploit
the potential link between FDI and initial differences in country’s abilities that may
trigger growth, this chapter therefore deals with the endogeneity of FDI, which
could potentially distort its true effect in the growth estimation. To the extent
that the leader nation may transfer knowledge to the follower country through FDI,
the former has an incentive to assist the latter to make sure investment projects
can be undertaken efficiently. At the same time, the latter has an incentive to
improve their own abilities to make sure that the technologies can be absorbed and
copied efficiently. This argument is similar to that in the study by Nelson and
Phelps (1966), which shows that the growth rate is dependent on the differences in
the level of human capital and the technology between the leading and developing
nations. Therefore, obtaining the benefits from FDI may require both the follower
and the leader to have a certain level of abilities. Since the current literature rarely
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ventures in this direction, the first contribution of this chapter is that we focus on
the differences among the relative levels of human capital and technology between
the leader and follower countries. To build up a theoretical framework, we depart
from the models presented in Romer (1990) and Barro and Sala-i Martin (1997) by
assuming that the adaptation cost depends on the relative levels of human capital
and technology and consider the potential relationship between countries’ abilities
through which the growth effect of FDI may occur. Our model, therefore, generates
some useful and testable predictions that help us to understand more about the
mechanism between the growth effect of FDI and countries’ abilities.
2.2.2 Empirical Strategy
Parallel to the theoretical literature, many cross-country studies have tried to solve
the discrepancy between theory and empirical findings in the FDI-growth nexus.
The empirical strategies differ narrowly; typically, just three approaches are used
when estimating the impact of FDI on growth. The first is to use Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) to provide estimates for FDI and other determinants of growth. The
studies using OLS generally suggest that the growth effect of FDI is contingent
on factors within the host country. For example, Durham (2004), among others,
argues that previous studies neglect the association between the benefits of FDI
and the host country’s absorptive capacity. By using data on 80 countries from
1979 to 1998, Durham (2004) examines the growth effect of FDI and absorptive
factors, including the host country’s property rights, regulations, corruption, and
the stock market. The findings suggest that FDI has an unmitigated positive effect
on economic growth. Similarly, Olofsdotter (1998), who employs an OLS estimator
and treats human capital and trade openness as the factors that may strengthen the
benefits from FDI, shows that FDI is positively associated with growth and that the
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beneficiary effects of FDI are stronger in countries with a higher level of institutional
capability. Another empirical study by Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Zejan (1994) uses
OLS to analyse the influence of certain interchanges of FDI on growth. By using
data on 78 developing countries for the period 1960-1985, the authors suggest that
while FDI is positively associated with growth, such an association is only the case
for high-income developing countries. Although these studies are informative, their
findings are sensitive to the unobserved country-level heterogeneity, e.g., the different
unobserved steady states across countries that are fixed over time (Barro & Sala-i
Martin, 1997). Since OLS is not able to eliminate these potential biases, these cross-
country unobserved variations may thus lead to biased estimates. This criticism
is also supported by Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003), who argue that there is
within-country heterogenous productivity and thus fixed- and random-effect models
can produce more robust estimates compared to OLS.
In addition, there are other strands of the empirical literature which suggest that
FDI is endogenous, as the effect of FDI on growth has been widely confirmed to be
dependent upon a set of conditions in the host country (C. Wang et al., 2004). In a
comprehensive literature review, Li and Liu (2005) point out that there are of two
issues regarding the endogeneity of FDI that are usually discussed. The first is the
potential bilateral causality between FDI and growth. Being the first to highlight
the complex relationship between FDI and growth, Nair-Reichert and Weinhold
(2001), who employ a panel of 24 developing countries over 25 years and apply a
mixed fixed and random (MFR) coefficient approach that allows for heterogeneity in
the causal relationship between FDI and growth, confirm that there is considerable
heterogeneity across developing countries. Hsiao and Shen (2003) argue that the
feedback effects among FDI and growth may exist, as there are intangible factors,
such as bureaucracy, the degree of openness and stability of institutions, that may
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be important in attracting FDI. To mitigate the bias, the authors set up a two-
equation system in which FDI and GDP are the two dependent variables. By using
three stages least squares estimates (3SLS) for 23 developing countries from 1982
to 1998, they find that a 1% increase in FDI raises GDP by 0.0485%, while a 1%
increase in GDP raises FDI by 2.117%. Similarly, by using 80 countries over the
period 1971-1995, Choe (2003) applies a panel VAR model to examine the causal
relationship between growth and FDI. The author finds that there exists a two-way
causation between FDI and growth, but the effect of growth to FDI is more apparent
compared to the effect of FDI to growth. Li and Liu (2005), who investigate whether
FDI affects growth based on 84 countries over the period 1985-1999, confirm that
FDI has positive effects on growth and GDP growth rates also affect FDI positively.
While the above studies draw our attention to the causal link between FDI and
economic growth, the causality test requires the panel structure to include a long-
term dimension in order to obtain consistent estimates (Baltagi, 2008) and, typically,
other relevant variable biases still exist in the model (Sims, 1972).
Another important, but often overlooked, issue is the endogeneity of FDI per
se. As Borensztein et al. (1998) remark, “the correlation between FDI and growth
could arise from the endogenous determination of FDI...the problem is that there
are no ideal instruments available”. Some studies, therefore, apply the instrumental
variable approach by using the lagged values of FDI to mitigate the bias. Campos
and Kinoshita (2002), for instance, by using the lagged stock of FDI, quality of the
bureaucracy, number of telephone lines, external liberalization index and OECD
growth rates as instruments for FDI, find strong evidence supporting the view that
there is a positive effect of FDI on host-country growth. Borensztein et al. (1998),
among others, use the lagged value of FDI, total GDP, dummies for East Asia and
South Asia, measures of political stability and quality of institutions as the instru-
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ments of FDI and find that FDI has no statistically positive effects on growth, and
that its positive effects depend on the host country’s absorptive capability. Another
similar study undertaken by Makki and Somwaru (2004), who use lagged values of
FDI, lagged values of trade and the natural logarithm of total GDP as instruments,
find no significant positive effects of FDI on growth in developing countries. B. Xu
(2000), on the other hand, uses the predicted value of multinational enterprises’
(MNEs’) value-added divided by the host country’ GDP and MNEs’ technology
transfer expenditures divided by the MNEs’ value-added as two instrumental vari-
ables for FDI. Based on 40 countries from 1966 to 1994, Xu finds that the host
country needs to reach a minimum threshold value in human capital in order to
benefit from the technology transfers found in FDI.
While the endogeneity problem can be addressed by applying instrumental vari-
able techniques, a number of studies argue that in the FDI-growth regression, all
right-hand side variables may be correlated with the model disturbance (Easterly,
Loayza, & Montiel, 1997; Doytch & Uctum, 2011). One solution is to use the dy-
namic panel technique, namely, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) esti-
mator (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Blundell & Bond, 1998; Roodman, 20093). In GMM
estimation, all right-hand- side variables lagged two periods or more can be valid
instruments and generate consistent and efficient estimates. Carkovic and Levine
(2005), for example, apply Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimation to investi-
gate the FDI-growth nexus, while Basu and Guariglia (2007), Doytch and Uctum
(2011) and Iamsiraroj and Ulubas¸og˘lu (2015) implement both the Arellano-Bond
and Blundell-Bond estimators to estimate the growth effect of FDI. Since no study
3Arellano and Bond (1991) provide dynamic panel estimators designed for solving the predica-
ment of a weak exogenous assumption, which is called the “Difference GMM”. Blundell and Bond
(1998) then build a system GMM that allows the introduction of more instruments and can improve
efficiency. Further, Roodman (2009) implements “xtabond2” (the code used in STATA), which of-
fers unique features, including observation weights, automatic difference-in-Sargan/Hansen testing
and the ability to collapse instruments to limit instrument proliferation.
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has yet provided ideal instruments, by considering all possible endogeneity and gen-
erating a set of instruments, GMM could be a good way to alleviate the bias.
Nevertheless, there are debates over the GMM estimations. First, system-GMM
is commonly believed to be more efficient than first-differenced GMM (Bond, Hoef-
fler, & Temple, 2001). By assuming that the time-varying disturbances in the origi-
nal level’s equations are not serially correlated, the basic idea of first-differenced
GMM is to take first differences to remove unobserved time-invariant, country-
specific effects and then use the level of the series lagged two periods or more of
all right-hand-side explanatory variables in the first-differenced equations as a set of
instruments. This procedure makes estimates unbiased because unobserved country
fixed effects and any omitted variable biases will no longer exist. It also allows all
parameters to be estimated consistently because there is a set of instruments that
help to mitigate the endogeneity bias. However, the first-differenced GMM estima-
tor behaves poorly if the sample size is finite and time series are persistent (Bond
et al., 2001; Doytch & Uctum, 2011). Blundell and Bond (1998) note that the first-
differenced GMM estimator may be subject to a large downward finite bias when the
lagged levels of the series are weakly correlated with subsequence first differences.
The system-GMM, on the other hand, is recommended as being a more appro-
priate estimator in a growth context (Bond et al., 2001). The reason why the system
estimator performs better than the first-differenced estimator is because the former
includes not only the standard set of instruments in first differences with lagged
levels but also an additional set of instruments in levels with lagged first differences.
Bond et al. (2001), by estimating Solow growth regressions, show that system-GMM
presents more reasonable and efficient results than first-differenced GMM. Another
point worth noting is that the disturbances in one-step and two-step system-GMM
estimators are different. While they may be the same in some special cases, the
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former is more efficient than the later in finite samples because the asymptotic stan-
dard error in the two-step GMM estimator may be seriously biased and reduce the
estimated efficiency (Blundell & Bond, 1998).
2.3 The Model and Estimation Framework
This section presents the theoretical and empirical frameworks used in this chap-
ter. By extending the leader-follower (or innovation-imitation) model developed by
Romer (1990) and Barro and Sala-i Martin (1997), we analyse a case in which there
is participation in innovation and imitation activities on the part of the firms in
the leader and follower nations. FDI is not allowed in this scenario, and technology
transfers may be unavailable, as the absence of FDI raises the issue of international
patent protection, which implies that countries behind the technological frontier only
participate in imitation activities. In the next scenario, we allow FDI to take place
in the model, where the frontier countries in the “North” are producing designs for
new types of intermediate goods and the firms in the frontier countries can transfer
certain technologies abroad by building facilities, licensing and then adapting tech-
nology through FDI in the “South” (Helpman, 1993; Jones & Vollrath, 2013). In
this scenario, the adaptation activities pursued by the multinational firms involve
the relative level of countries’ abilities and the cost of adaptation. We then derive
an equation that shows how countries’ abilities are shaping the growth effect of FDI
and how these factors make such impacts on the relative level of GDP per capita
between the leader and follower countries.
2.3.1 Theoretical Model Setup
There are two countries, a leader and a follower, denoted by the subscripts i = 1, 2,
respectively. There is a unique final good produced in perfect competition in both
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countries using the same technology, as described below. In these economies, the
growth of GDP per capita comes through the invention and/or adaptation/imitation
of new capital goods. In the leader country, firms in the R&D sector devote re-
sources to creating new capital goods. Once a new capital good has been created,
the inventor will be granted with an infinite patent. This patent will be sold to
an intermediate producer, which will sell the differentiated good in a monopolis-
tic competition environment. In the follower country, imitation is assumed to be
cheaper than innovation; therefore, the follower country prefers to copy rather than
to invent. The next subsection describes the fundamentals for the leader country,
and the fundamentals for the follower country will be described afterwards.
2.3.1.1 Invention in Country 1 (The Leader)
Final Goods Sector
In the leader country, the final output is produced under perfect competition using
the following technology:
Y1 = A1H
1−α
1
N1∑
j=1
(X1j)
α (2.1)
where 0 < α < 1, X1j is the quantity employed of the jth type of nondurable
capital good, and N1 is the number of types of capital goods available in country
1. Following Jones and Vollrath (2013), we assume that the total human capital
of the country is given by H1 = e
(ϕµ1)L, where ϕ is a measure of the quality of
human capital and µ1 is the number of years each worker in the labour force spends
in education, and L measures the size of the labour force. The parameter A1 is an
overall measure of technological efficiency, which varies across countries. Individuals
in the economy are endowed with h units of human capital4. Firms in the final good
4For simplicity, I abstract from a household’s decision of accumulating human capital.
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sector will choose H1, X1j to maximise profit:
max
H1,X1j
Y1 − w1H1 −
N1∑
j=1
P1jX1j
where P1j is the price of intermediate j in the leader nation. The first order condition
associated with each capital good is given by:
A1αH
1−α
1 X
α−1
1j = P1j (2.2)
Which implies that the quantity of the intermediates j input demanded, X1j, is a
function of the price P1j
X1j = (
αA1
P1j
)
1
1−αH1 (2.3)
equation (2.3) is the demand for j type capital good innovated in country 1.
Intermediate Goods Sector
Each variety of capital goods is produced by a unique producer using 1 unit of final
output. Since each producer is the only supplier of that capital good, the producer
settles the price that maximizes the profits:
max
P1j
(P1j − 1)X1j
s.t. P1j = A1αH
1−α
1 X
α−1
1j
(2.4)
The producer of X1j selects P1j at each date to maximize the current profit at the
date. Thus, to solve the problem we substitute of equation (2.3) into equation (2.4)
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and take the first order condition with respect to P1j to yield the monopoly price:
max
P1j
pi1j(v) = (P1j − 1)(αA1
P1j
)
1
1−αH1 (2.5)
so
∂pi1j
∂P1j
=
−α
1− αP
−1
1−α
1j (αA1)
1
1−αH1 − ( −1
1− α)P
−2+α
1−α
1j (αA1)
1
1−αH1
= 0
By simplifying the above equation, we obtain the monopoly price P1j =
1
α
. Note
that the monopoly price is constant over time and it is the same for all intermediate
goods, because the cost of production for all intermediate goods is the same, and
each good enters symmetrically the production function (Eq. (2.1)). Substituting
the price into Eq. (2.3) to get the total quantity of the type j intermediate good we
obtain:
X1j = X1 = (
αA1
P1j
)
1
1−αH1
= α
2
1−αA
1
1−α
1 H1
(2.6)
Therefore, the level of aggregate output is given by the following equation:
Y1 = A1H
1−α
1 α
2α
1−αA
α
1−α
1 H
α
1N1
= A
1
1−α
1 α
2α
1−αH1N1
(2.7)
Substitution of Eq. (2.6) into the objective function of (2.4), we obtain the profits
that the intermediate producer obtains at each period of time which is given by:
pi1j = pi1 = (1− α)α
1+α
1−αH1A
1
1−α
1 (2.8)
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where Eq. (2.8) implies that the profit flow is constant over time across goods.
Research Sector
Let denote with V1 the value of a patent. This is given by the current discounted
value of profits obtained by the intermediate producer. Households in the economy
have two options, they can invest in bonds obtaining an interest r1, or they can
invest in innovation. Since the profit flow is constant, the present discounted value
of profits associated with the invention of an intermediate good is given by:
V1(t) = pi1j
∫ ∞
t
e
∫ s
t −r1(v)dvds (2.9)
where r1(v) is the real interest rate at time v in country 1. As we described, re-
searchers will decide to enter the R&D sector if V1(t) > η1 (η1 is the innovation
cost). Since there is free entry in the R&D sector, in equilibrium the net profit must
be equal to zero. In equilibrium:
V1r1 = pi1 + V˙1 (2.10)
Eq. (2.10) says that the investing V1 of any resources in bonds will earn V1r1; in-
vesting in innovation, by contrast, will obtain pi1+ V˙1. By using free entry condition,
which implies that V˙1 = 0 (since η1 is constant), we have the following equations:
r1 =
pi1
η1
= (1− α)α 1+α1−αH1A
1
1−α
1 η
−1
1
(2.11)
where r1 is the rate of return, which depends on the underlying technology A1 and
H1.
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Households
We close the model by considering behaviour of households. Households maximise
a standard inter-temporal utility function, subject to the underlying households’
aggregate budget constraint
Max
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
C1−θ1 − 1
1− θ dt
s.t. ct + b˙t = wtht + rtbt + pit
bt ≥ 0
b0 > 0
(2.12)
Where bt, wt, ht and rt are households’ assets, wage rate, labour and the rate of
return. In Eq. (2.12) ρ refers to the rate of time preference and θ > 0 so that
the elasticity of marginal utility is a constant. To solve the utility maximization
problem, we consider the Hamiltonian
H(c, b, t, u) = e−ρt
C1−θ1 − 1
1− θ + µt[wtht + rtbt + pit − ct] (2.13)
The solution to the Hamiltonian is characterized by following first order conditions
∂H
∂c
= 0
∂H
∂bt
= −µ˙
(2.14)
and the transversality condition is given by
lim
t→∞
µtbt = 0 (2.15)
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and from Eq. (2.14) we obtain
e−ρtC−θ1 − µt = 0
r1µt = −µ˙
(2.16)
Note that by taking logs and time derivatives in Eq. (2.16) we obtain
C˙1
C1
=
1
θ
(
−µ˙
µ
− ρ) (2.17)
combining Eq. (2.17) with Eq. (2.16) we have the following equation (the Euler
equation)
C˙1
C1
=
1
θ
(r1 − ρ) (2.18)
from Eq. (2.18), the growth rate of C1 is constant since r1 is constant.
In equilibrium, the households’ aggregate assets equal the market value of firms’
intermediate goods, so bt = η1N1 (implies that b˙ = η1N˙1 as η1 is constant). The
level of consumption is therefore given by
C1 + b˙ = w1H1 + r1η1N1 + Π1 (2.19)
In the steady state C1, y1 and N1 are growing at a constant rate and r1, X1, pi1, V1
and bt are constant (i.e.,
C˙1
C1
= y˙1
y1
= N˙1
N1
). The growth rate of this economy is given
by
γ1 =
1
θ
((1− α)α 1+α1−αH1A
1
1−α
1 η
−1
1 − ρ) (2.20)
equation (2.20) shows that γ1 ≥ 0 if (1 − α)α
1+α
1−αH1A
1
1−α
1 η
−1
1 ≥ ρ holds. It implies
that the growth rate of output is consistent with the growth rate of N1 at the
constant rate of γ1. In other words, the growth rate of the leader nation grows as
the number of new types of intermediates increases. The growth rate is increasing
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in H1 but decreasing in η1.
2.3.1.2 Imitation in Country 2 (The Follower)
Final Goods Sector
As country 2 holds a low level of technology, imitation may be the best way for coun-
try 2 to improve their efficiency. The follower country can copy the intermediates
invented in the leader country and then upgrade their present level of technology.
The final output is produced under perfect competition using the following technol-
ogy:
Y2 = A2H
1−α
2
N2∑
j=1
(X2j)
α (2.21)
where 0 < α < 1 and H2 is the level of human capital (skilled labour H2 = e
(ϕµ2)L),
X2j is the quantity employed of the type j intermediate good, N2 is the total number
of intermediates in country 2. Note that the capital goods currently employed in the
follower country are assumed to be the one invented in country 1. The parameter
A2 again is an overall measure of technological efficiency.
Imitating new types of intermediate goods is costly, thus the cost of imitation is
set as follows:
m2 = (
N2
N1
)σ (2.22)
where N1 and N2 refer to the number of intermediates that are available in the
leader and the follower country. Note that the cost of technology transfer rises with
the current level of intermediates used by the country, as it is the case in standard
growth models of technology transfer (Jones, 1995; Barro & Sala-i Martin, 1997;
Jones & Vollrath, 2013, Ch5); this reflects the idea that technologies are transferred
from the easiest ones to the most complicated ones (i.e., σ > 0).
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Intermediate Goods Sector
As country 2 will put the same monopoly price of type j intermediate good 1
α
, equa-
tions (2.6) and (2.7) therefore provide the equations as follows (parallels with the
leader country):
X2j = X2 = α
2
1−αA
1
1−α
2 H2 (2.23)
Y2 = A
1
1−α
2 α
2α
1−αH2N2 (2.24)
pi2j = pi2 = (1− α)α
1+α
1−αH2A
1
1−α
2 (2.25)
equation (2.23) is the total quantity of the type j intermediate good, Eq. (2.24) is
the total output in the follower country and Eq. (2.25) is the flow of profit of type
j intermediate.
Imitation Sector
Through equations (2.23) to (2.25), the present value of profits from imitation of
intermediates j in country 2 is
V2(t) = pi2
∫ ∞
t
e
∫ s
t −r2(v)dvds (2.26)
where r2 is the rate of return in country 2 at time t. Using the free-entry condition,
the present value of profit from imitation in equilibrium must be equal to the cost
of imitation at each point in time
V2(t) = (
N2
N1
)σ (2.27)
which implies that the profit gained from investing bonds equals the profit gained
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from imitation
r2m2 = pi2 + m˙2 (2.28)
Household
Households in country 2 maximise the standard inter-temporal utility function and
subject to the budget constraint. The Euler equation is therefore given as below
C˙2
C2
=
1
θ
(r2 − ρ)
=
1
θ
((
N2
N1
)−σ(1− α)α 1+α1−αH2A
1
1−α
2 − ρ)
(2.29)
In the steady-state, the growth rate of Y2 and C2 equal the growth rate of N2, which
equals γ1 (as will be seen in Eq. (2.36)). Therefore, the rates of return in the two
countries are the same, which implies that
γ∗2 = γ1 (2.30)
Since the preference parameters ρ and θ are the same in both countries, equations
(2.11), (2.20) and (2.29) imply the rates of return in the two countries are the same
r∗2 = r1 (2.31)
and from (2.28) we obtain
r∗2 =
pi2
m2
= (
N2
N1
)−σ(1− α)α 1+α1−αH2A
1
1−α
2
(2.32)
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where m2 is constant as in the steady state. Thus, from Eq. (2.32) we obtain
pi2
m2
=
pi1
η1
(2.33)
where pi2
m2
= r2 and
pi1
η1
= r1, as given. We can simplify the Eq. (2.33) as follows:
(m2)
∗ =
pi2
pi1
η1
= η1
H2
H1
(
A2
A1
)
1
1−α
(2.34)
from Eq. (2.34) we obtain the steady-state value of (N2
N1
)∗
(
N2
N1
)∗ = [η1
H2
H1
(
A2
A1
)
1
1−α ]
1
σ (2.35)
Substitution of the steady-state value of (N2
N1
)∗ to the common growth rate shows
that the growth rate of the follower country and the leader country are the same
(γ2)
∗ =
1
θ
[((η1
H2
H1
(
A2
A1
)
1
1−α )−1(1− α)α 1+α1−αH2A
1
1−α
2 )− ρ]
=
1
θ
[η−11 (1− α)α
1+α
1−αH1A
1
1−α
1 − ρ]
= γ1
(2.36)
In the steady state the relative level of GDP per capita for two countries is given
by
(
y2
y1
)∗ = (
A2
A1
)
1
1−α
h2
h1
(
N2
N1
)∗
= (
A2
A1
)
1+α
(1−α)σ (
h2
h1
)
σ
σ+1η
1
σ
1
(2.37)
Thus, the ratio depends positively on the relative values of A2
A1
, h2
h1
and N2
N1
.
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2.3.1.3 Inward Foreign Direct Investment from the Leader
We now consider foreign direct investment in the process of knowledge transfer.
Assuming there are two activities the firm in the leader country can undertake:
adapting or not adapting their intermediate to the follower economy. We assume
that both countries respect legislation regarding international intellectual property
and consequently, the intermediate producer can exert the monopoly rights across
both countries. Firms from country 1 adopt the products for use in country 2 at d2
unit costs of adaptation and the rate of return to this adaptation activities through
FDI exceeds the rate for innovation (r1) at the costs η1 in country 1.
To analyse the role of FDI in the process of technology through firms’ adaptation
activities, we assume that the adaptation cost depends on the difference in countries’
efficiency and the explanation is the following. When multinational firms participate
in adaptation activities in the follower country, they are expected to pay for the pre-
start-up training cost (Teece et al., 1977). As remarked by Teece et al. (1977),
the domestic firm which has more skilled labour is likely to have less difficulty in
absorbing new technology in the industry, and so the cost is likely to be lower.
Whilst the cost is lower if the local firm has the capability to solve unusual technical
problems (Oshima, 1973). Therefore, we assume that the relative level of human
capital and technology efficiency are the determinants that have such impacts on
technology transfer activities. The cost of adaptation is therefore set as follows:
d2 = (
N2
N1
)σ(
A1
A2
)δ(
H1
H2
)β, A2 ≤ A1andH2 ≤ H1 (2.38)
A1/A2 and H1/H2 refer to the relative level of technology and human capital between
country 1 and 2. σ, δ and β are the power of the variables that are set to be
positive, following the reasons below. The cost of adaptation was lower than those
for innovation when little copying has occurred but rose as the pool of uncopied
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ideas contracted (Barro & Sala-i Martin, 2004, Ch8). In other words, the cost
of adaptation rises as technologies are transferred from the easiest to the most
complicated (i.e., σ > 0). In addition, the difference between Eq. (2.38) and Eq.
(2.22) is that here we assume that the relative level of technology and human capital
have such impacts on leader country’s adaptation activity. The cost of adaptation
decreases in the increase in the level of human capital and the current level of
technological efficiency in the host country; this reflects the fact that multinationals
find it easier to transfer technology when the population in the host country is skilled
and the level of technology is high (i.e., δ > 0 and β > 0).
The innovators now have the intellectual property rights over the use of their
intermediates in country 1 and country 2. Let us denote V1d for the value of a firm
in country 1 that adopts the product in domestic (country 1) and foreign (country
2) and V1nd for the value of a firm which does not adopt the intermediate in the
foreign country. If the firm does not adapt the intermediate, the value of V1nd is
given by pi1
η1
, as shown in Eq. (2.11). Whilst the value of V1d is given by the sum of
the profit pi1 and pi2 divided by the sum of the cost in η1 and d2 if the firm decides
to adopt the intermediate in the follower economy, which is given by
V1d =
pi1 + pi2
η1 + d2
(2.39)
where d2 = (
N2
N1
)σ(A1
A2
)δ(H1
H2
)β. In equilibrium, V1nd and V1d will be the same, which
implies
pi1 + pi2
η1 + d2
=
pi1
η1
(2.40)
therefore, the ratio of N2 and N1 in the steady state is given as follows:
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((N2
N1
)∗(H1, H2, A1, A2, η1)):
(
N2
N1
)∗ = [[
η1(pi1 + pi2)
pi1
− η1](A2
A1
)δ(
H2
H1
)β]
1
σ
= [η1(
A2
A1
)
1+δ−αδ
1−α (
H2
H1
)1+β]
1
σ
(2.41)
Eq. (2.41) implies that the number of varieties of intermediates adapted N2/N1 is
affected by the cost of innovation η1, the relative level of human capital parameter
H2/H1 and the relative level of technology A2/A1
5. It also highlights the fact that
a higher cost of innovation would increase the number of intermediates produced in
the follower country, which implies that the leader would do more on adapting their
intermediates in the follower country. As N2/N1 represents the role of FDI in the
model, this equation theoretically highlights the endogeneity of FDI, which can be
properly addressed by the right-hand side variables - namely H2/H1 and A2/A1 - in
the equation. The common growth rate in country 1 now is given by
γ˜ =
1
θ
(r˜ − ρ) (2.42)
where r˜ = pi1+pi2
η1+η1(
A2
A1
)
1
1−α H2
H1
.
Eq. (2.42) shows that in equilibrium the growth rate of country 1 is affected
by the cost of innovation and the profit gained from the innovation. The relative
level of technology and human capital are also the determinants of the growth rate.
Note that the growth rates of country 2 and country 1 are the same because the
multinational from country 1 will increase the production of country 2 that stim-
ulates the growth rate. In other words, the rate of return in equations (2.28) and
(2.29) correspond to a steady state in which N1, Y1, C1, N2, Y2 and C2 all grow at a
constant rate γ˜. While it shows that the growth rate of country 2 will become larger
5The proof is provided in Appendix.
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once FDI arrives in the country, it will however slow down when the level of human
capital and technology in country 2 increases, as seen in Eq. (2.38). For example,
the college enrolment in China increased nearly fivefold after receiving large inward
FDI between 1997 and 2007, yet the growth rate slowed down when the level of
human capital increased (Whalley & Zhao, 2010).
From equations (2.7) and (2.24) we then obtain the ratio of per-worker product
for the two countries
(
y2
y1
)∗ = (
A2
A1
)
1
1−α
h2
h1
(
N2
N1
)∗
= (
A2
A1
)
1+δ−αδ+σ
(1−α)σ (
h2
h1
)
1+β+σ
σ (η1)
1
σ
(2.43)
Eq. (2.43) shows that the ratio (GDP per capita in level) depends on the relative
level of the productivity parameters A2/A1, the relative level of (N2/N1)
∗ and h2/h1.
Recall from Eq. (2.41) that the number of intermediates available in country 1 and
country 2 is determined by the relative level of technology and human capital, while
Eq. (2.43) shows that the relative level of GDP per capita is determined by the
number of intermediates available in country 1 and 2.
2.3.2 The Role of FDI: Hypotheses
Our model generates a number of testable implications on the growth effect of FDI
and the pre-determinants of FDI itself. We present hypotheses describing the mech-
anisms through which the growth effect of FDI occurs and what factors may hinder
the growth effect of FDI.
The Effect of FDI on the relative level of GDP per capita
Past empirical studies have indicated that the growth effect of FDI is controver-
sial. While some studies observe a positive and significant effect of FDI on the host
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country’s economy (Campos & Kinoshita, 2002; Alfaro et al., 2004; C. Wang et al.,
2004; Makki & Somwaru, 2004; Delgado, McCloud, & Kumbhakar, 2014), others
find ambiguously insignificant effects (Borensztein et al., 1998; Hermes & Lensink,
2003; Durham, 2004; Jude & Levieuge, 2017). Nevertheless, the growth effect of
FDI is clearly given by Eq. (2.43). The expression Eq. (2.43) shows that N2/N1
may directly affect the growth rates, as the more capital goods that are adopted by
the multinational firms, the more advanced technologies can be transferred from the
leader to the follower countries. This leads to the first testable implication for the
growth effect of FDI from our model:
HYPOTHESIS 1. The estimated coefficient of N2/N1 (FDI) is positively associated
with y2/y1; an increase in the level of FDI increases the relative income of developing
versus developed economies.
The Effect of Pre-Determination of FDI on GDP per capita
In addition, the concept that the level of human capital in a host country is critical
for FDI to generate positive effects has been discussed intensively (Borensztein et
al., 1998;Hermes & Lensink, 2003; Durham, 2004). While some studies find that the
empirical results are consistent with this argument, our theoretical model outlines
that it is the relative level of human capital that matters for the relative level of GDP
per capita. The expression in Eq. (2.41) for the pre-determination of FDI shows
that the number of intermediates available in both leader and follower countries is
influenced by the differences in the relative level of human capital and technology
between the two countries (i.e., the indirect effects of A2/A1 and h2/h1 through
N2/N1 on y2/y1), while Eq. (2.43) shows that the differences in the relative level
of human capital and technology also determine the rate of return directly, i.e., the
direct effects of A2/A1 and h2/h1 on y2/y1. In other words, FDI enters the equation
37
2.3. THE MODEL AND ESTIMATION FRAMEWORK Chapter 2
endogenously with the differences in abilities between the two countries. Therefore,
we have the second and the third testable implications from our model:
HYPOTHESIS 2. An increase in the relative level of human capital increases the
relative level of income per capita. This increase comes through both a direct effect
(from h2/h1 to y2/y1) and an indirect effect via FDI.
HYPOTHESIS 3. An increase in the relative level of technology increases the rel-
ative level of income per capita. This increase comes through both a direct effect
(from A2/A1 to y2/y1) and through an indirect effect via FDI.
2.3.3 Estimating Technology, Human Capital, FDI and GDP
per capita
We rely on our theoretical model to analyse how FDI (N2/N1) influences GDP per
capita (y2/y1). In doing so, three key variables need to be constructed. The first
two refer to A2/A1 and h2/h1, while the third refers to N2/N1. We first compute the
relative level of human capital h2/h1. To construct this variable, we follow Jones
and Vollrath (2013):
schoolingv = eϕµ
v
where the superscript v refers to s and st. The ϕ is set to be 0.10. The parameter
µv refers to the average educational attainment of the labour force in years, where
the superscript s is the average total schooling and st is the tertiary educational
attainment. The parameter ϕ is assumed to be equal to 10%, which is based on a
large body of literature in labour economics that finds that an additional year of
schooling increases the wages earned by an individual by something like 10% (Jones
& Vollrath, 2013, Ch3).
Having constructed the schoolingv, we then compute the relative level of human
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Figure 2.1: The Relationship between the Relative Level of GDP per capita (vertical
axis) and Human Capital in Year 1985 and 2005
capital as follows:
hv =
hv2
hv1
=
Schoolingv2
Schoolingv1
, v = s, st (2.44)
where the superscript 1 refers to the leader country (the US) and 2 refers to other
follower country. As specified in Eq. (2.38), the higher the level of human capital
in the leader country, the lower the cost of adaptation and the higher the GDP per
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Figure 2.1 (Continued): The Relationship between the Relative Level of GDP per
capita (vertical axis) and Human Capital in Year 1985 and 2005
capita in the follower country. This measure in logarithms lies within the range 0.271
to 0.693 for hs and 0.624 to 0.695 for hst. A large ratio in the measure indicates a
high level of human capital in the follower country, which enables firms in the US
to transfer knowledge to the recipient economy efficiently. Figure 2.1 shows that
the relative level of GDP per capita (in logarithms) and the relative level of human
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capital (in logarithms) are clearly positive and that an upward trend is displayed
through the two-way scatter plots.
The proxy for the relative level of technology A2/A1 is constructed by using the
TFP in levels. First, we derive the TFP formulation from equations (2.1) and (2.21)
for the leader and follower countries:
Av1 = TFP
v
1 = (
GDPpc1
kα1 h
v
1
1−α )
Av2 = TFP
v
2 = (
GDPpc2
kα2 h
v
2
1−α )
(2.45)
where the GDPpc refers to the GDP per capita; the coefficient α, which is
the human capital share, is set at one-third; h is the investment rates of human
capital mentioned above and k is the capital stock per capita. The relative level of
technology is then measured by dividing the level of TFP in the country by the level
of TFP in the US, which is:
As =
As2
As1
=
TFP s2
TFP s1
Ast =
Ast2
Ast1
=
TFP st2
TFP st1
(2.46)
where TFP s2 and TFP
s
1 refer to the TFP calculated by using the average total
schooling in the follower 2 and leader 1 countries, respectively, while TFP st2 and
TFP st1 refer to the TFP calculated by using the tertiary educational attainments in
these same two countries, respectively. The measure of the relative level of technol-
ogy lies between 0 and 1, where a value near 1 indicates a slight difference between
the leader and follower country. As discussed in the preceding section, the higher
the level of TFP in the follower country, the higher the volume of FDI stock and
the higher the GDP per capita in the follower country. The relationship between
the relative level of TFP (in logarithms) and the relative level of GDP per capita
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Figure 2.2: The Relationship between the Relative Level of GDP per capita (vertical
axis) and TFP in Year 1985 and 2005
(in logarithms) is displayed in Figure 2.2, which shows an upward trend for the
developing countries in the years 1985 and 2005.
From Eq. (2.43), the dependent variable y is measured as follows:
y =
GDPpc2
GDPpc1
(2.47)
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Figure 2.2 (Continued): The Relationship between the Relative Level of GDP per
capita (vertical axis) and TFP in Year 1985 and 2005
where the GDPpc is the GDP per capita, and the subscripts 2 and 1 refer to the
follower and leader nations, respectively. Whilst most of the literature considers
GDP growth rate as the dependent variable (Benhabib & Spiegel, 1994; Azman-
Saini, Baharumshah, & Law, 2010; Grijalva, 2011; Alaali, Roberts, & Taylor, 2015),
we focus on the relative level of GDP per capita between the developing country
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Figure 2.3: The Relationship between the Relative Level of GDP per capita (vertical
axis) and the FK in Year 1985 and 2005
and the US, following the theoretical model.
The third proxy, N2/N1, reflects the number of intermediates that are either
innovated in the leader country N1 or adapted to the follower country N2. To
capture this concept, we define N2/N1 as the FDI stock in the follower country
divided by the capital stock in the leader country. We believe that the FDI stock in
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the follower country is appropriately represented as N2 and that the capital stock
in the leader country is appropriately represented as N1. For simplicity, we use the
notation FK to denote the N2/N1. The variable FK is therefore constructed as
follows:
FK =
N2
N1
=
FDI2
K1
(2.48)
where FDI2 refers to the FDI stock in the follower countries, while K1 refers to
the capital stock (the number of intermediates available) in the leader country (the
US). To see how this measure fits our research question and data, Figure 2.3 shows
a scatter plot for the relationship between FK and the relative level of GDP per
capita in the years 1985 and 2005. As displayed, we find a stepped upward trend
with the positive slope in the figure, which allows us to intuit that the firms from
the leader nation adopt the products in the follower countries through FDI, which
helps followers to move towards catching up with the leader countries.
2.3.4 Econometric Method
The methodology of the empirical investigation follows our theoretical model Eq.
(2.43), whilst we are guided by the current empirical literature in in terms of miti-
gating the potential omitted variable biases by controlling for a set of variables that
are not included in the theoretical model, e.g., the population growth rates, the
domestic investment rates, the exchange rates and the government expenditures6.
2.3.4.1 Baseline Specification
We now test our model prediction regarding the impact of FDI stock on the relative
level of growth rates. To examine the relationship between y2/y1 and N2/N1, we use
6Borensztein et al. (1998), Li and Liu (2005) and Hermes and Lensink (2003) search for a set
of robust variables for modelling growth and therefore provide useful information allowing us to
mitigate potential omitted variable biases.
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the measures of FK and y, in which FK is used to capture the notion of the number
of intermediates available in the country and y stands for the relative level of GDP
per capita. In addition to capturing the notion of A2/A1, we use the variable A
v,
where Av2/A
v
1 denotes TFP
v
2 in country i divided by TFP
v
1 in the US. The variable
hv then captures the notion of hv2/h
v
1. Note that the superscript differs with the
different investment rates of human capital to measure the TFP, i.e., v = s, st,
where s refers to the total average schooling attainment and st refers to the average
tertiary schooling attainment. The regression for 67 countries is specified as follows:
lnyi,t = β0 + β1lnFKi,t + β2lnh
v
i,t + β3lnA
v
i,t + τ
′
Z
′
+ δi + ρt + εi,t (2.49)
where lnyi,t refers to the relative level of GDP per capita in natural logarithms and
lnhvi,t is the relative level of human capital that refers to lnh
s
i,t and lnh
st
i,t, respectively.
The lnFKi,t refers to the number of intermediates available in the leader country
and adapted in the follower countries N2/N1 in natural logarithms, while lnAvi,t is
the relative level of technology that refers to lnAsi,t and lnA
st
i,t, respectively. The
term Z
′
is the set of other control variables and comprises five core explanatory
variables, including domestic investment rate (in relative terms), the growth rate of
the population, the government expenditures (share of GDP), the exchange rates
and the trade openness. They are frequently included as determinants of growth
in cross-country studies (Olofsdotter, 1998; Borensztein et al., 1998; B. Xu, 2000;
Campos & Kinoshita, 2002; Durham, 2004; Alfaro et al., 2004; Delgado et al.,
2014). In addition, in a cross-country study Barro and Sala-i Martin (1997) show
that different countries have different steady states, while B. Xu (2000), who studies
the effect of technology diffusion from multinationals on TFP, also includes time-
and country-specific effects to control for the steady-state differences across countries
and across time. Thus, in our model’s Eq. (2.49), the terms δi and ρt are the country
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and time fixed effects that we set up to control for unobserved heterogeneity across
country and across time, respectively. All variables, except the population growth
rate, government expenditures, and domestic investment rates, are measured in
natural logarithms.
Note that there might be potential correlations between FDI, the relative level
of technology, human capital and country-specific characteristics, as it can be ar-
gued that FDI affects follower countries primarily, and perhaps exclusively, through
countries’ relative levels of technology, human capital and country-specific factors,
which may not be observed easily from the theoretical model (Borensztein et al.,
1998; Durham, 2004). To this end, we examine the extent to which the effect of FDI
on the relative level of GDP per capita is: (i) dependent upon certain conditions in
FDI recipient countries and/or (ii) influenced by country-specific characteristics in
the robustness test. To simplify this, the specifications can be written as follows:
lnyi,t = β0 +β1lnFKi,t +β2lnh
v
i,t +β3lnA
v
i,t +β4ln(h
v
i,t×FKi,t) + τ
′
Z
′
+ δi + ρt + εi,t
(2.50)
lnyi,t = β0 +β1lnFKi,t +β2lnh
v
i,t +β3lnA
v
i,t +β5ln(A
v
i,t×FKi,t) + τ
′
Z
′
+ δi + ρt + εi,t
(2.51)
lnyi,t = β0+β1lnFKi,t+β2lnh
v
i,t+β3lnA
v
i,t+(Dummy
′×lnFKi,t)ζ+τ ′Z ′+δi+ρt+εi,t
(2.52)
where the Dummy
′
includes a set of dummy variables to group countries into dif-
ferent income groups: the middle and upper income developing countries MUDC,
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the lower-middle-income developing countries LMDC, the low-income developing
countries LDC, the least-developed countries LEADC and the developed countries
Developed. Note that in Eq. (2.52) we first run the regression with the Developed
dummy omitted, then we control for it but leave other dummies omitted to avoid
the multicollinearity issue.
2.3.4.2 Dynamic Panel of GMM Estimator
While OLS may present some useful initial insights, it does not address any endo-
geneity in the model. For instance, the measure of technology used in the early
literature may introduce potential endogeneity bias due to the fact that the initial
level of efficiency is not controlled for (Borensztein et al., 1998; Durham, 2004).
Although we control for the initial differences measured as the level of TFP and
human capital, such potential correlation between the lags might still lead biased
estimates (Doytch & Uctum, 2011). In addition, the potential reverse causality in
the FDI-Growth regression may exist (Coe, Helpman, & Hoffmaister, 1997). It thus
implies that OLS estimates may be biased, and all right-hand side variables may
correlate with the error term. To avoid these pitfalls, we apply the difference GMM
estimator. The advantage of using this approach is that the difference GMM has one
set of instruments to deal with the endogeneity along with the explanatory variables,
and one set to deal with the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and
the error term (Blundell & Bond, 1998; Doytch & Uctum, 2011).
Drawing on the above equations, we can rewrite the growth regression as follows:
lnyi,t = αlnyi,t−1+β1lnFKi,t+β2lnhvi,t+β3lnA
v
i,t+β4ln(h
v
i,t×FKi,t)+τ
′
Z
′
+δi+ρt+εi,t
(2.53)
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lnyi,t = αlnyi,t−1+β1lnFKi,t+β2lnhvi,t+β3lnA
v
i,t+β5ln(A
v
i,t×FKi,t)+τ
′
Z
′
+δi+ρt+εit
(2.54)
equations (2.53) and (2.54) are the growth equations that consist of a one-year
lagged of the dependent variable and an unobserved country-specific effect δi, the
error term εi,t, with respect to time t and country i. Arellano and Bond (1991)
propose transforming equations (2.53) and (2.54) into first differences to remove the
panel unobserved country-specific effect, the above equations can now be rewritten
as follows:
lnyi,t − lnyi,t−1 = α(lnyi,t−1 − lnyi,t−2) + β1(lnFKi,t − lnFKi,t−1) + β2(lnhvi,t − lnhvi,t−1)
+ β3(lnA
v
i,t − lnAvi,t−1) + β4[ln(hvit × FKit)− ln(hvi,t−1 × FKi,t−1)]
+ τ
′
(Zi.t − Zi,t−1) + εit − εi,t−1
(2.55)
lnyi,t − lnyi,t−1 = α(lnyi,t−1 − lnyi,t−2) + β1(lnFKi,t − lnFKi,t−1) + β2(lnhvi,t − lnhvi,t−1)
+ β3(lnA
v
i,t − lnAvi,t−1) + β5[ln(Avi,t × FKi,t)− ln(Avi,t−1 × FKi,t−1)]
+ τ
′
(Zi.t − Zi,t−1) + εi,t − εi,t−1
(2.56)
now the country-specific effect is eliminated from the equation. However, the first-
differencing introduces correlation between the differenced lagged-dependent vari-
able and the new error term. Note that the estimates are biased even when the set
of all explanatory variables are strictly exogenous (Easterly et al., 1997). We thereby
need an instrument that is correlated with the differenced lagged-dependent variable
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but not with the error term. With the assumption that εit are serially uncorrelated,
the lagged values of the dependent variable in lagged two periods or more are valid
instruments in the above equations. Therefore, for T ≥ 3, the model implies the
following linear moment restriction:
E[(εi,t − εi,t−1)lnyi,t−1] = 0, j = 2, ..., t− 1; t = 3, ..., T (2.57)
Now with the given reverse causality, an assumption that all explanatory variables
are strictly exogenous would lead to inconsistent estimates. Rather, we assume
that all right-hand variables are weakly exogenous. We, therefore, need another
set of instruments to mitigate the potential bias. Based upon equations (2.55) and
(2.56), all the right-hand side variables with lagged periods two or more are valid
instruments. Therefore, for T ≥ 3, the model implies the following linear moment
restrictions:
E[(εi,t − εi,t−1)Xi,t−1] = 0, j = 2, ..., t− 1; t = 3, ..., T (2.58)
where X refers to all right-hand side explanatory variables. Since we use all right-
hand side variables as the set of instruments, the issue of the reverse causation that
comes from FDI stock, the relative level of technology and human capital and other
factors are solved simultaneously.
However, there are some drawbacks with the difference GMM. First, the lagged
level instruments become weak instruments when the explanatory variables are per-
sistent over time. Second, the lagged instrument of the dependent variable becomes
a weak instrument when the dependent variable follows a random walk (Alonso-
Borrego & Arellano, 1999; Blundell & Bond, 1998). Therefore, we need two further
conditions, which are provided by Blundell and Bond (1998), to improve the esti-
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mated efficiency by processing the system GMM. The necessary conditions for the
system GMM are:
E[(lnyi,t−1 − lnyi,t−2)(δi − εi,t)] = 0 (2.59)
E[(Xi,t−1 −Xi,t−2)(δi − εi,t)] = 0 (2.60)
where δi is the unobserved country-specific effect with their differences; the above
conditions are necessary when the system GMM is employed as the econometric
method to overcome the shortcomings of difference GMM. Thus, we use the moment
conditions with instruments to process the system GMM (Blundell & Bond, 1998).
Note that the consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the set
of instruments, that is, the lagged value of GDP per capita, FDI and other right-
hand side variables in our growth specification. It implies the importance of the
test for the validity of the instruments. Therefore, the over-identifying restriction
will be presented in the tables of the regression results. The xtabond2 with gmm-
and iv-style is used in STATA 14.0 with one-step system GMM models Roodman
(2009).
2.3.4.3 Two-Stage Least Squares Fixed-Effect Instrumental Variable Es-
timation
As noted, the determinants of FDI are indirectly distorting the growth effects of FK
on y. While the system GMM estimator is appropriate to deal with the endogenous
bias, it may be more appropriate to use Two-Stage Least Squares Fixed-Effect Panel
Data Instrumental Variable approach since we have derived the equations which
show how FK and y are determined by hvit and A
v
it (see equations 2.41 and 2.43).
Hence only relying on lagged values of FK would not suffice since it is determined
by specific variables. Given that the system-GMM estimator is not available to
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account for the effect of predetermination of FDI, one way to evaluate this concern
is to instrument FDI accordingly to account for the bias. The regression is set up
as follows:
lnyit = β0 + β1 ˆlnFKit + β2lnh
v
it + β3lnA
v
it + τ
′
Z
′
+ δi + ρt + εit (2.61)
The estimation strategy follows the two-stage least squares process; first, we regress
dependent variable FK on its determinants suggested by Eq. (2.41):
lnFKit = pi0 + pi1lnh
v
it + pi2lnA
v
it + ϑ
′
C
′
+ γi + vit (2.62)
where C
′
is the set of other control variables that contain one- and two-year lagged
values of FK. The lagged values of FK are suggested as extra instruments by the
empirical literature, as FDI itself may be influenced by the process governing growth
rates and the reverse causality will raise both the flows and growth simultaneously,
which implies that including the lagged may mitigate the bias (Borensztein et al.,
1998; Durham, 2004; Iamsiraroj & Ulubas¸og˘lu, 2015). After estimating the first
stage, we extract the predicted value of ˆFK, as the instrument for FK. We then
process several tests to make sure the validity of the instrument, which will be
provided in the empirical analysis. We then use the predicted value as the instrument
of FK in the second-stage estimation. The estimation fits the model after sweeping
out the fixed-effects by removing the panel-level means from each variable. While
the assumption that the fixed-effects are correlated with the explanatory variables
is assumed, the Hausman test is used to detect whether the assumption is rational.
Finally, an overidentification test is performed in the regression models. The
overidentification test involves three steps: first, estimating the structural equation
by two-stage least squares estimator and obtaining the predicted residuals; second,
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 1977-2007
Variable Definition Mean SD Min Max Obs.
lny The GDP per capita, relative to the US in logarithm -1.827 1.478 -5.537 0.788 1,732
fdini The FDI stock, million US dollars$ 70,021 243,869 0.01 3,551,307 1,732
lnFK The number of intermediates between countries in logarithm 0.870 1.021 8.21e-07 5.215 1,732
Schoolings The average total educational attainment 7.231 2.690 0.65 12.86 1,732
Schoolingst The average tertiary educational attainment 0.326 0.271 0 1.49 1,732
lnhs The relative level of human capital in logarithm 0.476 0.095 0.271 0.693 1,732
lnhst The relative level of human capital in logarithm 0.648 0.013 0.624 0.695 1,732
lnAs The relative level of TFP in logarithm 0.854 0.593 0.025 3.095 1,732
lnAst The relative level of TFP in logarithm 0.745 0.579 0.017 2.959 1,732
lnFK × lnAs The interaction term of lnAs and lnFK 0.943 1.313 3.46e-07 6.307 1,732
lnFK × lnAst The interaction term of lnAst and lnFK 0.866 1.245 3.14e-07 6.066 1,732
lnFK × lnhs The interaction term of lnFK and lnhs 0.473 0.614 4.59e-07 3.615 1,732
lnFK × lnhst The interaction term of lnFK and lnhst 0.570 0.677 5.25e-07 3.615 1,732
Pop growth The population growth rates in level 1.072 3.796 -0.989 65.850 1,732
Gov/GDP The government expenditures measured in share of GDP 11.872 87.863 0.040 792.416 1,732
lnExchange The exchange rates in logarithm 1.436 3.611 -23.025 12.992 1,732
Invest/GDP The domestic investment rates measured in share of GDP 5.121 27.446 -0.0003 396.774 1,732
lntgdp The trade openness in logarithm 4.077 0.577 1.843 5.983 1,732
Developed The dummy 1 if developed country, 0 otherwise 0.333 0.471 0 1 1,732
MUDC The dummy 1 if MUDC, 0 otherwise 0.390 0.488 0 1 1,732
LMDC The dummy 1 if LMDC, 0 otherwise 0.109 0.312 0 1 1,732
LDC The dummy 1 if LDC, 0 otherwise 0.099 0.299 0 1 1,732
LEADC The dummy 1 if LEADC, 0 otherwise 0.066 0.249 0 1 1,732
Notes: lnFK is FDI stock divided by US capital stock. The average year of schooling is computed by using the educational attainment for the
population aged 15 and above. lnhs is constructed by using the average total schooling. lnhst is constructed by using the tertiary schooling. lnAs is
constructed using As formulation. lnAst is constructed using Ast formulation. Population aged 15-64 across 1977-2007. Government expenditures gov
include the expenditures in health and education services. domi is gross capital formation at a constant price. lnExchange is measured by 1 US dollar
with local currency (e.g., 1 US dollar to the Local Currency). lntgdp is measured as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services, measured
as the share of gross domestic product, the percentage of GDP.
by regressing the residual on all exogenous variables, we can obtain the R2; third,
under the null hypothesis that all instruments are uncorrelated with the residual,
we use nR2 ∼ χ2q, where q is the number of instrumental variables from outside
the model minus the total number of endogenous explanatory variables, to test the
hypothesis (Wooldridge, 2012, Ch15).
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Overview
We use data from the World Development Indicator (2016), World Bank National
Account Data, Penn World Table 6.3, Barro and Lee (2015), International Monetary
Fund (henceforth, IMF) Fiscal Affairs Department, Investment and Capital Stock
Dataset (2015), and United Nations Conference on Trade And Development (hence-
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forth, UNCTAD). The dataset we construct contains 67 countries and is organized
over the period 1977 to 2007. The selection of countries and time periods is based
entirely on data availability. Since some variables are unavailable for some countries
in the period, we can only construct an unbalanced panel dataset with a time-period
gap. The number of observations is reduced by deleting those with missing values,
giving a total of 1,732 observations. Our primary interest is in the estimation of the
effect of FDI on the relative level of GDP per capita and how this effect varies with
respect to the relative level of technology and human capital in each country and
each year. Our secondary interest is in identifying the endogeneity of FDI on the
relative level of GDP per capita, a channel through the influence of human capital
and technology on FDI and a channel through which the effect of FDI is passed onto
GDP per capita in relative terms.
2.4.2 GDP, FDI, Human Capital and Technology
The relative level of GDP per capita, which is the dependent variable throughout
the analysis, is measured as GDP per capita (in constant 2010 US dollars) in the
US and across other countries. This variable is measured by the GDP divided by
midyear population, where GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of the gross values
added by all resident producers in the economy. We collect this data from the World
Bank National Accounts dataset.
Our measure of FDI is the FDI stock relative to US capital stock, described in
Section 2.3.3, Eq. (2.48). First, the FDI stock variable is from UNCTAD STAT7
measured in US dollars at current prices in millions. Although there are several
sources for data on FDI, it is important to use data on FDI stock rather than flow.
The FDI stock measures the total level of direct investment at a given point in time
7Access to UNCTAD STAT: https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/dimView.aspx.
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and is the value of foreign investors’ equity in net loans to enterprises operating
in the reporting economy. Our model focuses on the diffusion of technology from
leading economies to followers, which involves costs of imitation and adaptation, and
these costs are assumed to be influenced by the pool of uncopied ideas (technologies);
therefore, we prefer using the FDI stock.
Second, in order to construct the variable FK, which represents N2/N1, FDI
stock is divided by the US capital stock. Data on the US capital stock and the
capital stock across countries and time are from IMF Investment and Capital Stock
Dataset (2015), which provides comprehensive data on public investment and capital
stock (i.e., general government), private investment and capital stock, as well as
investment and capital stock arising from public-private partnerships, across the
Fund member countries through the period 1960-20138.
Data on human capital, such as the average total educational attainment and
average tertiary educational attainment rates, are drawn from Barro and Lee (2015).
While early studies normally used enrolment ratios or literacy rates as the measure
of the level of human capital, these data do not measure the aggregate stock of
human capital available contemporaneously as an input to production adequately
(Barro & Lee, 2013). Therefore, we use data on educational attainment only.
Turning to the technology variable, we construct a relative level of technology
between the leader (the US) and follower (developing countries) based on equations
(2.45) and (2.46). In doing so, we use data from Barro and Lee (2015) and the
IMF Investment and Capital Stock Dataset (2015) to construct variables for human
capital and FDI, respectively, and to construct a relative level of TFP between the
8The accompanying Document “Estimating Public, Private, and PPP Cap-
ital Stocks” http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/publicinvestment/data/info.pdf
to the IMF Board Paper “Making Public Investment More Efficient”
(http://www.imf.org/external/pp/longres.aspx?id=4959) describes in great detail the series’
definitions, the investment series’ data sources, as well as the methodology in constructing the
stock series. The methodology follows the standard perpetual inventory equation and builds
largely on Kamps (2006) and Gupta, Kangur, Papageorgiou, and Wane (2014).
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leader and follower countries, which is presented as A2/A1. The data show that
the mean values are 0.854 and 0.745 for the TFP (denoted as lnAs in Table 2.1)
when it is calculated via the average total schooling and the tertiary educational
attainment, respectively (denoted as lnAst in Table 2.1). The statistics are close to
B. Xu (2000), where the TFP is calculated by using the host country TFP divided
by the US TFP and the mean is reported to be around 0.720, with 0.110 as the
standard deviation.
2.4.3 Other Control Variables
The control variables for our empirical model are guided by the voluminous growth
regression literature. National Account data, including government consumption,
growth rate of the population, and domestic investment are taken from Penn World
Table 6.39, which has been long been used in several cross-country studies, e.g.,
Edwards (1992), Blomstrom et al. (1994), Fischer (1993) and Campos and Kinoshita
(2002). First, as the previous empirical studies find the effect of government expen-
ditures on macroeconomic stabilization on growth (Barro & Sala-i Martin, 1997;
Borensztein et al., 1998; Makki & Somwaru, 2004), we include this variable in our
model. Government consumption is measured by the sum of government expendi-
tures in education and health service at a constant price. We divide it by the GDP
to control for its dependence on the size of the country. Second, while early studies
generally find a negative effect of the growth rate of a population, Jones and Voll-
rath (2013) remark that the estimated coefficient of the population growth rate in
the growth regression should be positive, as an increase in the population increases
the number of people engage in research activities, meaning that technological im-
provement is associated with the growth rate of a population. The variable for the
9Data can be accessed from National Accounts for PWT 6.3:
https://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/pwt.html
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population growth rate, which is the average growth rate for the period based on
the population aged above 15, is therefore controlled for in the model. Third, it
is argued that the positive correlation between FDI, domestic investment market,
and subsequent growth may be one of the few consistent results to have emerged
(Easterly et al., 1997; Borensztein et al., 1998; Makki & Somwaru, 2004; Alfaro
et al., 2004); therefore, we control for the domestic investment rate measured as
relative level of gross domestic investment divided by GDP in the follower countries
to that of the leader country (the US).
Lastly, trade openness and exchange rate are included. The measure of the
former is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services, while the latter is
measured as a ratio of US dollars to the local currency. As Iamsiraroj and Ulubas¸og˘lu
(2015) suggest that these two variables are expected to be correlated with FDI, GDP
per capita and other macroeconomic variables, we include both in our model to avoid
potential bias. Both data are drawn from the World Development Indicator (2016).
Table 2.1 provides information on all variables employed in our model.
Note that since there are 21 developed countries and 46 developing countries in
the dataset, the income differences that may potentially matter for the relationship
between FDI and GDP per capita may need to be considered in the analysis. There-
fore, we divide countries into different income groups by using the dummy variables.
To group the dummies properly, we follow The World Bank (2011)’s Development
Indicator Report and use the following groups: the middle- and upper-income devel-
oping countries MUDC, the lower-middle-income developing countries LMDC, the
low- income developing countries LDC and the least-developed countries LEADC.
The developed dummy is equal to 1 if the country is developed and 0 otherwise.
Table 2.2 lists all the countries in our dataset.
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Table 2.2: The List of Countries 1977-2007
Developing Country Developed Country
Argentina Malaysia Austria
Barbados Mauritius Belgium
Benin* Mexico Canada
Bolivia*** Morocco** Denmark
Brazil Mozambique* Finland
Bulgaria Venezuela France
Cambodia* Korea Germany
Cameroon*** Kenya Greece
Cote d’lvoire*** Trinidad and Tobago Hong Kong
Colombia Niger* Ireland
Chile Panama Italy
China Paraguay** Japan
Costa Rica Peru Luxembourg
Dominican Republic Philippines*** Netherlands
Ecuador Poland Norway
Egypt** Romania Portugal
El Salvador** Russia Spain
Fiji** Senegal* Sweden
Ghana*** Tunisia** Switzerland
Honduras*** Sri Lanka** United Kingdom
India*** South Africa United States
Indonesia** Iraq
Iran Zimbabwe
Least Developed Countries (LEADC) 7
Middle- and Upper-Income Developing Countries (MUDC) 22
Lower Middle-Income Developing Countries (LMDC) 12
Low Income Developing Countries (LDC) 5
Total Developing Countries 46
Total Developed Countries 21
Total Countries 67
Notes: *** refers that the country is assigned as the least developed country; ** refers that the country is assigned as the
lower-middle income developing country; * refers that the country is assigned as the lower income developing country.
2.5 Results
We now turn to the regression analysis based on the baseline specification (2.49)
to test our model predictions against the data. We first estimate the effect of FDI
on the relative level of GDP per capita based on the theoretical model (2.43), and
then we rely on Eq. (2.41) to overcome FDI’s endogeneity. We will further test
whether the effect of FDI on the relative level of GDP per capita differs when the
interaction terms with human capital, technology, and income groups are included in
the extended model. As it is informative to examine how the results differ from the
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estimations, the regressions are done by using OLS, fixed-effects and random-effects
for the first part of the empirical analysis, while instrumental variable analysis with
fixed-effects and system-GMM estimators are employed throughout the second part
of the analysis.
2.5.1 Baseline Specification
2.5.1.1 The General Growth Effect of FDI
The analysis starts by estimating empirical specification (2.49) (based on theoreti-
cal model 2.43), where the interaction terms are not yet included in the regression
models. The results are presented in Table 2.3. We have tried two different speci-
fications, where we use average total schooling with estimated results presented in
Columns 1, 3 and 5 and the average tertiary schooling with results presented in
Columns 2, 4 and 6 to construct the relative levels of human capital (hs and hst)
and relative levels of technology (As and Ast), respectively.
For the sample of 67 countries, it is clear that FDI is significant. The results from
columns (1) to (2) indicate that FDI (or N2/N1) enters significantly with positive
coefficients and is statistically significant at the 1% significance level, whilst the
relative level of technology and human capital also enter the model significantly at
the 1% significance level with a priori expected signs. The estimated coefficients of
FDI provided in columns (1) and (2) suggest that FDI has an unambiguously positive
sign when estimating the relative level of GDP per capita, which is in line with our
model prediction and confirms the hypothesis listed in Section 2.3.2. The estimated
coefficients imply that a 1% increase in lnFK increases the relative level of GDP
per capita by 0.074% in column (1) and 0.086% in column (2). The relative levels of
the technology variables lnAs and lnAst in columns (1) and (2) are 1.790 and 1.827,
which indicate that a 1% increase in the relative level of technology will increase the
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Table 2.3: The Impact of FDI on Growth 1977-2007: The General Effects
OLS Fixed-Effect Random-Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnFK 0.074*** 0.086*** 0.074*** 0.086*** 0.075*** 0.086***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
lnAss 1.790*** 1.790*** 1.790***
(0.051) (0.041) (0.041)
lnAst 1.827*** 1.827*** 1.827***
(0.062) (0.052) (0.052)
lnhs 1.897*** 1.897*** 1.897***
(0.142) (0.149) (0.149)
lnhst 0.535 0.535 0.535
(0.979) (0.794) (0.793)
Other Controls
Pop growth 0.0005 0.0007 0.0005 0.0007 0.0004 0.0007
(0.0008) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Invest/GDP -0.00005 0.0003 -0.00004 0.0003 -0.00004 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.00014) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Gov/GDP -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
lntgdp 0.096*** 0.129*** 0.096*** 0.129*** 0.096*** 0.129***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
lnExchange -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009* -0.009***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Hausman 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-square 0.9960 0.9955 0.6764 0.6142 0.6764 0.6142
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,732 1,732 1,732 1,732 1,732 1,732
Notes: Hausman test provides probability > χ2 to test the null hypothesis that the difference in
coefficients is not systematic. We reject the null if the probability is less than 5%, which suggests
the favour of the fixed-effect model. Country fixed-effect, year fixed-effect are controlled for in all
specifications. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses except for columns (3) and (4). *,
** and *** indicate the level of statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
relative level of GDP per capita by 1.790% and 1.827%, respectively. The human
capital variables lnhs and lnhst are confirmed to be positively associated with lny,
where lnhs is statistically significant at the 1% significance level, whereas lnhst is
insignificant. This indicates that the higher the relative level of human capital, the
more knowledge is transferred into the follower countries. The results suggest that
a 1% increase in the relative level of human capital (measured by lnhs) increases
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the relative level of GDP per capita by 1.897%. The signs of other control variables,
which are included to strengthen our model’s robustness, are just as expected. The
results are preliminarily consistent with our model predictions.
Next, we subject the current results to the fixed-effects bias. We turn to the al-
ternative approaches using the fixed-effect and random-effect estimators. Columns
(3) to (6) show that the results do not vary across specifications regarding the esti-
mated coefficients and signs, as they are similar to the results presented in columns
(1) and (2). Overall, we find that the elasticity of lny with respect to lnFK remains
positive and significant at the 1% significance level; from the mean, an increase of
10% in lnFK is associated with a minimum 0.74% and a maximum 0.86% percent
increase in the relative level of GDP per capita. The other two variables of interest -
the relative level of human capital and technology - are also confirmed as statistically
significant with unambiguously positive signs throughout the specifications.
The baseline results imply that our model fits well with the data, preliminar-
ily supporting the hypothesises that FDI, human capital and technology in rela-
tive terms are complementary with respect to enhancing the process of technology
transfer increasing the rate of return in the follower countries. However, we must
exercise caution when interpreting the effect obtained thus far. By ignoring the pre-
determinants (i.e., endogeneity) of FDI (N2/N1) predicted in Eq. (2.41), we may not
be able to determine whether the model captures the effect of FDI in transferring
knowledge from the adaptation of multinational firms’ efforts in the follower coun-
tries precisely or whether this is an independent effect of FDI. Recall Eq. (2.41),
where the variable N2/N1, which is captured by FK, is suggested to be predeter-
mined by the factors A2/A1 and h2/h1. To further investigate this issue, we apply
2SLS with fixed-effect instrumental variable estimation and the system-GMM in the
next section.
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Table 2.4: The Endogenous FDI: IV Estimation.
2SLS IV1 2SLS IV2 FE IV1 FE IV2 RE IV1 RE IV2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First stage
lnAs on lnFK 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.155***
(0.052) (0.044) (0.044)
lnAst on lnFK 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.114***
(0.055) (0.050) (0.050)
lnhs on lnFK 0.470*** 0.469*** 0.469***
(0.210) (0.158) (0.158)
lnhst on lnFK 3.130*** 3.130*** 3.130***
(0.766) (0.747) (0.747)
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overidentification(nR2) 3.855 2.759
Time-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600
Notes: The dependent variable is lnFK. All regressions control for the year and country fixed effects. IVs are
different in terms of lnAs, lnAst, lnhs and lnhst. The observations are reduced by the lagged lnFK variables.
Robust standard error in the parentheses in columns (1) and (2). *** indicate the level of statistical significance
at the 1% level.
2.5.1.2 The Endogenous FK
We now investigate the pre-determinants of FDI (N2/N1) by using instruments. In
what follows, we employ 2SLS, two-stage least squares with fixed-effects (2SLSFE),
and two-stage least squares with random-effects instrumental variable estimators.
Since the idea of applying rational instruments is based on Eq. (2.41), we first run
the FDI (N2/N1) regression, which regresses lnFK on the relative level of coun-
try’s abilities (Av2/A
v
1 and h
v
2/h
v
1) and the lagged values of lnFK and extracts the
predicted value of FDI as a valid instrument. The instrument should satisfy the
validity requirement; it should be correlated with FDI (relevant condition) but un-
correlated with the error term of the GDP equation (exogeneity condition). The
relevant condition can be examined via the estimated results of the first stage in the
2SLS analysis, yet the exogeneity condition is unfortunately not examinable. Nev-
ertheless, since the predicted value of FK rules out the potential pre-determination
of FDI, it is believed to be uncorrelated with other potential biases, which implies
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Table 2.5: The Impact of FDI on Growth 1977-2007: Taking Endogeneity into
Account
2SLS 2SLS Fixed-Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnFK 0.080*** 0.091*** 0.080*** 0.091***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009)
lnAs 1.776*** 1.776***
(0.054) (0.043))
lnAst 1.785*** 1.785***
(0.062) (0.054)
lnhs 1.672*** 1.672***
(0.147) (0.155)
lnhst 0.328*** 0.328***
(0.980) (0.812)
other controls
Pop growth 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Invest/GDP -6.61e-06 0.0002 -6.61e-06 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Gov/GDP -0.00007 0.0001 -0.00007 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
lntgdp 0.092*** 0.126*** 0.092*** 0.126***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
lnExchange -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600
Notes: Robust standard error in parentheses except for columns (1),
(2). *, ** and *** indicate the level of statistical significance at 10%,
5% and 1%, respectively.
the satisfaction of the exogeneity condition. For the relevant condition, the first-
stage regression results are provided in Table 2.4, where the relevant condition of
the two instruments is satisfied by the significant association between lnFK, lnAv
and lnhv as well as the large F statistics in the first-stage regressions. Therefore, we
can reject the hypothesis of a weak instrument at the 5% significance level. For the
above reasons, we believe that our instruments are valid.
Now, before we move on to estimate the second-stage regression, for comparison
purposes, we first highlight the results obtained by using the one-step system-GMM
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estimator. The results are provided in columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.8 in the
Appendix. In terms of the growth effect of FDI, we observe that the estimated
coefficient of lnFK is reported to be ambiguous and insignificant. However, we
find that the relative level of technology is confirmed as statistically significant with
a clear sign. Yet the relative level of human capital is only confirmed as positive
and statistically significant in column (1), and its estimated coefficient changes from
positive to negative in column (2), although it is insignificant. These results have
some implications. First, while GMM can generate prolific instruments, the results
reveal that the system-GMM estimator may be less efficient, as it treats all the right-
hand side variables as endogenous and uses the lagged terms across all right-hand
side variable as their own instruments. Second and perhaps more technically, as
Roodman (2009) highlights that instrument proliferation in system-GMM can over-
fit endogenous variables and fail to expunge their endogenous components, which
weakens the power of the Hansen test and a perfect Hansen statistic of 1.000 may
be a telltale sign, the results provided in columns (1) and (2) show that the Hansen
J statistic is just 1.000 and so we view the results provided by the system-GMM
as potentially biased. Thirdly, while the system-GMM can generate prolific instru-
ments, it seems to underestimate the impact of FDI on GDP per capita because it
does not properly take into account the endogeneity of FDI. Lastly, but not least,
as remarked by Roodman (2009), GMM estimation performs well only when the
analysis is based on a “small T and large N” panel. If T is large, dynamic panel
bias become insignificant, and a fixed effect estimator would perform better. Since
the samples used here are of the “long T, but not large N” variety, the results may
be potentially biased. The above arguments seem to be sufficient grounds for not
focusing on the results provided by the GMM estimator.
Next, we estimate the second-stage regression by using 2SLS and 2SLSFE esti-
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mators. The results are provided in Table 2.5. From columns (1) to (4), we find
that the estimated coefficients of lnFK remain positive and statistically significant
at the 1% significance level throughout. It means that a 1% increase in lnFK will
generate either a 0.080% or 0.091% increase in lny. The mechanism for generating
positive effects from FDI can be described as follows. The high level of country’s
abilities encourages multinational firms to adapt their intermediates with low adap-
tation costs in the follower economies. The high level of country’s abilities thus
helps attract more multinational firms and makes the follower benefit more from
FDI. The estimated results are robust to the heterogeneity, and the country and
time fixed effects are all controlled for.
Overall, the above results are to be expected given that we estimate our model
based on the relative level of GDP per capita using Eq. (2.43), where we use the
relative level of technology and human capital based on Eq. (2.41) to overcome
the endogeneity bias (the pre-determinants of FDI). It is clear that failing to ac-
count for the endogeneity of FDI leads to an underestimation of the gains from FDI
(from 0.074 to 0.080 and from 0.086 to 0.091, respectively). The results provided in
columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.8 in the Appendix support this concept empirically
- the estimated coefficient provided by the GMM estimator is twenty times (or even
more than twenty times) lower than the one provided by the two-stage instrumental
approach (in absolute value, from 0.004 to 0.080). In a nutshell, it suggests that the
general regression that has been used in the early empirical growth regressions might
potentially underestimate the benefit from FDI. In addition, given the instrumental
estimates, all interested variables are identified as significant and positively associ-
ated with the relative level of GDP per capita between the US and follower countries,
which implies that our theoretical framework fits the data well and provides new
and interesting results.
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2.5.2 Robustness Checks
The effect of FDI on the host country may be investigated further in another sce-
nario. We explore whether the results found in the preceding section hold when
the interaction terms between lnFK and the relative level of human capital and
technology and the interaction terms among the country groups are included, while
examining whether there is a “conditional effect” of FDI, i.e., the importance a cer-
tain level of development as a prerequisite for the growth effect of FDI (Borensztein
et al., 1998; Hermes & Lensink, 2003). In doing so, we focus on the 2SLSFE instru-
mental estimator and the one-step system-GMM estimator to estimate the impact
of FDI on the relative level of GDP per capita. The estimation strategy involves
including one interaction at a time in order to avoid the multicollinearity problem.
2.5.2.1 The Role of Countries’ Abilities
We now turn to investigate whether the relative levels of human capital, technol-
ogy and FDI reinforce each other to determine the rate of return in the follower
economies. The results are presented in Table 2.6.
Apart from the main concern of the growth effect of FDI, the coefficients of the
interaction terms between the FDI, the relative level of technology and human capi-
tal are all estimated as statistically significant from columns (1) to (4) in Table 2.6,
regardless of which interaction term is included. Columns (1) and (2) in the table
correspond to the differential effect of receiving FDI on GDP for the change in the
relative level of technology. The elasticity of lny with respect to lnFK, which enters
interactively with the relative level of technology, is negative and statistically signifi-
cant at 1% significance level. The estimation of lnAs× lnFK and the lnAst× lnFK
suggest that the effect of the change in lnFK on lny depends negatively on the
change in the relative level of technology. Column (1) indicates that receiving for-
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Table 2.6: Robustness Check: The Interaction between FDI and Countries’ Abilities
1977-2007
2SLS Fixed-Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnFK 0.214*** 0.234*** 0.563*** 3.626**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.061) (1.673)
lnAs 1.924*** 1.835***
(0.040) (0.042)
lnAst 2.000*** 1.748***
(0.050) (0.056)
lnhs 1.363*** 2.130***
(0.143) (0.159)
lnhst 2.076*** 10.063***
(0.735) (4.527)
lnFK × lnAs -0.142***
(0.008)
lnFK × lnAst -0.170***
(0.009)
lnFK × lnhs -0.827***
(0.101)
lnFK × lnhst -5.431**
(2.564)
other controls
Population -0.0001 -0.00001 0.0001 0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006))
Invest/GDP -0.0001 0.00002 -0.0002 -0.00002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00006)
Gov/GDP 0.00008 0.0002 0.0003 0.00003
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
lntgdp 0.049*** 0.080*** 0.073*** 0.113***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015)
lnExchange -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Time-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.7218 0.6779 0.6898 0.6131
Pro > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate the level of statistical significance at 10%,
5% and 1%, respectively.
eign capital decreases the growth effects of technology in the follower countries by
0.13410%, which implies intuitively that the adaptations in the follower nations by
10As the sample mean of lnAs × lnFK is 0.943, the differential effect of lnAs × lnFK on lny is
0.943× 0.142 = 0.133906.
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the multinational firms will become more difficult, as the unadopted subset of the
intermediates (technologies) from the leader country is limited, and multinational
firms are assumed to adopt the goods from the easiest to the toughest. We also
find that the absence of FDI reduces the growth effect on GDP per capita by 0.147
(0.866× 0.170)%, since the mean of lnAst× lnFK is 0.866, and its estimated coeffi-
cient is confirmed to be -0.170 at the 1% significance level. In terms of the differential
effect of receiving FDI on GDP for the change in the relative level of human capital,
we find negative and statistically significant estimates in columns (3) and (4). The
negative coefficient of lnhs× lnFK indicates that the growth effect of lnFK would
be reduced by an increase in the level of human capital in the follower countries.
This result holds when lnhst × lnFK is controlled for.
The estimated coefficients of FDI, the relative level of human capital and tech-
nology and other core explanatory variables are reported in the table in columns (1)
to (4) for the 2SLS IV fixed-effect estimator. The elasticity of lny with respect to
lnFK is confirmed as positive and significant at the 1% and 5% significance levels
with clear signs throughout the columns. The results are not affected by the interac-
tions, meaning that the effect of lnFK on lny is indeed positive and not necessarily
dependent on other conditions. The variables lnAs and Ast are estimated as positive
and significant throughout; the positive coefficient for the level of technology implies
that a high level of technology would help the follower reduce the gap in GDP per
capita compared to the leader nation. The results provided in columns (3)-(6) in
Table 2.8 in the Appendix are estimated using system-GMM. Although some of the
interesting variables are identified as statistically significant, the results vary with
the specifications, especially the significance of the effect of FDI on GDP per capita
which disappears in the last column of the table.
In short, the results suggest that while the positive effect from FDI on the relative
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level of GDP per capita does not necessarily depend on the “certain conditions”,
which is usually suggested by the empirical literature (e.g., Borensztein et al., 1998,
B. Xu, 2000), the increasing levels of human capital and technology would limit the
follower countries’ abilities to benefit further from FDI. It may reflect the fact that
once a certain level of development has been reached in the follower countries in
the “South”, they may start investing in innovation activities rather than simply
relying on technology transfers through FDI carried out by the multinational firms
from the leader country.
On the one hand, the existing studies highlight the threshold values for which
the growth effects of FDI can occur. Focusing on developing countries, Borensztein
et al. (1998) find that only the countries (46 out of the 69 developing countries)
with secondary school attainment above 0.52 can benefit from FDI’s growth effects.
B. Xu (2000), by using cross countries manufacturing data, also finds that only the
countries with a threshold level of human capital above 2.3 can benefit from FDI’s
growth effects. Others suggest that the effect of FDI on growth is contingent on
the interaction between human capital, access to foreign financing (Cohen, 1994)
and the interaction between secondary school enrolment and machinery imports
(Romer, 1993). Although our findings are contrary to some previous studies, we
focus on a different intuition by using different measures with a different dataset
across different countries; thus, our results may not be completely comparable with
others and the results from the interaction terms in our model are only based on
the 64 countries. Also note that the negative effects from the interaction terms in
our model might differ across countries, as it is likely that the countries with a low-
income level might experience less negative effects from the interaction terms. This
is because they might still rely on the adaptation activities carried out by the firms
from the leading nations in order to absorb technologies and benefit from FDI. On
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the other hand, our findings can be supported by the studies Hermes and Lensink
(2003), Alfaro et al. (2004) and Durham (2004), who find the interaction between
FDI and schooling (or education rate) to be statistically insignificant, which might
give support to the view that the interaction terms between the relative level of
technology, human capital and FDI should be of concern other than the threshold
values of the host country. Another possible explanation is that above-mentioned
studies do not take into account the endogeneity correctly by instrumenting FDI
using the human capital and technology variables.
2.5.2.2 Country-Specific Characteristics
With the results of the positive effects of FDI on the relative level of GDP per capita
confirmed, we now subject these findings to the unobservable country-specific char-
acteristics, as our data contains 67 countries with different income levels throughout.
To detect it, the dummies of Developed, MUDC, LMDC, LDC and LEADC, that
equal one for developed, middle, upper- income, lower-middle-income, low-income
and least-developed economies and zero otherwise are generated. Table 2.7 shows the
regression results. Columns (1) to (4) provide the estimates when the dummies are
included by using 2SLSFE with the instrumental variable estimator, while columns
(7) to (10) in Table 2.8 in the Appendix provide the results by using system-GMM.
The overall results are very close to the ones presented previously, which implies
that the growth effect of FDI is identical and consistent with our model predictions.
To be specific, when the groups of developing countries are controlled for, the esti-
mated coefficients for the elasticity of lny with respect to FDI remain significant at
1% and 5% significance levels with estimated coefficients from 0.038 in column (2)
to 0.223 in column (4). The interaction terms are generally confirmed to be statis-
tically significant regardless of the specification estimated. Turning to the results
when the developed dummy is controlled for, we repeat our regression of columns
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Table 2.7: Robustness Check: Country-Specific Characteristic 1977-2007
2SLS Fixed-Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnFK 0.045** 0.038*** 0.203*** 0.223***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
lnAs 1.730*** 1.773***
(0.038) (0.040)
lnAst 1.718*** 1.770***
(0.047) (0.050)
lnhs 1.661*** 1.341***
(0.141) (0.147)
lnhst 3.473*** 2.571***
(0.723) (0.760)
lnFK × MUDC 0.163*** 0.190***
(0.010) (0.011)
lnFK × LMDC 0.236*** 0.355***
(0.045) (0.048)
lnFK × LDC 0.128*** 0.202***
(0.030) (0.032)
lnFK × LEADC 3.947*** 4.287***
(0.274) (0.292)
lnFK × Developed -0.173** -0.200***
(0.011) (0.012)
Population 0.0001 0.0002 0.00006 0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Invest/GDP -0.0001 4.83e-06 -0.0002 -0.00001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Gov/GDP 0.0003 0.0005* 0.0004 0.0005
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
lntgdp 0.045*** 0.072*** 0.062** 0.093***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
lnExchange -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Time-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.7428 0.7021 0.7095 0.6614
Observations 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate the level of statistical significance at 10%, 5% and
1%, respectively.
(1) and (2) after dropping off the developing dummies with lnFK but adding the
interaction between the developed dummy and lnFK in the model. The results
are provided in columns (3) and (4), which show highly similar results compared
with the previous findings on the estimated coefficients of FDI, the relative level of
human capital, the relative level of technology as well as other control variables.
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In terms of the differential effect of lny with respect to the interaction of develop-
ing nation dummies, see columns (1) to (2), the coefficients of differential elasticities
are significant regardless of whether lnhv and lnAv are included. While the differen-
tial effect of lny with respect to lnFK, which enters interactively with a developed
dummy, is confirmed to be negative and significant. If we concentrate on the es-
timates in which the interaction of the developed dummy and FDI is included, we
can observe that the growth effect of FDI on GDP per capita is decreasing with
increasing income level, from an estimated coefficient of -0.173 in column (3) to
-0.200 in column (4). On the other hand, if we focus on the estimates for which
the interaction of developing dummies and FDI are controlled for, it is clear that
the positive effect of FDI is the strongest in the least-developed economies, with
estimated an coefficient of 3.947 at the 1% significance level, and it is the weakest
in the middle and upper developing countries, with an estimated coefficient of 0.163
at the 1% significance level. These results imply that the less-developed economies
would benefit more from the innovation activities carried out by the firms from the
leader country and the adaptation activities carried out by the firms in the follower
economies.
In the following regressions, we repeat the regressions in columns (1) to (4)
by using the system-GMM and provide the results in columns (7) to (10) in Ta-
ble 2.8 in the Appendix. Regressions in columns (7), (8), (9) and (10) show that
system-GMM estimation yields qualitatively different results compared to those ob-
tained via 2SLSFE instrumental variable estimation. The estimated coefficients for
FDI are significantly positive in the last two columns, but negatively significant in
columns (7) and (8). While the relative level of technology is positive and significant
throughout the columns, the estimated coefficients of human capital are identified
as positively significant in columns (7), (8) and (10) but insignificant in column
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(9). We also carried out the Hansen J statistics and, unfortunately, the results re-
main problematic, as perfect Hansen J 1.000s are found throughout the regressions.
Again, in this case, we are more confident with the estimated results provided by
2SLSFE.
2.6 Conclusion
FDI has long been considered an important channel for transferring technologies
and promoting economic development in developing countries. Researchers have
attempted to establish conclusive evidence showing that FDI contributes positively
to the development of a country, yet existing studies that apply growth empirics
with FDI generally find less significant or even a negative effect of FDI in growth re-
gression. This study explores, theoretically and empirically, the connection between
FDI and economic growth. Unlike the previous literature, we focus on the effects of
a country’s initial relative efficiency on the effects of FDI on economic growth. Our
findings make two major contributions to the literature.
First, the results show a significant and positive association between FDI and the
relative level of GDP per capita, which confirms that the growth effects of FDI take
place in the host-country economy. The existence of this relationship suggests that
FDI contributes to GDP per capita and is indeed an important factor in economic
development. While the direct elasticity of GDP per capita to FDI implies that the
growth effect of FDI does not necessarily depend upon other growth determinants, it
will be smaller if the relative efficiency of a particular country is smaller. Second, the
results suggest that the relative level of countries’ abilities is important in the FDI-
growth regression. The relative level of countries’ abilities is identified as positive
and significant in the model, which implies that most studies to date have ignored
its crucial impacts on growth. Therefore, our model provides a way to address the
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endogeneity of FDI in the growth regression properly.
The results presented in this chapter have some clear and important implications
for both policymakers and researchers. First, policymakers should endeavour to
accelerate their country’s economy by attracting FDI because doing so is one of the
best ways for a country to develop. FDI can bring in advanced knowledge from the
world-leading nations, which is the catalyst for knowledge improvement. Therefore,
the FDI recipient economies gain not only the growth effects but also an endogenous
growth effect from FDI. Second, researchers should be aware of the endogenous
determination of FDI, which may not be addressed properly by the system-GMM
estimator. Modelling the endogenous determination of FDI may be a good way to
mitigate the bias in order to estimate the growth effect of FDI accurately.
The above results lend support to those who, early in the growth-FDI empir-
ics, stressed the importance of FDI for the developing or the transition countries
(Campos & Kinoshita, 2002; C. Wang et al., 2004; Li & Liu, 2005; Iamsiraroj,
2016). Although, more recently, the ambiguous role of foreign capital on a country’s
economy has been discussed intensively, it seems that it is hard to identify the con-
tribution of FDI without an original theoretical framework. At the same time, the
above results also warrant the stress put on the econometric strategy with respect
to the endogeneity of FDI on growth. Given the limited success in identifying the
growth effect of FDI empirically so far, it may also be interesting to extend our
theoretical framework to modelling the concept of a country’s innovation and adap-
tation behaviour. As the instruments and an appropriate estimator may admittedly
be demanding, more theoretical work in this area could also be done.
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2.7 Appendix: Proof of Equation 2.41
As Eq. (40) shows that
pi1 + pi2
η1 + d2
=
pi1
η1
(2.63)
which can be simplified as follows:
(η1 + d2)pi1 = η1(pi1 + pi2)
η1 + d2 =
η1(pi1 + pi2)
pi1
d2 =
η1(pi1 + pi2)
pi1
− η1
(2.64)
hence
d2 = (
N2
N1
)σ(
A1
A2
)δ(
H1
H2
)β =
η1(pi1 + pi2)
pi1
− η1
N2
N1
∗ = [η1(
A2
A1
)
1+δ−αδ
1−α (
H2
H1
)1+β]
1
σ
(2.65)
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2.8 Appendix: One-step system-GMM
Table 2.8: One-step system-GMM 1977-2007
One-Step System-GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
lnFK -0.004 0.00008 0.025** 0.027** 0.085** 0.039 -0.011* -0.012* 0.036*** 0.032***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.010) (0.028) (0.147) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
lnAs 0.405*** 0.464*** 0.449*** 0.502*** 0.475***
(0.093) (0.095) (0.091) (0.101) (0.094)
lnAst 0.361*** 0.435*** 0.363*** 0.451*** 0.425***
(0.080) (0.098) (0.078) (0.096) (0.089)
lnhs 0.295* 0.238 0.383*** 0.301** 0.137
(0.155) (0.185) (0.161) (0.140) (0.175)
lnhst -0.582 -0.056 -0.448 0.431** 0.113**
(0.760) (0.658) (0.862) (0.677) (0.716)
lnFK × lnAs -0.027***
(0.009)
lnFK × lnAst -0.030***
(0.009)
lnFK × lnhs -0.144***
(0.043)
lnFK × lnhst -0.060
(0.226)
lnFK × MUDC 0.057*** 0.055***
(0.013) (0.012)
lnFK × LMDC 0.061 0.075*
(0.044) (0.043)
lnFK × LDC 0.009 0.020
0.039) (0.037)
lnFK × LEADC 0.880*** 0.917***
0.212) (0.221)
lnFK × Developed -0.050*** -0.046***
(0.011) (0.002)
Population -0.00008 -0.00009 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00007 -0.00009 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.010)
Invest/GDP -6.35e-06 0.00006 -0.00001 0.00001 -0.00007 0.00005 -0.00001 0.00002 0.026*** 9.17e-06
(0.00006) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.005) (0.00008) (0.00005) (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00007)
Gov/GDP 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0004** 0.0003***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.0002) (0.0001)
lntgdp 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.043***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
lnExchange 0.001 0.001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003 0.001 -0.003 -.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
lnlagy 0.860*** 0.888*** 0.835*** 0.861*** 0.845*** 0.887*** 0.798*** 0.829*** 0.824*** 0.855***
(0.040) (0.032) (0.034) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.036) (0.033) (0.031) (0.028)
Time-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(2) 0.102 0.100 0.120 0.112 0.111 0.100 0.172 0.153 0.146 0.127
Hansen J-test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Observations 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,526 1,526
Notes: Instruments used for system-GMM are all right-hand side variables with robust to heteroskedasticity and series correlation in errors. Hansen J-test is the
test that detects the validity of instruments applied here. The null hypothesis of AR (2) is the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation.
The null hypothesis of Hansen’s J test is that the instrumental variables are just identified. *, ** and *** indicate the level of statistical significance at 10%, 5%
and 1%, respectively.
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Chapter 3
Refining Vertical Productivity
Spillovers from FDI: Evidence
from 32 Economies
3.1 Introduction
Productivity spillovers are firmly believed to be triggered by the presence of multi-
national firms surrounding domestic firms in the host country. To be specific, the
literature generally defines productivity spillovers to be the productivity improve-
ments that domestic firms acquire when they have access to the specialized resources
of multinational firms through foreign direct investment (henceforth, FDI) (Haskel,
Pereira, & Slaughter, 2007). The forms used by, and the motivations for, multina-
tional firms locating activities abroad can be traditionally distinguished as “hori-
zontal” FDI and “vertical” FDI. The “horizontal” FDI refers to the replication of
the whole production facility abroad with the aim of being close to the customer
base (Markusen, 1984; Brainard, 1993; Alfaro & Charlton, 2009), while “vertical”
FDI refers to the reallocation of different stages of the production process abroad
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with the aim of taking advantage of differences in production costs across countries
(Helpman, 1984; Alfaro & Charlton, 2009). In more recent studies, vertical FDI
has been distinguished between the input sourcing behaviours of “backward” and
‘forward” linkages, where the backward linkage refers to the inputs supplied by the
domestic firms to multinational companies and the forward linkage refers to the in-
puts supplied by multinational firms to domestic firms (Javorcik, 2004; Newman et
al., 2015; Jude, 2016). While existing studies have found the bulk of FDI spillovers
to be backward in nature (Javorcik, 2004; Blalock & Gertler, 2008; Barrios, Go¨rg,
& Strobl, 2011), in this study, we construct new measures of vertical spillovers that
account for the differences in firms’ sourcing and supplying strategies within an
industry and refine both types of vertical spillovers. Our new measurements re-
veal that both backward and forward spillovers are more prevalent than previously
thought.
A common challenge which exists in the literature is the absence of firm-level
data with which to distinguish the differences in firms’ local sourcing behaviours,
which limits the measurement of FDI vertical spillovers at the sectoral level. To
account properly for vertical spillovers derived from the presence of multinational
firms, ideal measures require data which provide information on a firm’s sourcing
behaviour, particularly concerning information on how much a firm is sourcing from,
and supplying to, a multinational company. Researchers have instead used input-
output data at the sectoral level to construct vertical spillovers measures as proxies
for studying domestic firms’ productivity gains from multinational firms. The em-
pirical studies have relied on the assumption that firms’ source inputs do not vary
with firms’ ownership status, i.e., domestic and acquired firms within any given sec-
tor are homogeneous with regards to sourcing inputs from, and supplying inputs
to, multinationals for situations in which productivity spillovers from multinational
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firms to domestic firms arise (Javorcik, 2004; Gorodnichenko et al., 2014; Newman
et al., 2015; Jude, 2016). In doing so, little may be learned about which domestic
firms do receive the vertical spillovers originating from multinational firms, as the
traditional measurement only measures the strength of sectoral linkages (Go¨rg &
Seric, 2016) and the assumptions imposed in the existing literature might be vio-
lated (Barrios et al., 2011). Multinationals and domestic firms could, in fact, be
heterogeneous in sourcing behaviour or production technology in practice.
A firm-level survey dataset provided by the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (henceforth, EBRD) in conjunction with the World Bank Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (henceforth, BEEPS) enables us
to provide a more nuanced and comprehensive analysis of FDI vertical spillovers,
in which we distinguish the differences in sourcing and supplying activities across
firms to refine the vertical spillovers, fulfilling the overall objective of this chapter.
Because we still do not observe local sourcing activities between multinational firms
and domestic firms directly, i.e., the information regarding the number of inputs
domestic firms purchased from multinational firms is still absent as a limitation of
the dataset, we use a combination of multinational firms’ sales to the large domestic
firms across sectors1 in conjunction with the local inputs of each domestic firm and
the domestic firm’s imported inputs to measure forward linkage spillovers at the firm
level. Additionally, we use the actual sales of each domestic firm to multinational
firms to measure backward linkage spillovers at the firm level. The horizontal mea-
surement, however, remains at sectoral level. To this end, we construct two proxies
for forward-linkage variables and one proxy for a backward- linkage variable to relax
1The data used in this chapter only asked each firm to indicate the number of outputs that went
to the eight given sectors. Firms’ sector assignments were also based on these eight given sectors
during the survey periods 2002, 2003 and 2005. This sectoral-level information, which will be used
to construct the new forward linkages described in Section 3.3, is based only on multinational firms
within the same sector. Therefore, even with this sectoral-level variable, our measure is still less
aggregated than the standard measure of forward linkages, which is constructed based on all firms
in the sectors.
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the assumptions posted in the literature. We refine the vertical spillovers in both
backward and forward linkages and verify the accuracy of our constructed measures
in a number of ways.
Some of our empirical findings suggest that it might be worthy to reconsider
the conventional wisdom in terms of the way in which vertical FDI spillovers are
measured. Consistent with the existing literature, we find that backward spillovers
occur in those developing countries; additionally, the effects of backward spillovers
are considerably more important than the effects of horizontal spillovers on domestic
firms’ productivity. However, disaggregating the measurement of backward linkages
from the sectoral level to the firm level reveals that multinational firms do not
have the same sourcing behaviour as local firms in the host country. Differences
arise because multinational firms locating abroad are very likely to source input
materials differently across nations compared to local firms (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996),
whereas the average sourcing behaviour at the sectoral level provided by the input-
output data suggests that sourcing behaviour is homogeneous across firms in the host
country (Barrios et al., 2011; Go¨rg & Seric, 2016). Contrary to the conventional
wisdom, therefore, we find that based on the sample of 32 economies the traditional
measurement of backward spillovers do not provide evidence of the spillover effects
on domestic firms’ productivity, whereas our proposed measurement seems to be
able to control for the heterogeneous sourcing activities across multinationals and
domestic firms and provides evidence of backward linkage spillovers on productivity.
Another striking empirical finding is that the significant effect of forward linkages
might have been previously underestimated and neglected by the existing empirical
literature. As the traditional measure of forward linkage remains at the sectoral
level, indirect effects are measured by including average sourcing proportion vari-
ables capturing spillover potential with ambiguous effects but not direct contact with
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multinational firms. The way the literature has estimated the forward spillovers re-
lies on the assumption that domestic firms purchase inputs from multinational firms
with the same proportion as domestic firms purchase inputs from other domestic
firms in the host country. Firms’ strategies with regards to undertaking sourcing
activity have long been recognized to be complex (Javorcik & Spatareanu, 2008).
This debate matters, as the different strategies have bearing on how sourcing activ-
ity triggers FDI forward spillovers within firms. As foreign inputs may embody more
advanced technologies, the capabilities of foreign inputs buyers may be increased.
However, if the bargaining weight, for instance, shifts the input prices in favour of
other multinationals’ local partners, domestic suppliers’ profits will be squeezed and
a reduction in productivity will be observed (Girma et al., 2008). On the other
hand, positive forward spillovers occur if domestic firms can access foreign inputs at
lower costs.
The differences in firms’ sourcing behaviours might explain why the literature has
been unable to confirm the importance of forward spillovers in terms of productivity.
Although our data limitations still impede a more precise estimation of forward
linkages, in order to obtain the proximate estimates, we construct new variables
that capture the proximity of the spillover effects of forward linkages using the
proportion of local inputs and imported inputs across each domestic firm, combining
the proportion of production that each multinational firm supplied to the large
domestic firms across sectors. We present evidence that the forward spillovers can
be both positively and negatively associated with firms’ productivity, which depends
crucially on the disaggregate measures we employ.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of recent FDI
literature on vertical spillovers. Next, Section 3.3 outlines the empirical strategy,
while Section 3.4 describes dataset. The results of our various estimations and main
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conclusions are presented in Section 3.5 and Section 3.6.
3.2 Literature Review
FDI spillovers on the productivity of domestic firms take place when the entry
or presence of multinational firms creates positive externalities in a host country.
Horizontal spillovers within sectors may arise when domestic firms increase their
production efficiency by hiring employees of foreign firms (Javorcik, 2004) or by
imitating a new process observed in the local market (Gorodnichenko et al., 2014).
Within sectors, however, horizontal spillovers may be less likely to be found, as
multinational firms compete with domestic firms and may force domestic firms to
contract by stealing business, preventing their knowledge and technologies from
leaking to their domestic competitors (Javorcik, 2004; Newman et al., 2015; Kim,
2015). There is a large body of literature, including Haddad and Harrison (1993)
on Morocco, Harrison, Aitken, et al. (1999) on Venezuela and Kosova (2010) on the
Czech Republic, that has documented that horizontal spillovers in terms of produc-
tivity are ambiguous. In contrast, multinational firms have less incentive to prevent
technology diffusion between sectors; hence, vertical spillovers occur when multina-
tional firms establish sourcing linkages with local firms in the host country. The
empirical literature, therefore, has paid more recent attention to vertical spillovers,
particularly backward linkages (Newman et al., 2015).
To measure the vertical spillovers, information on the inputs demanded by each
domestic firm from multinational firms and the inputs demanded by multinational
firms from each domestic firm is required. However, the unavailability of detailed
firm-level information has led researchers to measure the vertical spillovers by using
the host countries’ input-output tables (i.e., Javorcik, 2004). Javorcik’s measure-
ment has been used widely in empirical studies to estimate the spillover effects from
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forward and backward linkages.
Backward spillovers onto the productivity of domestic firms occur when domes-
tic firms benefit from having foreign customers due to the higher product quality
requirements and the technological assistance provided to increase supply quality
and efficiency (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Giroud, Jindra, & Marek, 2012). However,
empirical investigations of FDI backward linkages have not provided strong support
for predictions of positive spillovers onto productivity. Using a sectoral-level mea-
surement, MacDuffie and Helper (1997) find evidence of productivity gains on the
part of U.S. parts suppliers for the Japanese automobile market. Javorcik (2004)
finds that spillovers are more likely to occur when the upstream domestic firms sup-
ply inputs to the downstream multinationals throughout 20 sectors in Lithuania .
On the other hand, Blalock and Gertler (2008) suggest that multinational firms may
establish relationships with different local suppliers to reduce dependency on a sin-
gle supplier and lower the input price, which results in low measured productivity.
Given the benefit of lower-priced inputs, Pack and Saggi (2001), by way of contrast,
note that downstream multinationals may increase the demand for the inputs from
upstream firms and that the stronger demand downstream may increase the outputs
of upstream firms, perhaps helping the technology recipients in the local supplier
pool. X. Xu and Sheng (2012), among others, find a negative and statistically signif-
icant effect of backward spillovers on Chinese manufacturing firms between 2000 and
2003.2 Explanations of different findings with regards to backward spillovers also
relate to the assumptions regarding firms’ sourcing activities. Barrios et al. (2011)
argue that the evidence against backward spillovers is a consequence of using aggre-
gate data across sectors from the input-output tables of the host country and find
2Papers in the more recent literature also speak of the potential variations in the ownership
structure and multinational firms global-sourcing strategies. As noted by Newman et al. (2015),
foreign ownership structures across firms might determine firms’ local sourcing behaviours; thus,
the backward spillovers might be biased unless the variation in ownership structure is controlled
for.
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that the positive effects of backward spillovers only appear once the input-output
tables are switched from the host country to the multinationals’ home countries.
Forward spillovers onto the productivity of domestic firms take place when do-
mestic firms gain access to new, improved inputs produced by multinational firms
(Javorcik, 2004). Many studies since Grossman and Helpman (1991b) have argued
traditionally that the input materials provided by the foreign firms embody ad-
vanced technologies, allowing domestic firms to benefit from efficient organization
and adopting advanced production processes. Similarly, Javorcik (2004) stresses that
domestic firms benefit from the spillovers if the inputs supplied by foreign firms are
accompanied by services and other supports, including labour training and know-
how, for the domestic buyers. However, empirical studies, including Kim (2015) on
South Korea, Newman et al. (2015) on Vietnam and Jude (2016) on countries in
Central and Eastern Europe, do not provide support for positive forward spillovers
onto productivity. Instead, they find strong evidence for negative forward spillovers
onto domestic firms’ productivity.
Additionally, Barrios et al. (2011) point out that the measures applied in the
existing studies are fully dependent upon the assumption that multinationals from
different nationalities have the same supplying behaviours as the domestic firms
in the host country, and this assumption might lead to biased estimation of for-
ward spillovers. A slightly different argument presented in Go¨rg and Seric (2016)
states that the frictions between customers and suppliers are likely to be different
than what is assumed, i.e., the actual frictions between customers and suppliers
may provide some guidance on how to better measure the linkage effects. In es-
timating the forward linkage spillovers, Barrios et al. (2011) use a measurement
incorporating input-output tables taken from each multinational firm’s own coun-
try instead of using the input-output tables of the host country. Due to the lack of
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data and measurements allowing domestic firms’ direct linkages to the multinational
firms to be estimated, the authors fail to show the importance of forward spillovers
onto productivity. Given that only firm-level data are available on the suppliers of
multinationals, Go¨rg and Seric (2016) focus on whether domestic firms receiving as-
sistance from multinationals strengthen the spillovers onto their productivity. They
find that supplying inputs to multinationals is positively associated with firms’ pro-
ductivity. As noted by Newman et al. (2015), there is a particularly notable dearth
of evidence on the existence of forward linkage spillovers from multinational firms
to domestic firms.
The lack of consistent evidence casts doubt on whether such spillover effects exist.
More importantly, the empirical literature focused on vertical spillovers relies on
sectoral-level measurements in conjunction with input-output tables, which implies
that they measure the indirect sector’s linkage effects (Go¨rg & Seric, 2016). Doing
so may reveal that the differences in sourcing and supplying activities across firms
may potentially matter for empirical findings and perhaps explain why the mixed
empirical evidence concerning the beneficial vertical spillover influence of FDI on
domestic firms’ productivity has emerged.
We add to the existing studies on exploiting the measurement of vertical spillovers,
providing one further step towards understanding the mechanisms at work. We
construct two indirect measures for forward linkages at the firm level based on the
reported firm’s sales that go to each downstream sector and the sales of multina-
tionals that go to large domestic firms. These data allow us to get away from relying
on input-output tables. Most closely related to our empirical analysis is the study
by Gorodnichenko et al. (2014), which uses the BEEPS dataset to examine existing
hypotheses about the spillover effects of FDI vertical linkages - with sectoral-level
input-output tables establishing the vertical linkages - and shows that only backward
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linkages have a positive, but less significant, effect on domestic firms’ productivity.
However, as we will show below, it is crucial to distinguish the effect of directly
sourcing from, and supplying to, multinationals for firms that experience produc-
tivity improvements from those that are just assumed to source inputs from, and
supply inputs to, multinational firms.
3.3 Estimation Strategy
Our core focus is on the effect of vertical spillovers through backward and forward
linkages on the productivity of domestic firms based on our alternative measures
defined at the firm-level. We provide detail information of constructing the main
linkage variables in section 3.3.1, while the productivity estimation and our empirical
model specifications are provided in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.
3.3.1 FDI Spillovers Measurement
The standard measures on vertical linkages were constructed by Javorcik (2004),
whereby she incorporated the input-output tables to collect data on the proportion
of inputs purchased by downstream local firms from upstream local firms and data
on the proportion of outputs sold by upstream local firms to downstream local firms
ForwardIOj,t =
∑
d
δIOd,j ×Horizontald,t (3.1)
BackwardIOj,t =
∑
u
δIOu,j ×Horizontalu,t (3.2)
were δIOd,j is the proportion of inputs purchased by sector j downstream from sector
d upstream , δIOu,j is the proportion of outputs sold from sector j upstream to sector
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u downstream. Horizontald,t is therefore the proportion that measures sales of
multinationals over the total sales in upstream sector d and downstream sector u
(Caves, 1974) defined as follows:
Horizontalj,c,t =
∑
i ρi,j,c,t × Salesi,j,c,t∑
i Salesi,j,c,t
(3.3)
where ρi,j,c,t is the foreign ownership of firm i in country c sector j at time t, Salesi,j,c,t
is the total sales of firm i in country c sector j at time t.
Perhaps due to data availability, the above measures have been used widely in
many papers since, e.g., Gorodnichenko et al. (2014)3, Newman et al. (2015), Kim
(2015) and Jude (2016). However, these measures may have shortcomings since the
sourcing behaviour is assumed to be common across firms within the same industry
in equations (3.1) and (3.2). They may, in fact, capture the indirect effects other
than the direct spillover effects originating from multinational firms and received by
domestic firms. To clarify matters, defining δIOd,j and δ
IO
u,j in measures of backward and
forward linkages implies that the following assumptions are held: (i) multinational
firms in upstream sectors supply the same proportion of inputs to domestic firms in
downstream sectors as do local firms in upstream sectors, and (ii) domestic firms in
upstream sectors supply the same proportion of inputs to downstream multinational
firms as they do to downstream local firms.
First, it should be clear that multinational firms should arguably have different
production technology compared to local firms in the host country, which implies
that sourcing and supplying strategies are likely to differ. From our data based
on the 32 economies, it suggests that the local sourcing activities between multina-
tional firms and domestic firms, for example, are very different, on average – the
3Gorodnichenko et al. (2014) define forward and backward linkages weighted by the share of
sales of industry j sold to, and purchased from, industry d.
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mean value of the proportion of materials sourced locally by multinational firms is
0.47, whereas it is about 20 percentage points higher for domestic firms with the
proportion of input materials sourced locally. These sourcing differences also vary
across countries (See columns (8) to (11) in Table 3.9 in the Appendix)4. Adher-
ing to the two assumptions above would be contradictory to the idea that vertical
technology transfer occurs from multinational to domestic firms through both link-
ages. Second, it is not realistic that multinational firms and local firms across
sectors use the same average proportion to supply inputs to downstream domes-
tic firms. Domestic firms in downstream sectors might purchase more inputs from
upstream domestic firms, as the input prices offered by multinational firms could
be higher if the multinationals have a large market share (Newman et al., 2015).
Since the proportion of inputs that domestic firms require exactly from multina-
tional firms remains unclear, maintaining assumption (i) may only result in the
indirect spillover effects from domestic firms purchasing inputs from other domestic
firms who copy the inputs produced by multinational firms being measured and not
the direct forward linkage effects from domestic firms purchasing inputs provided
by multinational firms embodying new and advanced technologies from which they
can learn (Grossman & Helpman, 1991b). It may overlook the true importance of
forward linkages. Third, it is likely that multinational firms would buy more inputs
from other multinational firms (Belderbos, Capannelli, & Fukao, 2001), as the input
quality might matter5. Assumption (ii) implies that Eq. (3.2) may only capture the
competition effect from domestic input suppliers producing products that are simi-
lar to the input requirements of multinational firms rather than the direct backward
4It is also noteworthy that the multinational firms in Guatemala, FYROM, and Elaslvador
tend to source few input materials from local suppliers compared to the multinationals in other
developing countries.
5Belderbos et al. (2001) provide evidence showing that Japanese affiliates of parent firms be-
longing to the same Keiretsu tend to have input buyer-supplier relationships with other Keitretsu
affiliates.
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linkage effect from multinational firms improving the productivity of their suppliers
through training, quality control and inventory management.
The assumptions stated above could arguably lead to biased estimates on both
backward and forward linkages, and it is not clear a priori whether not being able
to distinguish firms’ sourcing activities would lead to an upward or downward bias
in the estimates. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to construct the vertical
linkages that may be better able to distinguish sourcing and supplying differences
across firms. Our measurement choice, detailed further below, is driven in part by
data limitations preventing us, for example, from knowing the number of inputs each
firm bought from foreign suppliers. Rather, we infer the number of inputs bought
by domestic firms from multinational firms across each sector by using the number
of outputs sold by multinational firms to large domestic firms across each sector.
In order to relax assumption (i), data on domestic firm’s inputs purchased from
multinationals upstream is required. Unfortunately, this data is unavailable. Nev-
ertheless, the BEEPS data set allows the distinction between the sales from multi-
national firms that go to each downstream sector and the sales from multinational
firms that go to the large domestic firms. Therefore, we construct the proportion
of outputs sold by each multinational firm to the large domestic firms across down-
stream sectors as an important proxy indicating the number of inputs domestic firms
would approximately purchase from multinational firms:
αj,h,c,t =
∑
m
cm,j,h,c,t
(∑
j
∑
mMultinationalSales
LD
m,j,c,t∑
j
∑
mMultinationalSalesm,j,c,t
)
(3.4)
where MultinationalSalesLDm,j,c,t denotes the outputs sold by a given multinational
firm m to the large domestic firms (where the superscript LD stands for “large
domestic firms”), and MultinationalSalesm,j,c,t represents the total sales of multi-
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national firm m. The cm,j,h,c,t is the proportion of sales of multinational firm
6 m
that goes to local firms in downstream sector h in country c at time t. Therefore,
the variable αj,h,c,t represents a sectoral- level proportion that shows the volume of
inputs multinational firms would supply to the large domestic firms across sectors7.
By combining this information with imported inputs and local inputs across each
domestic firm, as we describe below, we are better able to infer the direct contact
between domestic firms and multinational firms at the firm level. As BEEPS only
provides data for the sales to large domestic firms, Eq. (3.4) also imposes the as-
sumption that domestic firms have the same sourcing behaviour as large domestic
firms in their country. While this assumption is strong, it is weaker and less re-
strictive than the assumption that multinational and domestic firms have the same
sourcing behaviour. In addition, it does not contradict vertical spillovers possibly
flowing from multinational firms to domestic firms. Nevertheless, we provide robust-
ness checks in the analysis in which we control for a firm’s age and export status.
If the productivity difference between large and other domestic firms plays a sig-
nificant role, we would then find that the two additional controls would change the
empirical findings. However, we can confirm that this is not the case in our data
since we find similar results for the estimated coefficients (see section 3.5.2).
Given Eq. (3.4), it is unclear whether such outputs that come from multination-
als to domestic firms would be used as the input materials by the domestic firms.
To tackle this uncertainty, we multiply Eq. (3.4) by the proportion of a firm’s input
6We define a multinational firm as a firm that has foreign ownership of at least 10% (including
10%) by using a dummy variable, following studies Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) and Yudaeva,
Kozlov, Melentieva, and Ponomareva (2003).
7Note that αj,h,c,t is constructed based on the eight given sectors and is based entirely on
the multinational firms operating in the host country within the same sector instead of all firms
operating in the host country. Arguably, this variable is not perfect, but it is more realistic to
represent the number of demanded inputs supplied by multinational firms available to domestic
firms by using Eq. (3.4), as aggregating all firms’ supplying behaviours, which is how the standard
measure is constructed, is more aggregate than aggregating just multinational firms’ supplying
behaviours. Although we are only able to establish linkages for the eight given sectors, it is easier
to extend the analysis when more sectors and firms are included in BEEPS.
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sourced from the local market. This allows us to identify the output supplied by
multinationals to the domestic firms to be used as input materials by domestic firms.
In doing so, we construct the forward linkages as follows:
Forwardproxy−buyi,j,c,t =
∑
h
αj,h,c,t × µi,j,c,t (3.5)
where αj,h,c,t is the proportion of outputs sold by multinational firms in upstream
sector j to the large domestic firms in downstream sector h, and µi,j,c,t is the pro-
portion of total inputs sourced domestically by firm i in sector j of country c at
time t. This measure indicates the proportion of inputs sold by multinational firms
in upstream sectors to downstream domestic firms that is now going to firm i mea-
sured at the firm level. The measure proposed in Eq. (3.5) lets us investigate how
Assumption 1 affects forward spillovers.
Assumption (i) is also relaxed by using the domestic firm’s imported inputs. The
logic here is that it is likely that domestic firms would purchase the same proportion
of inputs from upstream multinationals as they purchase from outside the country
(imported). For example, domestic firms would buy 10% of input materials from
multinational firms if they import 10% of input materials from abroad. Following
this idea, we construct the second forward linkage measure by using imported inputs
as follows:
Forwardproxy−impi,j,c,t =
∑
h
αj,h,c,t × imi,j,c,t (3.6)
where imimportedi,j,c,t is imported inputs over the total input for firm i in country c
and sector j at time t. Note that the imported inputs may be influenced by other
factors, for example, by the transportation costs. Therefore, the demand for the
imported inputs may be lower, leading to a reduction in the inputs purchased from
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the multinational firms. Nevertheless, comparing the measures in Eq. (3.5) and Eq.
(3.6) would allow us to observe a more accurate effect of forward spillovers on firm
productivity, as a range of magnitude would be captured by the two measures. In
doing so, an assumption that a firm acquires inputs from multinational firms the
same proportion that they acquire (imports) from country c is made. One concern
is whether input materials from abroad and input materials from multinationals are
substituted at some level. However, because we cannot directly observe the actual
amount of input materials purchased by domestic firms from multinationals, we can-
not see how different it would be between the imported materials and the materials
purchased from multinationals. Therefore, for simplicity, we assume domestic firms
would purchase the same amount of input from multinationals as they import from
abroad.
Although this assumption may be strong, it can be supported by Halpern, Ko-
ren, and Szeidl (2015), who document that foreign-owned firms have better access
to low-cost input suppliers abroad and face lower transactions costs and are thus
more efficient at using imports than domestic firms. In addition, Rodriguez-Clare
(1996) who develops a two-country model in which multinational firms exist, em-
phasizes that intermediate goods are non-tradable and only multinationals have
access to intermediate goods from both countries. Therefore, to avoid inefficiency,
domestic firms may thus purchase those inputs from multinational companies in-
stead of imports, which implies that holding the assumption above may not be too
problematic8.
To relax assumption (ii), information on domestic firms’ supplies to downstream
8Halpern et al. (2015) provide evidence showing that the benefits from imports differ between
foreign and domestic firms. They find that foreign-owned firms benefit about 24 percent more than
purely domestic firms from each 1$ they spend on imports and offer suggestive evidence that the
premium for using imports is caused by foreign ownership. Hence, even if we hold the assumption
mentioned above, our empirical results do not imply that domestic firms’ productivity gains from
imports but rather FDI forward linkages.
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multinationals is required. We take this data from BEEPS to estimate backward
linkage spillovers at the firm level9. The backward linkage is constructed as follows:
Backwardfirmi,j,c,t = δi,j,c,t × ai,j,c,t × Salesi,j,c,t ×DDomesticF irm (3.7)
where ai,j,c,t is the proportion of total sales to the domestic market, while δi,j,c,t is
the proportion of total domestic sales from firm i in country c and sector j at time
t to multinational firms. Salesi,j,c,t represents the total sales of firm i in sector j at
time t. DDomesticF irm is a dummy set equal to 1 if the foreign ownership of firm i
is less than 10% and 0 otherwise. Using the dummy variable helps us to make sure
that the outputs are supplied by domestic firms to multinational firms instead of by
the local firms to multinational firms. This variable is constructed using the natural
logarithm.
We also construct both backward and forward linkages based on Eq.(3.1) and Eq.
(3.2) as the existing standard measures. Doing so allows us to see how alternative
measures influence the analysis and lets us determine whether our new measures
perform better than the existing ones used in the literature. Lastly, as we mainly
focus on the vertical linkages, the horizontal spillover therefore remains unchanged
and is measured by using Eq. (3.3).
3.3.2 Productivity Estimation
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of the production function assumes that
inputs are not determined by firms’ efficiency levels, which could be unrealistic.
Due to data limitations, the early FDI spillover literature typically pooled data es-
9Based on the BEEPS, Godart and Go¨rg (2013) use a dummy variable indicating whether
domestic firms’ sales are to multinational firms, while Gorodnichenko et al. (2014) use data on the
proportion of total domestic sales to multinationals from 2005 as an additional control variable in
their model only.
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timating the production function using OLS techniques (Gorodnichenko, Svejnar,
& Terrell, 2010; Commander & Svejnar, 2011; Gorodnichenko et al., 2014). While
we follow these studies to estimate firm-level productivity, we conduct a robust-
ness check by estimating different forms of the production function with additional
controls (See Section 3.5.2).
The estimation of the production function involves two steps. The first step is
to regress the firms’ output on the capital stock, labour and material inputs. The
empirical estimation is based upon a Cobb-Douglas production function, as shown
below:
lnYi,j,c,t = β0 + βLlnLi,j,c,t + βK lnKi,j,c,t + βM lnMi,j,c,t + sj + τt + zc + εi,j,c,t (3.8)
where Li,j,c,t, Ki,j,c,t and Mi,j,c,t are the logarithms of employment, capital and mate-
rials used by firm i in country c and sector j at time t, and Yi,j,c,t is the logarithm of
a firm’s total sales. As we mentioned previously, potential simultaneity bias in input
choices may exist and can be addressed by implementing the Olley and Pakes (1996)
and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) types of productivity measures. Nevertheless, the
time dimension in our data is insufficient to implement these approaches, as our
data relies primarily on the pooled 2002, 2003 and 2005 data. Gorodnichenko et al.
(2014), on the other hand, suggest that adding country and industry fixed-effects to
the specification may mitigate the endogeneity of the inputs. The sj denoted sector
fixed effects and zc denoted country fixed-effects are thus controlled for in the model.
In addition, following Newman et al. (2015), including a full set of time dummies
may mitigate heterogeneity over time in the production function. Thus, time fixed-
effects τt are also controlled for in the model. Once consistent estimators for βL, βK
and βM are estimated, the productivity (the residual ˆεi,j,c,t) can be estimated using
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Eq. (3.9):
εˆi,j,c,t = lnYi,j,c,t − βˆLlnLi,j,c,t − βˆK lnKi,j,c,t − βˆM lnMi,j,c,t (3.9)
3.3.3 The Empirical Model
3.3.3.1 Pooled OLS Estimation
Given the estimated productivity at the firm level, the benchmark regression for
measuring spillovers on firms’ performance with pooled OLS across economies, sec-
tors, and firms is given as follows:
εˆi,j,c,t = α0 + α1Horizontalj,c,t + Forwardβ +Backwardγ
+ sj + C
′
Z + τt + zc + ωi,j,c,t
(3.10)
where εˆi,j,c,t denotes the total factor productivity (henceforth, TFP) in logarithmic
form; Backward refers to the measure constructed by using input-output tables
from the 12 countries as in Eq. (3.2) at the sectoral level, and the logarithm of
firm-level backward linkages constructed by Eq. (3.7), respectively; Forward refers
to the measure constructed by using input-output tables from 12 economies as in
Eq. (3.1), and the others constructed via Eq. (3.5) and Eq. (3.6). The sj sector
fixed effects, τt time fixed effects and zc country fixed effects are controlled for.
Additionally, it could be argued that multinational firms may be attracted by the
host country’s stability. Such spillovers may not exist due to the instability of the
host country. On the other hand, spillovers may exist because of the attractiveness
of a host country’s stability, which implies that such estimates of vertical linkages
may be overestimated if we fail to control for the potential correlation between
multinational firms and the country’s stability. The BEEPS asks, ”What is the
level of the obstacle to the functioning of this establishment?” This question provides
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information on how firms are obstructed by “political instability”, “macroeconomic
instability”, and “corruption” via assigning 0 to no obstacle, 1 to minor obstacle, 2 to
moderate obstacle, 3 to major obstacle and 4 to very severe obstacle. As these data
were collected at the firm level, we control these variables in our specification, where
C
′
is a vector of firm-level institutional environmental control variables, including
the political instability, macro instability and corruption, in order to increase the
accuracy of our estimations. Note that the Correlated Random-Effect (henceforth,
CRE) model is also employed to better suit the data structure. The estimation
details are provided in Section 3.3.3.2.
In addition to the baseline specification, we are concerned about the potential
omitted variable bias (unobserved heterogeneity). First, a well-known problem in
FDI spillovers studies is firms’ motivations to undertake multinational activity. For
example, a firm that is more willing to pursue a joint venture with multinationals
may experience more productivity gains, as multinational firms may deliberately
transfer technology to their local partners as part of a strategy to build an efficient
network for overseas operations (Pack & Saggi, 2001; Blalock & Gertler, 2008). This
motivation for joint venture agreements implies that domestic firms experience pro-
ductivity gains because they receive benefits from multinational firms other than
those coming from FDI vertical spillovers. If this is the case, then failing to control
for firms’ motivations is likely to result in an overestimation of the effect of vertical
spillovers on the productivity of domestic firms. Moreover, as highlighted in recent
studies, the technological activities of foreign firms themselves may be an impor-
tant determinant of whether spillovers are realised, which implies that the direct
technology transfers between foreign firms and domestic firms might influence the
vertical spillovers (Giroud et al., 2012; Newman et al., 2015). To test the extent
to which the spillover measures used in the model are related to direct knowledge
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transfer, we examine the impact of the interaction between being directly linked
with multinational firms, along the motivation and technology acquisitions, and the
existence of vertical linkages by using data on whether the domestic firm agrees to a
joint venture with the foreign partner and whether domestic firm has acquired new
production technology in the last 3 years. We construct the following variables and
add them to the baseline model:
ForwardMotivated = Forward×Dagree (3.11)
BackwardMotivated = Backward×Dagree (3.12)
ForwardNewtechnology = Forward×DNewtecnology (3.13)
and
BackwardNewtechnology = Backward×DNewtechnology (3.14)
where Backward refers to BackwardIOj,c,t and Backward
firm
i,j,c,t; Forward refers to
ForwardIOj,c,t, Forward
proxy−imp
i,j,c,t and Forward
proxy−buy
i,j,c,t ; Dagree is 1 if the domes-
tic firm agreed to a joint venture with the foreign partner and 0 otherwise and
DNewtechnology is 1 if the domestic firm acquired new technology and 0 otherwise.
Second, it can be argued that firms in both upstream and downstream sec-
tors would benefit from the upgrading industry. For example, domestic firms in
downstream sectors can benefit from the upstream domestic firms who engage in
supplying products to downstream multinationals. It can be seen that downstream
multinationals may deliberately transfer technology to their upstream material sup-
pliers and that the suppliers may possibly supply these materials to the other down-
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stream domestic firms. Markusen and Venables (1999) call this a “supply-backward
spillover”. Schoors and Merlevede (2007) when examining Romania find that the
supply-backward spillover is positive but insignificant , while Jude (2016) when
examining CEEC countries finds negative and insignificant effects on firms’ pro-
ductivity from the supply-back spillover. In contrast, it may be more likely that
domestic firms that purchase inputs from upstream multinationals also supply in-
puts to other downstream domestic firms. As demanded inputs from multinational
firms may involve knowledge spillovers to domestic firms that, in turn, may lead
to industry upgrading, other domestic input customers may also benefit from this
indirect linkage. Because this potential linkage involves both forward and backward
linkages, failing to control for this correlation might lead to an overestimated bias
and reduce the accuracy of our measures. We add to the literature by constructing
this linkage as follows:
Backwardsupply−back = ai,j,c,t × Forward (3.15)
where ai,j,c,t and Forward are defined as above.
3.3.3.2 Correlated Random Effects Estimation
It is possible that there have been omissions of unobserved individual effects, which
may potentially bias the estimates. Haskel et al. (2007) suggests that the firm
that has higher-quality management or a better infrastructure in a given region
may perform better than the others. Since these factors may be unknown to the
econometricians but known to the firm, biased estimates would result. This issue can
be addressed by employing the fixed-effect model to remove any fixed plant-specific
unobservable variations and the fixed regional and industrial effects.
However, this approach may lead to another econometric concern. First, it leads
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to aggravate measurement errors in the regression unless longer time differences are
applied (Griliches & Hausman, 1986). Second, once an entire cross-section is used
up to estimate the fixed-effects, there is inefficiency due to data loss. Third, since the
estimator relies on within sample variation, the estimates are imprecisely estimated
if the variation is small. The effects of such variables can neither be estimated
nor enter the regression if there is no within sample variation at all. Since the
time period used in this study is very short, this approach is not followed. Finally,
the measurement error becomes worse under differencing/de-meaning, and the bias
caused might outweigh the bias from using the Random-Effect model incorrectly
(Deaton, 1985).
Instead, the Correlated Random Effects (henceforth, CRE) model is applied to
tackle the above concerns. First, the CRE approach still allows the unobserved in-
dividual effects to be correlated with the other explanatory variables. Second, the
CRE approach provides a simple and formal way of choosing between the Fixed-
Effect (henceforth, FE) and Random-Effect (henceforth, RE) estimators. Although
Hausman’s test is informative in deciding whether the FE is more appropriate than
the RE, i.e., whether the unobserved firm’s individual effect is correlated with the
error term, the literature suggests that the CRE approach provides a more intu-
itive regression-based test and overcomes the drawbacks10 of using Hausman’s test
(Wooldridge, 2012, Ch14). Third, in the FE (or First-Differenced when there are
two time periods), the correlation between xi,j,c,t and x¯i,j,c can result in a higher
variance for the estimated coefficients. The variance would be even higher when
there is little variation in xi,j,c,t across time t, in which case xi,j,c,t and x¯i,j,c tend to
be highly correlated. In the limiting case where there is no variation across time
for any firm i, perfect collinearity would be present and FE would fail to provide
10Any variable that varies by time or by ’individual’ only should not be part of the test
(Wooldridge, 2012, Ch14).
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estimates. On the other hand, the RE estimator has no bearing on the variance
and performs better than the FE estimator. Fourth, with an unbalanced panel due
to attrition (presumably the firm that is missing in the wave 2005 would probably
have gone out of business or have merged with other companies), FE is biased and
inconsistent, even though Hausman’s test provides a large Chi-squared test statistic
rejecting RE in favour of FE. The CRE approach also provides a way to include
time-constant explanatory variables, which is not possible when using the FE esti-
mator. Lastly, it should be noted that the RE estimator is more suitable if the data
involve a large N , but small T (Wooldridge, 2012, Ch14).
The idea behind the CRE approach is to allow the omitted firm’s individual
effects to be correlated with the average level of each explanatory variable xi,j,c,t
rather than assume that it is uncorrelated - which is the random effects approach.
The firm’s individual effects can be thus decomposed as follows:
ai = σ + γx¯i,j,c + ri (3.16)
where ri,j,c,t is uncorrelated with each xi,j,c,t, and x¯i,j,c is the time-averaged variable
(x¯i,j,c = T
−1∑T
t=1 xi,j,c,t). As x¯i,j,c is a linear function of the xi,j,c,t, the Cov(x¯i,j,c,
ri)=0. It follows that ai and x¯i,j,c are correlated whenever γ 6= 0.
Assuming that Eq. (3.8) suffers from omitted variable bias, we would like to
mitigate this bias by allowing firm’s individual effects into the model:
lnYi,j,c,t = ai + βLlnLi,j,c,t + βK lnKi,j,c,t + βM lnMi,j,c,t + sj + τt + zc + ϑi,j,c,t
(3.17)
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substituting Eq. (3.16) into Eq. (3.17) will give the following equation
lnYi,j,c,t = σ + x¯
′
i,j,cγ + ri + βLlnLi,j,c,t + βK lnKi,j,c,t + βM lnMi,j,c,t
+ sj + τt + zc + ϑi,j,c,t
(3.18)
where x¯
′
i,j,c refers to the time average variable of employment, capital and material
uses.
It is clear that the assumption Cov(ai,xi,j,c,t)=0 holds when ai is replaced by
ri. Also, because ϑi,j,c,t is assumed to be uncorrelated with xi,j,c,t, ϑi,j,c,t will be
uncorrelated with x¯
′
i,j,c. In addition, the correlation between xi,j,c,t and ai is now
controlled by the x¯
′
i,j,c; therefore, ri is uncorrelated with xi,j,c,t. All the assumptions
above are added to the model. The estimated parameters of employment, capital and
materials will therefore be used to extract firm’s estimated productivity (residual).
The same CRE approach on the second step of productivity estimation is applied
as follows:
ϑˆi,j,c,t = c+ x¯
′
i,j,cδ + ϕi + b1Horizontalj,c,t + b2Forward+ b3Backward
+ sj + τt + zc + ρi,j,c,t
(3.19)
where ϑˆi,j,c,t is the estimated productivity residual, and all other right-hand side vari-
ables are defined above. Wooldridge (2012) notes that “if the panel data set is unbal-
anced, then the average of variables such as time dummies can change across firms -
it will depend on how many periods we have for cross-sectional firms” (Wooldridge,
2012, p. 498). In such cases, the time averages of any variable that changes over time
must be included. Therefore, all time average variables are included in the model.
To control for omitted variable biases, equations (3.11), (3.12), (3.13), (3.14), (3.15)
and the country stability variables will all be included in Eq. (3.10) respectively
and re-estimated by CRE approach.
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3.4 Data
Our primary data source is the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD) in conjunction with World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey (BEEPS), which covers waves from 2002 onwards. Identical
questionnaires are used in all countries, which makes the empirical evidence reli-
able. Firms in both service and manufacturing sectors are covered and rely on the
same sampling frames11. We matched the waves 2002, 2003 and 2005 based on the
variables of interest. Although the dataset contains a panel component consisting
of about 605 firms that were surveyed in 2002 and again in 2005, many variables
of interest have a retrospective component, and it is difficult to detect robust re-
lationships with a small panel of firms (Gorodnichenko et al., 2014). Hence, our
analysis is restricted to relying primarily on the pooled 2002, 2003 and 200512. As
BEEPS is a designed survey, trained interviewers conducted face-to-face interviews
and all participants were anonymous, thus the individual perception bias can be
disregarded (Fries, Lysenko, Polanec, et al., 200313; Godart & Go¨rg, 2013).
The data include the share of the firm’s sales, raw material used, number of
employees, capital stock and the firm’s supplying, sourcing and foreign ownership
statuses. To be specific, the survey asks each firm: “How many permanent, full-
time employees does your firm have?”, “In fiscal year, what were the total annual
sales of this establishment?”, “What was the net value of assets after depreciation
of the machinery and equipment (including vehicles), land and buildings at the end
of fiscal?”, and “How much raw material was bought in the services?”. The answers
11The BEEPS approaches a large number of observations with a core 41-page questionnaire
module via standard interview supported by the EBRD and the World Bank, and 46- and 44-page
questionnaire modules for manufacturing and services sector respectively. Details of these surveys
can be found at: http://ebrd-beeps.com/data/.
12We provide results showing how the main results would have differed had they been based on
the small panel of firms in Table 12 in the Appendix.
13Fries et al. (2003) find no significant perception biases across the countries in the sample.
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Table 3.1: Number of Firms in Each Sector
Industry(sector) Code# No. Domestic firms No. Multinational firms
Mining, Quarrying 1 71 13
Construction 2 578 51
Manufacturing 3 2,116 389
Transport and storage 4 266 50
Wholesale, Retail trade and Repair of motor vehicles 5 1,374 231
Real estate 6 361 74
Hotels, Restaurants 7 276 49
Other services 8 398 64
Notes: Sector classification is determined by the question “How would you best describe your firm’s main area of activity in terms
of sales?”.
to these questions are therefore used to calculate the measure of firm productivity.
For the proposed measure on backward linkages (Eq. (3.7)), information on “firm
sales to multinationals” is used. This information is based on the questions: “What
proportion of your total sales is sold domestically?” and “What proportion of your
total domestic sales is to multinationals located in your country (not including your
parent company, if applicable)?”. Meanwhile, to calculate the proposed measure
on forward linkages, the information from the following questions is used: “What
proportions of total sales are to the sectors Mining and quarrying (sector code 1);
Construction (sector code 2); Manufacturing (sector code 3); Transport, Storage
and Communication (sector code 4); Wholesale, Retail trade and Repair of motor
vehicles (sector code 5); Real estate (sector code 6); Hotel and Restaurants (sector
code 7) and Other services (sector code 8)?”; and “What proportion of your total
domestic sales is to the large domestic firms (those with approximately 250 plus
workers and not including your parent company)?”. We also acquire information on
firms’ domestic sources and imported inputs with the questions: “What proportion
of your establishment’s material inputs and supplies are purchased from domestic
sources” and “What proportion of your establishment’s material inputs and supplies
are purchased from imported directly?”. These data are used for constructing the
measures on the firm-level forward linkages shown in Eq. (3.5) and Eq. (3.6).14.
To calculate the standard vertical linkages, we collected data from input-output
14We provide an overview of firms’ sourcing and purchasing activities by country and the sector
classifications specified in Tables 3.9 and 3.10 in the Appendix.
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Table 3.2: Pair-wise Correlations of Spillover Variables
ForwardIO BackwardIO Forwardproxy−imp Forwardproxy−buy
BackwardIO 0.9687
(0.000)
Forwardproxy−imp 0.0510 0.0446
(0.1092) (0.1618)
Forwardproxy−buy -0.1536 -0.1747 -0.2438
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.000)
Backwardfirm 0.0137 0.0162 0.1423 -0.0382
(0.6670) (0.6105) (0.0000) (0.1034)
Notes: This table provides the raw correlation coefficients and p-values in columns and paren-
theses. Although some measures are statistically correlated, the correlation coefficients are lower
between the proposed measures and standard measures, perhaps suggesting preliminarily that
some differences may exist across firms’ sourcing and supplying activities.
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Variables Definition Obs. Mean SD Max Min
ρ The foreign ownership in % 5,440 0.012 0.254 8 0
δi,j,c,t The proportion of total domestic sales to multinationals 5,440 0.039 0.133 1 0
a The proportion of total sales to the domestic market 5,440 0.901 0.221 1 0
c1,c,t The proportion of total sales to sector 1 5,440 0.004 0.060 1 0
c2,c,t The proportion of total sales to sector 2 5,440 0.099 0.286 1 0
c3,c,t The proportion of total sales to sector 3 5,440 0.439 0.460 1 0
c4,c,t The proportion of total sales to sector 4 5,440 0.050 0.209 1 0
c5,c,t The proportion of total sales to sector 5 5,440 0.250 0.398 1 0
c6,c,t The proportion of total sales to sector 6 5,440 0.066 0.241 1 0
c7,c,t The proportion of total sales to sector 7 5,440 0.051 0.213 1 0
c8,c,t The proportion of total sales to sector 8 5,440 0.033 0.154 1 0
α The proportion of total sales to large domestic firms across sectors 5,440 0.155 0.261 1 0
µ The proportion of total inputs sourced domestically 5,440 0.707 0.365 1 0
im The proportion of total inputs imported 5,440 0.131 0.279 1 0
Dagree Dummy in agreed to foreign joint venture 5,440 0.049 0.216 1 0
DNewtechnology Dummy in new production technology acquisition 5,440 0.317 0.465 1 0
lnSales The total annual sales of the firm in logarithmic form 5,440 6.610 2.947 20.484 0.693
Political Firms reported obstacle generated by political instability; 4 major obstacle 5,440 2.712 1.138 4 0
Macroeconomic Macroeconomic instability (inflation, exchange rate);4 major obstacle 5,440 2.654 1.154 4 0
Corruption Corruption; 4 major obstacle 5,440 2.219 1.167 4 0
FDI spillovers
Horizontal The horizontal spillovers 5,440 0.201 0.189 0.865 0
Forwardproxy−imp The forward linkages using imported inputs 5,440 0.019 0.057 0.561 0
Forwardproxy−buy The forward linkages using domestic sources 5,440 0.102 0.094 0.561 0
Backwardfirm The firm-level backward linkages in logarithmic form 5,440 0.795 2.227 17.257 -0.287
ForwardIO The standard forward linkages for 12 countries 3,069 0.257 0.204 0.925 0
BackwardIO The standard backward linkages for 12 countries 3,069 0.247 0.184 0.900 0
Production function
lnL The number of full-time employees in logarithmic form 5,440 3.116 1.626 9.116 0.693
lnL-3year The lagged three-year full-time employees in logarithmic form 5,333 3.026 1.669 9.210 0
lnM The total annual costs of electricity in logarithmic form 5,440 7.544 3.018 19.929 0
lnK The capital stock in logarithmic form 5,440 5.247 2.747 18.197 0
Age The firm’s age 5,435 16.650 18.380 202 1
Export share The proportion of total sales exported 5,440 0.080 0.201 1 0
Notes: The values are expressed in U.S. dollars.
Source: Author’s calculation.
tables from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Structural Analysis (STAN), the I-O 2012 latest Matrix. As surveyed firms are based
in the early 2000s (2002, 2003 and 2005) in BEEPS, all input-output tables were
taken from the early 2000s, except in the case of Latvia and Lithuania, as data for
the early 2000s were unavailable for the two countries. Instead, data from the mid-
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2000s was used for Latvia and Lithuania. The input-output coefficients are only for
the within-economy intermediate consumption of goods and exclude imports. Due
to data limitations, the standard measures are restricted to 12 countries only. They
are seven OECD member countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey) and five non-OECD countries (Bulgaria, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Russia).
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide information on the number of firms in each sector
and the correlations between the measures of vertical linkages. Table 3.3 provides
summary statistics. The key variables display reasonable mean values and signifi-
cant variation. The sample contains 5,440 observations for the periods 2002, 2003
and 2005. The average firm had 3.116 employees, 7.544 in costs for materials and
5.247 in capital stock, all reported in natural logs. The mean values of the proposed
measures are 0.019 and 0.102 for the forward linkages and 0.795 for the backward
linkages, while they are 0.257 and 0.247 for the standard forward and backward link-
ages, respectively. These measures are quite different in terms of magnitude, which
preliminarily supports our argument that the differences in sourcing and supplying
activities across firms may potentially drive the empirical findings.
3.5 Results
We start by attempting to gain a consistent estimate of firm-level productivity.
The results of the first-step production estimation provided by the pooled OLS,
fixed-effects and CRE estimators are provided in Table 3.11 in the Appendix. The
first step production estimation confirms the significance of capital, materials and
employment on firms’ productivity. They are all positive and statistically significant
at the 1% significance level. The results of the three estimators are similar, implying
that firms’ time-invariant unobserved variables does not affect firms’ performance
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much.
Having the estimated parameters in hand, the next step is to obtain the predicted
value of output which mitigates potential input biases and helps us to estimate the
vertical spillovers onto productivity based on the baseline regression model. Due to
the data’s characteristics, pooled OLS and CRE estimators are preferred over the
alternatives to estimate the FDI spillovers in the second-step estimation. In addition,
we conduct a robustness check related to the form of the production estimation as
an attempt to mitigate potential biases. We add to the analysis the firm’s age,
its export share and full-time employment lagged three years with the augmented
Cobb-Douglas production function to see if the results differ systematically.
3.5.1 FDI spillovers
In the regression analysis, we split the whole sample into two categories based on the
types of measurement, i.e., the standard and proposed measures. Table 3.4 reports
the results of estimating Eq. (3.10) using pooled OLS and CRE estimators with
standard measures. All models include country, sector, and year fixed effects. Note
that the standard measures on backward and forward linkages are constructed for
only 12 economies due to the data limitations of the input-output tables. The first
column of Table 3.4 displays the results obtained when the existing assumptions are
held simultaneously. The estimated coefficients of standard forward and backward
linkages are confirmed to be statistically insignificant, meaning that no spillover
effects on firms’ productivity are found in our data. The same result is produced in
column (4) using a CRE estimator.
Columns (2) and (3) show the results of controlling for institutional environ-
ment, supply-back, technology acquisition and motivation in having joint foreign
ownership. The results for vertical linkages remain statistically insignificant. The
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Table 3.4: Standard FDI Linkages for Productivity Based on 12 Economies
OLS CRE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Horizontal -0.024 -0.028 -0.029 -0.024 -0.028 -0.029
(0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.098) (0.094) (0.095)
ForwardIO 0.187 0.184 0.204 0.187 0.185 0.204
(0.296) (0.295) (0.310) (0.297) (0.296) (0.311)
BackwardIO -0.200 -0.211 -0.223 -0.200 -0.211 -0.224
(0.371) (0.371) (0.382) (0.371) (0.371) (0.383)
BackwardIOSupply−Back 0.427** 0.377* 0.424** 0.375*
(0.198) (0.199) (0.198) (0.199)
BackwardIOMotivation -0.885 -0.884
(0.988) (0.988)
ForwardIOMotivation 1.004 1.003
(0.942) (0.942)
BackwardIOTechnology 0.505 0.507
(0.404) (0.405)
ForwardIOTechnology -0.511 -0.513
(0.402) (0.401)
Political Instability 0.017* 0.017* 0.017* 0.017* 0.017* 0.017*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Macro Instability -0.024** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Corruption 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.7385 0.7388 0.7391 0.8500 0.8493 0.8498
Observations 3,069 3,069 3,069 3,069 3,069 3,069
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** are the significance levels at 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively.
same pattern can be found in columns (5) and (6) under the CRE estimation.
These results suggest that assuming homogeneous sourcing and supplying activi-
ties across firms using input-output coefficients does not provide any evidence for
vertical spillovers in our data. While vertical spillovers onto the productivity of
domestic firms are insignificant, the supply-back variable is somehow identified as
positive and statistically significant at the 5% and 10% significance levels, which is
consistent with Schoors and Merlevede (2007) but in stark contrast to Jude (2016),
where a negative effect was predicted to offset the positive effect of backward link-
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Table 3.5: Proposed FDI Linkages for Productivity for 12 Economies
OLS CRE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Horizontal -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062)
Backwardfirm 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.032***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006))
Forwardproxy−imp 0.823*** 0.959*** 0.828*** 0.965***
(0.208) (0.286) (0.211) (0.290)
Forwardproxy−buy -0.010 0.011 -0.011 0.009
(0.119) (0.125) (0.118) (0.124)
BackwardimpSupply−Back 0.577 0.591
(1.818) (1.820)
BackwardbuySupply−Back -1.019 -1.007
(0.813) (0.811)
BackwardfirmMotivation 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.001
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Forwardproxy−impMotivation -0.129 -0.126
(0.524) (0.526)
Forwardproxy−buyMotivation 0.450 0.449
(0.279) (0.279)
BackwardfirmTechnology -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Forwardproxy−impTechnology -0.435 -0.438
(0.390) (0.390)
Forwardproxy−buyTechnology -0.016 -0.016
(0.129) (0.129)
Political Instability 0.017* 0.018* 0.017* 0.018* 0.017* 0.018* 0.017* 0.018
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010))
Macro Instability -0.025*** -0.025** -0.025*** -0.025** -0.025** -0.025** -0.025** -0.025**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Corruption 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.7416 0.7402 0.7417 0.7405 0.7351 0.7402 0.7417 0.7405
Observations 3,069 3,069 3,069 3,069 3,069 3,069 3,069 3,069
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** are the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
ages on productivity. Regarding the effect of supply-back, we suspect here that
the positive effect of supply-back on productivity could possibly involve part of the
vertical spillover effects, as it is likely that the differences in firms’ sourcing and
supplying activities are correlated with the supply-back linkage. In other words,
the finding might be due to measurement errors in the sectoral-level measures in
conjunction with the data from the input-output tables.
For the sake of comparison, in the next regression, we employ our newly con-
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structed measures from equations (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7), where we employ informa-
tion on firms’ sourcing and supplying activities that either directly or indirectly links
to multinational firms, i.e., we distinguish sourcing and supplying differences across
firms. Both assumptions are relaxed under this circumstance. We re-estimate Eq.
(3.10) by splitting our regression into 2 parts: The first part of the results is based
on the 12 economies, as we want to use the standard measures to compare how
those differences in firms’ sourcing and supplying behaviours prevent researchers
from identifying the importance of vertical spillovers on productivity. The second
part of the results is based on all economies.
Table 3.5 provides the first part of the results. We find that the results in
columns (1) and (2) suggest statistically significant spillovers of backward linkages
onto firms’ productivity at the 1% significance level. This finding indicates that
inputs demanded by multinational firms from domestic firms increase domestic firms’
productivity; the estimated coefficient of 0.025 suggests that a one percent increase
in backward linkages would increase domestic firms’ productivity by 0.025 percent.
The forward measure is also confirmed to be statistically significant in column (1)
for Eq. (3.5), where firms’ imported inputs are used as the proxy to capture the
inputs demanded by the domestic firms from multinational firms. However, it loses
its significance when we swap the measure from Eq. (3.5) for the one from Eq.
(3.4) in column (2), where firms’ local inputs are used as the proxy for the inputs
demanded by domestic firms from multinational firms.
Columns (3) and (4) add the firm’s motivation for having a joint foreign venture,
new technology acquisitions and supply-back variables as additional controls for
unobserved heterogeneities. The results are in line with the previous specifications,
indicating that inputs demanded by multinational firms from domestic firms induce
the positive effects of backward spillovers on domestic firms’ productivity, while the
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Table 3.6: Proposed FDI Linkages for Productivity for 32 Economies
OLS CRE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Horizontal -0.065 -0.063 -0.064 -0.062 -0.063 -0.062 -0.062 -0.061
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Backwardfirm 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.018***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Forwardproxy−imp 0.692*** 0.816*** 0.701*** 0.821***
(0.135) (0.198) (0.136) (0.200)
Forwardproxy−buy -0.200*** -0.213*** -0.193*** -0.208**
(0.086) (0.094) (0.086) (0.094)
BackwardimpSupply−Back -0.213 -0.216
(0.468) (0.468)
BackwardbuySupply−Back 0.102 0.107
(0.500) (0.499)
BackwardfirmMotivation 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.009
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Forwardproxy−impMotivation -0.033 -0.014
(0.397) (0.396)
Forwardproxy−buyMotivation 0.040 0.025
(0.237) (0.237)
BackwardfirmTechnology 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Forwardproxy−impTechnology -0.295 -0.289
(0.236) (0.238)
Forwardproxy−buyTechnology 0.044 0.052
(0.105) (0.106)
Political Instability 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Macro Instability -0.018*** -0.017** -0.018** -0.018** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.017**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Corruption 0.014* 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 0.013 * 0.013*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.9030 0.9026 0.9030 0.9027 0.8636 0.8614 0.8632 0.8613
Observations 5,440 5,440 5,440 5,440 5,440 5,440 5,440 5,440
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** are the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
inputs demanded by domestic firms from multinational firms also induce the positive
effects of forward spillovers onto productivity. The coefficient of backward linkage
on column (3), when additional controls are added, is almost identical to what it was
in the previous two columns (0.025 versus 0.027 versus 0.026 for columns (1)- (3),
respectively). However, the coefficient becomes larger when firms’ local inputs are
used to proxy the inputs demanded from multinational firms. In the meantime, as
we have seen previously, the effect of the forward linkage becomes insignificant when
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we change the measurement from Eq. (3.5) to that of Eg. (3.4). These findings
again remain the same when the CRE estimator is employed to estimate the vertical
spillovers shown in columns (5) to (8). These results, therefore, confirm the idea that
when all exogenous variables are controlled for, the differences among firms’ sourcing
and supplying activities, i.e., the assumptions and the standard measures applied
in the existing literature, could lead to either overestimation or underestimation of
vertical spillovers.
To quantify the magnitude of vertical spillovers for all observed firms, we now
turn to the second part of the results shown in Table 3.6. The results in columns
(1) and (2) show that our proposed measures capture successfully the economically
important effects on firms’ productivity through both backward and forward linkages
at the 1% significance level. The estimated coefficient is 0.692 for Forwardproxy−imp
in column (1), which suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion
of demanded inputs from multinational firms leads to a 0.00692 unit increase in
the level of domestic firms’ productivity. The estimated coefficient is -0.200 for
Forwardproxy−buy in column (2), which indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in
the proportion of demanded inputs from multinational firms reduces domestic firms’
level of productivity by about 0.002 unit, other things being equal15. Consistent
with the main results in columns (1) and (2), the coefficients for backward and
forward linkages in columns (3) and (4) remain highly statistically significant when
the other variables are included. Again, we find a very similar pattern when the
CRE estimator is used in columns (5) to (8). Looking back at the previous findings
in Table 3.4, we find statistically insignificant effects of vertical spillovers based on
12 economies by using the standard measure. Hence, comparing results in columns
(1), (2), (3) and (4) of Tables 3.5 and 3.6 suggests that the variation in firms’
15Following Newman et al. (2015), we divide the estimated coefficients by 100 when the measures
of forward linkages are constructed. A one percentage point increase in the proportion of inputs
demanded from multinational firms is equivalent to a 0.01 unit increase in the forward measure.
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sourcing and supplying behaviours plays a determinant role and holding existing
assumptions does not provide evidence of vertical spillovers. In contrast, relaxing
the assumptions does make some differences in terms of identifying the economically
important effects of vertical spillovers.
In addition to the findings so far, some studies have suggested that positive
productivity spillovers may be due to firms deliberately transferring knowledge or
know-how to domestic firms (Girma et al., 2008; Newman et al., 2015) or, as we
discussed in Section 3.3.3.1, firms being self-motivated to become more productive.
Nevertheless, our findings suggest that positive productivity spillovers are not due
to a deliberate transfer of new technology from, or intended foreign partnerships
with, multinational firms, yet it is the direct linkages between domestic firms and
multinational firms, along with the demanded inputs, that are associated with the
technology transfer in the case of 32 developing economies. However, as revealed
in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8), the coefficients for both the backward and forward
linkages are higher than they were in the previous columns. The results therefore
suggest that although they are not directly associated with enhancing productivity,
failing to control for these variables could still lead to biased estimates.
In terms of the main results, these are the very interesting findings containing
both positive and negative effects of forward linkages. From the existing literature,
it seems to be more general to support negative spillovers through forward link-
ages. For example, Newman et al. (2015), by focusing on Vietnam, found a 0.00846
unit decrease in firms’ productivity following a one percentage point increase in the
proportion of inputs that is supplied by foreign-owned firms. Javorcik (2004), by
focusing on Lithuania, found a negative effect of forward linkages on both local and
domestic firms’ productivity, although the results were insignificance. By using Irish
data, Barrios et al. (2011) found that forward linkage spillovers appear to be nega-
112
3.5. RESULTS Chapter 3
tive throughout most of their specifications. Focusing on 19 African countries, Go¨rg
and Seric (2016) found a negative association with the new product process used
by domestic input buyers buying from multinationals. Furthermore, Kim (2015),
using South Korea, and Jude (2016), using CEEC countries, found negative forward
spillovers on productivity.
The possibility of having both significantly negative and positive effects from
forward linkages in our results comes from the fact that multinational firms from
upstream sectors might try to dominate market positions, thereby leading to less
competition and higher inputs prices for domestic customers (Girma et al., 2008).
Additionally, some of the domestic firms might still be able to access those intermedi-
ates directly from the upstream multinationals, which may generate some variations
across firms and across sectors. The latter may be associated more with the direct
forward linkages, which would transfer knowledge directly to the domestic firms.
Therefore, using the proportion of imported inputs to proxy the forward linkages
seems to capture variations among the inputs that domestic firms obtain directly
from multinationals with lower costs and thus produces the positive spillovers onto
domestic firms’ productivity. On the other hand, with the exception of the likeli-
hood of higher input prices, inputs produced by multinational firms may be complex
and may cause difficulties when being implemented into the production processes
of domestic firms. Hence, when using the proportion of local inputs to proxy for
forward linkages, the negative spillovers are captured.
3.5.2 Robustness checks
Having looked at the effects of both backward and forward linkages and the potential
omitted variable biases on firms’ productivity, the next question is whether the
findings we have found so far are robust, i.e. could other measures of the production
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Table 3.7: FDI Spillovers Created by Different Production OLS Estimators
Cobb-Douglas Production Function Two-step Production Function
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Horizontal -0.067 -0.062 -0.064 -0.062 -0.070 -0.069 -0.088 -0.080
(0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.047) (0.047) (0.051) (0.051)
Backwardfirm 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Forwardproxy−imp 0.730*** 0.743*** 0.770*** 0.658***
(0.198) (0.201) (0.199) (0.216)
Forwardproxy−buy -0.200** -0.197** -0.178* -0.300***
(0.096) (0.095) (0.094) (0.102)
BackwardimpSupply−Back -0.197 -0.196 -0.139 -0.721
(0.461) (0.466) (0.473) (0.498)
BackwardbuySupply−Back -0.027 -0.029 0.127 -0.188
(0.461) (0.461) (0.496) (0.472)
BackwardfirmMotivation 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.011 0.014
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Forwardproxy−impMotivation -0.053 -0.058 -0.080 0.211
(0.407) (0.407) (0.417) (0.438)
Forwardproxy−buyMotivation -0.062 -0.062 -0.024 -0.014
(0.237) (0.237) (0.245) (0.259)
BackwardfirmTechnology 0.009* 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Forwardproxy−impTechnology -0.189 -0.181 -0.281 -0.11
(0.233) (0.235) (0.235) (0.250)
Forwardproxy−buyTechnology 0.040 0.037 0.031 0.300
(0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.114)
Political Instability 0.001 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.003 0.003 -0.005 -0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Macro Instability -0.016* -0.014*** -0.014* -0.014* -0.019** -0.019** -0.020** -0.020**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Corruption 0.013* 0.013* 0.014** 0.014** 0.013* 0.013* 0.012 0.012
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Export share 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0009*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Age -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007** -0.0007 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
lnL 0.491*** 0.495***
(0.032) (0.032)
LnL− 3yearsago -0.009 -0.006
(0.016) (0.016)
LnK 0.092*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.093***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
LnM 0.469 0.469*** 0.468*** 0.469***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-input Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.9671 0.9650 0.9651 0.9650 0.9030 0.9027 0.8666 0.8664
Observations 5,435 5,435 5,328 5,328 5,435 5,435 5,328 5,328
Notes: Columns (5), (6), (7), and (8) control for lnL, LnL− 3yearsago, LnK, and LnM , respectively, in the first step of the production
function. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The sector-input fixed effects are only controlled for in columns (1) to (4). *,
** and *** are the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
function produce similar results? If the results were substantially different, then the
serious endogeneity of input choice could potentially bias the results. To answer
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Table 3.8: FDI Spillovers Created by Different Production CRE Estimators
Cobb-Douglas Production Function Two-step Production Function
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Horizontal -0.063 -0.062 -0.059 -0.058 -0.068 -0.067 -0.087* -0.080
(0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.047) (0.047) (0.051) (0.051)
Backwardfirm 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Forwardproxy−imp 0.736*** 0.750*** 0.775*** 0.664***
(0.201) (0.204) (0.200) (0.219)
Forwardproxy−buy -0.201** -0.192** -0.174* -0.298***
(0.094) (0.095) (0.094) (0.102)
BackwardimpSupply−Back -0.198 -0.199 -0.142 -0.729
(0.463) (0.468) (0.473) (0.497)
BackwardbuySupply−Back 0.162 -0.010 0.133 -0.204
(0.478) (0.460) (0.496) (0.472)
BackwardfirmMotivation 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.010 0.013
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Forwardproxy−impMotivation -0.038 -0.040 -0.063 0.237
(0.409) (0.410) (0.417) (0.439)
Forwardproxy−buyMotivation -0.091 -0.076 -0.036 -0.017
(0.238) (0.239) (0.245) (0.260)
BackwardfirmTechnology 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Forwardproxy−impTechnology -0.182 -0.173 -0.276 -0.103
(0.236) (0.239) (0.237) (0.252)
Forwardproxy−buyTechnology 0.054 0.049 0.039 0.305
(0.104) (0.105) (0.106) (0.115)
Political Instability 0.001 0.0007 -0.0006 -0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.006 -0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Macro Instability -0.015* -0.015* -0.013 -0.013 -0.018** -0.018** -0.019** -0.020**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Corruption 0.012* 0.012* 0.014** 0.014** 0.013* 0.013* 0.012 0.012
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Export share 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0009*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Age -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
lnL 0.493*** 0.494***
(0.032) (0.032)
LnL− 3yearsago -0.007 -0.005
(0.016) (0.016)
LnK 0.092*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.093***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
LnM 0.467*** 0.468*** 0.466*** 0.467***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-input Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.6442 0.6412 0.6496 0.6463 0.8638 0.8621 0.8648 0.8632
Observations 5,435 5,435 5,328 5,328 5,435 5,435 5,328 5,328
Notes: Columns (5), (6), (7), and (8) control for lnL, LnL− 3yearsago, LnK, and LnM , respectively, in the first step of the production
function. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The sector-input fixed effects are only controlled for in columns (1) to (4).
*, ** and *** are the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
this question, following Barrios et al. (2011) and Commander and Svejnar (2011),
we perform a test by re-estimating Eq.(3.10) in the form of the augmented Cobb-
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Douglas production function to obtain estimated coefficients on the variables of
backward and forward linkages. As suggested in Commander and Svejnar (2011)
for firm’s age, the export share and the full-time employment lagged three years
are the important predictors in the augmented Cobb-Douglas production function;
therefore, we control for these variables in the test.
Columns (1) to (4) in Table 3.7 provide the results for the augmented Cobb-
Douglas production function, while columns (5) to (8) are the results provided by
the two-step production estimation. Estimation in this instance is by pooled OLS
with all country, sector, time and sector-input fixed effects included. All proposed
measures enter the model positively, and the coefficients for both backward and
forward linkages do not change by much. Firm’s age enters negatively and is most
statistically significant at the 1% significance level, and we also find that the export
share is confirmed as statistically significant throughout the specifications. While
the input variables are still confirmed as positive and statistically significant, we
do not find any impacts from the three-year lagged employees. As to the vertical
linkages, regardless of whether these extra controlled variables significantly enter
the models, the effects of vertical spillovers on firms’ productivity remain highly
statistically significant, even when the CRE estimator is employed in Table 3.8.
Thus, we find no evidence that neither the different forms of production estima-
tion nor the extra controlled variables matter in terms of the findings thus far. By
employing the BEEPS data set to analyse foreign ownership and firm performance,
Commander and Svejnar (2011) also document that the Solow residual approach
generates broadly similar results to those obtained by instrumenting the input vari-
ables. Since our findings are consistent with the literature, we evidence that the
endogeneity of input choice is likely less serious in our data.
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3.6 Conclusion
Since Rodriguez-Clare (1996), the literature has highlighted the importance of spill-
overs from FDI on domestic firms’ productivity. To estimate spillovers, the literature
incorporates data from the host country input-output tables to establish measures
determining the strength of sectoral linkages (Javorcik, 2004). However, existing
studies assume homogeneous sourcing and supplying activities across firms and fo-
cus on the importance of backward spillovers on firms’ productivity. This chapter
uses a firm-level survey data set comprising 32 countries to distinguish firms’ hetero-
geneity in sourcing and supplying activities and to refine both backward and forward
spillovers on firms’ productivity. We construct measures to relax the assumptions
used in the literature and compare the results with those obtained using the stan-
dard measures. Our identification strategy reveals that the heterogeneity in firms’
sourcing and supplying activities to be crucial and that both forward and backward
linkages are economically important for improving domestic firms’ productivity. We
find that backward spillovers occur in these developing countries, whilst forward
spillovers can be both positively and negatively associated with firms’ productivity,
depending crucially on the measures we employ.
Relating the proposed measures to backward and forward linkages, we find a
strong and highly statistically significant relationship with domestic firms’ produc-
tivity, suggesting that buying inputs from, and supplying inputs to, multinational
firms induce vertical spillovers. This result holds whether we consider other indi-
rect linkages, factors, or a different form of production function. However, we find
no evidence of such spillovers through backward and forward linkages by using the
standard measures. Although our findings cannot be directly comparable due to
the different data structure that contains different firms, sectors, industries, and
countries from the existing literature, it might still be worth concerning about the
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heterogeneous sourcing and supplying activities across firms, which are assumed to
be homogeneous in the existing studies (such as Javorcik, 2004; Barrios et al., 2011;
Gorodnichenko et al., 2014; Newman et al., 2015; Kim, 2015; Jude, 2016). It is likely
that these differences might play a crucial role in preventing potential spillovers from
arising. In contrast to the earlier studies, our proposed measures attempt to distin-
guish these differences and evaluate the importance of vertical spillovers in terms of
the productivity of domestic firms based on the data that we have.
From an economic point of view, our results indicate that policies aimed at
attracting FDI and encouraging domestic firms to cooperate with multinationals
should be continued, as domestic firms may receive support, assistance, and poten-
tial benefits from multinational business partners. However, as highlighted previ-
ously, our measures post some assumptions, implying that, although they are not
contradictory to the spillovers arising from multinational firms, we cannot explicitly
and conclusively address the difference in domestic firms’ sourcing activities. In
addition, the use of short-term pooled data in our analysis does imply that our es-
timates may still, more or less, be biased. Further to this point, it would be fruitful
for future surveys to cover a more detailed long-term panel’s dimensions systemat-
ically in order that the impact of such heterogeneity on linkage spillovers can be
understood. Therefore, there is still substantial room for improvements via future
work.
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3.7 Appendix
Table 3.9: Sources and Supplies across Countries
Country Code Supply to multinationals Purchase from multinationals Local sourcing proportion
# Mean S.d Mean S.d Mean S.d Mean S.d Mean S.d
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Albania 1 0.290 1.080 0.117 0.192 0.160 0.214 0.436 0.391 0.503 0.421
Armenia 2 1.025 1.803 0.015 0.037 0.097 0.049 0.53 0.405 0.697 0.356
Azerbaijan 3 1.566 2.626 0.028 0.064 0.129 0.074 0.700 0.435 0.730 0.386
Belarus 4 0.181 0.804 0.012 0.022 0.044 0.027 0.407 0.397 0.597 0.376
Bosnia 5 0.756 1.860 0.036 0.080 0.089 0.098 0.313 0.420 0.604 0.407
Bulgaria 6 0.482 1.694 0.007 0.017 0.049 0.027 0.550 0.377 0.727 0.340
Croatia 7 0.911 1.993 0.035 0.056 0.098 0.071 0.436 0.416 0.571 0.398
Czech Rep. 8 0.664 1.824 0.031 0.078 0.223 0.141 0.547 0.347 0.750 0.338
Estonia 9 1.309 2.365 0.032 0.058 0.098 0.081 0.520 0.341 0.592 0.423
FYROM 10 0.820 1.932 0.012 0.018 0.026 0.022 0.200 0.324 0.484 0.405
Georgia 11 0.228 1.035 0.012 0.025 0.059 0.031 0.290 0.364 0.756 0.361
Hungary 12 1.636 2.761 0.010 0.022 0.059 0.029 0.526 0.350 0.736 0.343
Kazakhstan 13 0.747 1.845 0.034 0.087 0.160 0.167 0.257 0.359 0.746 0.361
Kyrgyz 14 0.251 0.981 0.005 0.010 0.022 0.013 0.359 0.414 0.630 0.396
Latvia 15 0.379 1.088 0.010 0.026 0.056 0.045 0.350 0.409 0.625 0.417
Lithuania 16 0.582 1.683 0.033 0.061 0.132 0.080 0.565 0.411 0.686 0.396
Moldova 17 0.344 1.310 0.019 0.048 0.068 0.079 0.700 0.402 0.684 0.396
Montenegro and Serbia 18 0.680 1.887 0.050 0.077 0.131 0.087 0.444 0.348 0.595 0.390
Poland 19 0.800 1.994 0.007 0.028 0.123 0.069 0.559 0.375 0.798 0.310
Romania 20 0.606 1.769 0.026 0.072 0.195 0.108 0.606 0.419 0.785 0.325
Russia 21 0.383 1.413 0.006 0.027 0.120 0.076 0.588 0.394 0.784 0.337
Slovakia 23 1.095 2.453 0.030 0.046 0.090 0.055 0.274 0.287 0.602 0.337
Slovenia 24 0.737 1.869 0.030 0.039 0.076 0.045 0.481 0.291 0.647 0.381
Tajikistan 25 0.643 1.359 0.006 0.016 0.029 0.027 0.664 0.413 0.757 0.355
Ukraine 26 0.302 1.182 0.006 0.021 0.082 0.045 0.480 0.406 0.715 0.350
Uzbekistan 27 0.259 1.240 0.013 0.045 0.148 0.067 0.508 0.399 0.854 0.288
Yugoslavia 28 0.572 1.855 0.075 0.096 0.139 0.110 0.340 0.328 0.545 0.407
Turkey 29 0.576 1.788 0.004 0.011 0.056 0.030 0.633 0.352 0.823 0.276
Guatemala 30 2.125 5.518 0.020 0.027 0.032 0.027 0.192 0.222 0.502 0.413
Honduras 31 2.743 5.791 0.017 0.017 0.021 0.018 0.250 0.427 0.540 0.469
Nicaragua 32 1.758 4.457 0.022 0.057 0.131 0.075 0.586 0.396 0.691 0.385
El Salvador 34 2.159 4.897 0.016 0.025 0.050 0.029 0.212 0.268 0.668 0.380
Note: Montenegro and Serbia are not assigned to the same group in any other surveys in the BEEPS dataset. However, for the
survey rounds in 2002, 2003 and 2005, they are assigned to one group. Ecuador is eliminated from the sample due to lot of missing
values. The codes 22 (Serbia) and 33 (Ecuador) are therefore not included. Columns (4) and (5) represent Eq. (3.5), while columns
(6) and (7) represent Eq. (3.6). Columns (8) and (9) represent multinationals’ local sourcing proportion, while columns (10) and (11)
represent for multinational firms’ local sourcing proportion.
Source: Author’s calculation.
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Table 3.10: Descriptive Statistics by Sourcing from Multinationals
Supplying to Multinationals? Purchasing from Multinationals?
Yes No Yes No Yes No
by Imported Inputs by Local Source
2002 lnK 5.146 4.013 5.073 3.841 4.201 3.844
lnL 3.888 3.283 4.068 3.112 3.418 2.855
lnM 9.898 8.802 10.049 8.555 8.985 8.629
lnSales 6.591 5.505 6.685 5.281 5.692 5.273
Firm’s age 16.366 15.638 17.561 15.077 16.109 12.006
2003 lnK 12.403 11.808 12.922 11.323 11.772 12.910
lnL 3.509 3.509 4.055 2.920 3.262 3.857
lnM 14.508 13.773 14.982 13.280 13.783 14.764
lnSales 15.381 14.848 16.100 14.281 14.808 15.948
Firm’s age 18.262 19.959 21.510 18.669 19.238 23.333
2005 lnK 5.719 4.954 5.868 4.789 5.098 4.736
lnL 3.311 2.886 3.615 2.717 2.983 2.575
lnM 6.698 5.822 6.959 5.670 6.034 5.673
lnSales 6.857 6.043 7.114 5.832 6.194 5.836
Firm’s age 18.353 16.531 19.860 15.735 17.219 12.110
Source: Author’s calculation.
Note: The values are expressed in U.S. dollars.
Table 3.11: Production Function Estimation
OLS FE CRE
(1) (2) (3)
lnK 0.096*** 0.075*** 0.095***
(0.007) (0.022) (0.007)
lnL 0.493*** 0.568*** 0.496***
(0.025) (0.064) (0.025)
lnM 0.437*** 0.283*** 0.434***
(0.024) (0.026) (0.024)
Time Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes
Firm No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.9658 0.6798 0.6479
Observations 5,440 5,440 5,440
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthe-
ses in columns (1) and (3). *, ** and *** are the signifi-
cance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3.12: FDI Linkages for Firm’s Productivity - Panel Data Check.
12 Economies All Economies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: OLS
Horizontal -0.049 0.003 -0.070 -0.038 -0.068 -0.074 -0.017 -0.020
(0.216) (0.197) (0.219) (0.225) (0.098) (0.098) (0.113) (0.113)
ForwardIO 0.327 0.073
(0.472) (0.175)
BackwardIO -0.442 0.111 0.077
(0.633) (0.242) (0.241)
Backwardfirm 0.047*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.027***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011)
Forwardproxy−imp 0.799* 0.603*** 0.561**
(0.485) (0.254) (0.251)
Forwardproxy−buy -0.201 0.014 0.035
(0.315) (0.178) (0.174)
Panel B: Fixed-effect
Horizontal 0.103 0.102 0.018 0.045 0.031 0.011 0.079 0.062
(0.241) (0.241) (0.272) (0.275) (0.190) (0.191) (0.206) (0.206)
ForwardIO -2.936 0.301
(3.759) (0.675)
BackwardIO 3.923 0.249 0.335
(4.477) (0.967) (0.967)
Backwardfirm -0.017 -0.011 -0.026 -0.018 -0.031
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025)
Forwardproxy−imp 0.498 0.956 0.960
(1.061) (0.617) (0.626)
Forwardproxy−buy -0.240 -0.126 -0.092
(0.485) (0.316) (0.333)
Panel C: Correlated Random-effect
Horizontal 0.101 0.066 -0.054 -0.027 -0.052 -0.058 -0.016 -0.021
(0.183) (0.169) (0.192) (0.199) (0.093) (0.093) (0.111) (0.111)
ForwardIO 0.256 -0.025
(0.480) (0.152)
BackwardIO -0.431 0.034 0.006
(0.615) (0.205) (0.210)
Backwardfirm 0.028*** 0.019*** 0.015* 0.027*** 0.022***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Forwardproxy−imp 0.764 0.575** 0.604*
(0.512) (0.247) (0.273)
Forwardproxy−buy -0.159 0.039 0.023
(0.310) (0.168) (0.172)
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-input No No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 691 691 612 612 1,132 1,132 1,131 1,131
Note: The table presents the results based on the small panel of firms. We try to see whether firms and other unobserved time-invariant effects
matter in the results. In columns (1) to (4), we regress dependent variable on 12 economies, while columns (5) and (8) show the results for 32
economies. Other controls including Supply-Back , Political Instability, Macro Instability, Corruption, Export share and Age, are controlled
for throughout specifications. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, except the results reported in Panel B. *, ** and *** are
the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Chapter 4
Foreign Ownership, Core Product
Competence and Markups
4.1 Introduction
UNCTAD (2017) records that the global flows of foreign direct investment (hence-
forth, FDI) reached $1.75 trillion in 2016, while 37% of that amount flowed into
developing countries. The large volume of FDI inflows received by those develop-
ing countries suggests the importance of the participation of multinational firms in
their economic development. Indeed, the literature has documented that produc-
tivity spillovers from multinational firms often contribute to positive productivity
gains for firms in developing countries. For instance, a growing body of work focus-
ing on the productivity spillover effects finds productivity gains occurring typically
through vertical linkages (Javorcik, 2004, for Lithuania; Gorodnichenko et al., 2014,
for 17 emerging economies; Newman et al., 2015, for Vietnam). Considering the fact
that local sourcing decisions may be endogenous, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008)
document that joint-venture foreign projects generate more productivity spillovers
to the host country compared to greenfield FDI projects, while studies by Arnold
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and Javorcik (2009) and Chang, Chung, and Moon (2013), who exploit acquisition
decisions and their effects on firms’ productivity, find that foreign ownership leads
to greater productivity gains for the acquired firms and that these acquire firms out-
perform local firms ultimately. Besides, foreign firms are also likely to lead to lower
marginal production costs and increased product quantities and quality (Stiebale &
Vencappa, 2018). Further to this, the theoretical literature also focuses on analysing
how multi-product firms’ core product competences enhance their productivity.
Recently, it has been pointed out that firms respond to increased foreign compe-
tition from international markets by dropping their worst-performing products and
reallocating resources towards the most competitive product lines (Bernard et al.,
2011; Mayer et al., 2014). By assuming that multi-product firms have their own core
competences and that they are less efficient in the production of varieties outside
their core competences, Eckel and Neary (2010) highlight that productivity increases
as firms concentrate on their core product lines following a decrease in product va-
riety. Following these studies, firms may respond to the increased product market
competition induced by the presence of multinational firms by selecting the prod-
uct lines that are more likely to succeed and experience productivity improvements.
This response operates potentially through multinationals increasing product mar-
ket competition, thus motivating domestic firms to reallocate production towards
core products, ultimately improving productivity1. Although the theoretical models
on multi-product firms have been very well developed (e.g., Bernard et al., 2011;
Eckel & Neary, 2010; Mayer et al., 2014), this crucial mechanism has received lit-
tle attention in the FDI literature, and few empirical studies have attempted to
incorporate these theories on FDI.
1Note also that multinational subsidiaries tend to invest more in innovation due to access to
technology and export opportunities (Guadalupe et al., 2012), whilst domestic incumbents that
were close to the frontier initially may be encouraged to innovate via the presence of a highly-
productive competitors (Aghion et al., 2015). These related mechanisms may also explain the
increase in firms’ productivity.
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Inspired by the literature on multi-product firms, it is thus the aim of this chapter
to identify empirically the mechanisms of productivity gains resulting from the skew-
ness towards core product competence – which we define it as the ratio of a firm’s
core product sales over the total sales throughout the analysis – via the presence of
foreign ownership - a fundamental link that provides local firms with market access
(market expansion), improvements of core production processes, and product inno-
vation. We exploit a novel channel through which the foreign ownership increases
firms’ productivity via the concentration effect within an industry. Doing so allows
us to establish a mechanism - variety further from the firm’s core competence lowers
productivity (Eckel & Neary, 2010)2 - that may act as an important mechanism in
explaining the changes in firms productivity. In addition, we complement our work
by also analysing the product market competition linked to the presence of foreign
ownership and firm’s core product competences. By doing so, we distinguish our
work from recent empirical studies by Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008), Borin and
Mancini (2016), and Weche (2018). These studies do not analyse product market
competition and core product competence, implying that all firms in their studies
are assumed to be single-product firms and market competition and core product
competence are left in the error term. They only look at the relationship between
FDI and firm-level productivity, which makes it impossible to address the issue of
differential core competences induced by the multinationals across industries. How-
ever, in one of the most prominent studies, Hottman, Redding, and Weinstein (2016)
show that 69% of firms supply more than one barcode and that these firms account
for more than 99% of output in their sectors, which indicates that multi-product
firms are the norm rather than the exception.
2The model of multi-product firms suggests that the technology of multi-product firms is char-
acterised by a core competence and flexible manufacturing and the marginal cost is assumed to
be the lowest for the core product with most efficient product process produced (Eckel & Neary,
2010).
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Our results are based on a cross-country, firm-level dataset drawn from the World
Bank Enterprise Survey covering 112 developing countries during the period 2006-
2016. Our data suggest that the presence of foreign ownership skews firms’ produc-
tion towards the core product lines, while our empirical results show that both the
foreign ownership share and whether the firm is foreign-owned exhibit positive and
statistically significant effects on core product competence (i.e., skewness towards
the best-performing product) and that this positive effect contributes ultimately to
firms’ productivity. We further document empirically that the product market com-
petition introduced by the presence of foreign ownership reduces the markups across
all product lines and that this effect alters the distribution of a firm’s core product
competence3. The results show a statistically significant and negative effect of the
presence of foreign ownership on markups, and this effect is ultimately passed onto
the firm’s core product competence.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of markups and
FDI literature. Next, Section 4.3 presents the theoretical hypotheses that guide the
empirical analysis. Further, Section 4.4 outlines the empirical strategy, while Section
4.5 describes the firm-level survey data. The empirical results and conclusions are
presented in Ssections 4.6 and section 4.7, respectively.
4.2 Literature Review
A relatively large body of literature now exists which explores productivity differ-
ences across both domestic and foreign-owned firms. Guadalupe et al. (2012) suggest
3As we illustrated in Section 4.3, the presence of foreign ownership is likely to affect a firm’s
decision in terms of product market expansion and/or product innovation - for example, by provid-
ing an increase in export market access that comes with foreign ownership, the exported product
mix might be associated with markups which might further have an impact on altering firms’
core product competence. We have not empirically examined these potential mechanisms in this
chapter but these mechanisms will be implemented in our future work.
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that multinational subsidiaries generally outperform domestic firms because multi-
national firms provide fundamental links that allow acquired firms to access process
and product innovations. They find that multinational subsidiaries innovate more
due to the increase in market access promoted by the multinational firms. A number
of studies also offer related insight by evaluating the effects of foreign ownership on
firms’ productivity. For example, Javorcik (2004) shows that the presence of for-
eign ownership generates positive externalities via backward linkages to local input
suppliers in Lithuania. Blalock and Gertler (2008) find evidence of productivity
gains for the firms that supply inputs to multinationals in Indonesian manufactur-
ing. While Arnold and Javorcik (2009) focus on the causal relationship between
foreign ownership and plant performance, Haskel et al. (2007) focus on whether the
productivity of domestic plants is correlated with foreign ownership in these plants.
Both studies confirm productivity improvements through foreign acquisition4.
In addition, there are a number of alternative mechanisms in the theory of
multi-product firms that may potentially link productivity improvement and multi-
national firms. Work done by Bernard et al. (2011), for example, shows that in-
creased product-market competition coming from international trade enhances the
zero-profit cut-off and reduces the average prices of varieties supplied by competing
firms, which lowers markups and increases within-firm productivity. The surviving
firms would respond to this market adjustment by dropping the products that have
lower values with respect to product attributes and would experience increases in
productivity. Eckel and Neary (2010) and Mayer et al. (2014) also suggest that
4Another informative study by Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) discusses the effect of the endo-
geneity of a firm’s sourcing behaviour on the extent of productivity spillovers. They suggest that
affiliates with joint domestic and foreign ownership (those firms having foreign equity of less than
10%) may face lower costs of production, as it is easier for them to find local suppliers of intermedi-
ates. Therefore, they tend to engage more in local sourcing activities, perhaps further implying that
foreign-owned firms (with more than 10% of foreign equity) may face higher costs of production,
as they tend to source materials abroad as opposed to obtaining supplies from domestically-owned
firms. Thus, in some circumstances, foreign-owned firms may be less productive.
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the tougher market competition shifts down the distribution of markups across all
products and induces firms to reallocate resources towards their better-performing
products and constitutes an improvement in productivity.
While the literature has emphasized the impact of competition pressure linked to
multi-product firms and international trade, similar effects from FDI with ownership
advantages (e.g., firm-specific assets and knowledge capital) to the local firms in the
host country may also be expected (Markusen, 1995). A number of studies have
thus attempted to assess the effect of multinational firms on markups. For instance,
in the study by Stiebale and Vencappa (2018), the authors look at the relationship
between foreign acquisition, markups, marginal costs, and product quality. Using
firm-product-level data for India, they find that while foreign multinational firms
increase the quality of products produced by the firms they acquire, acquisitions
are associated with high markups and lower marginal costs, on average. The result
implies that productivity spillovers may occur through an increase in the quantities
of existing products. Using Turkish data, on the other hand, Bircan (2019) finds
that foreign competition leads to a reduction in prices following acquisition but the
evidence regarding markups is insignificant. Focusing on the competitive effects
of trade and FDI on markups, Weche (2018), who uses six European countries
comprising 145,477 firm-year observations for 34,895 individual firms through 2006-
2013, finds no significant effect of FDI penetration on domestic markups. In contrast,
Chung (2001) finds that a foreign presence introduces additional competitors and
leads to lower markups in the domestic market. However, Aitken and Harrison
(1999) argue that multinational firms have both positive and negative influences
on market competition based on an empirical analysis of Venezuelan plants. By
introducing additional competitors, foreign firms harm incumbents’ productivity by
spreading their fixed costs across fewer, increasing the average cost and compressing
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markups5 6 7.
Although it is clear that the presence of multinationals would increase market
competition, the existing empirical findings in the effect of increased competition
induced by the presence of multinational firms remain ambiguous, and how the for-
eign presence alters product market competition and then further alters firms’ core
product production, which may result as productivity improvement, is still unclear.
As mentioned previously, firms respond to increased foreign competition by drop-
ping their worst-performing products, as the increased competition lowers markups
across all product lines. Mayer et al. (2014) and Eckel and Neary (2010) further
suggest that firms’ productivity declines when the product variety increases, as in-
creased variety pulls firms away from their core competences due to the additional
customization costs (i.e., the cannibalization effect). Each additional product di-
minishes the demand for a firm’s existing products and thus firms are encouraged
to focus on their “core competences” and drop marginal high-cost varieties, result-
ing in productivity improvements as firms become more concentrated on their core
product lines8.
Given that firms may reallocate resources towards higher-attribute products and
5Sembenelli and Siotis (2008) also note that foreign-owned firms (foreign ownership higher than
50%) increase market competition, but the results are limited to R&D-intensive industries in Spain.
The study suggests that there is no short-run effect of market competition that can be transferred
to productivity improvement.
6Another explanation is that the host industry firms are mature enough to meet the foreign
firms’ competitive challenge (Caves, 1974, p.184). If relatively nascent, incumbents will be unable
to reduce inefficiency, borrow technology, or otherwise catch up (Chung, 2001, p.187).
7One additional and very informative study focusing on multinational firms and markups is
Javorcik and Poelhekke (2017). They examine the effect of ownership changes on markups, TFP,
and output in order to investigate whether the positive effect of foreign ownership on firm perfor-
mance relies on a one-time knowledge transfer or not. The authors use divestment data(divestment
occurs when foreign affiliates are sold to local owners) from the Indonesian Census of Manufac-
turing for the period 1990-2009. Using the difference-in-difference approach, they find that the
benefits of foreign ownership are associated with the parent company providing distribution net-
works. Divested plants experience a large drop in markups, exported outputs, TFP, and imported
inputs.
8By using a panel data from Brazilian multi-product exporters, Arkolakis and Muendler (2010)
also find that firms’ productivity declines with each additional variety supplied to a market.
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changing product compositions because of the increased foreign competition, by
using a cross-country firm-level panel data Alfaro and Chen (2018) offer empirical
support to emphasize the mechanisms by which multinational firms could also in-
fluence domestic firms’ performances through product reallocations. They establish
the link between foreign entry and firm’s productivity by taking into account the
endogeneity of the foreign presence and then estimate its effect on different bins of
TFP9 and the effect of foreign presence on labour, revenue, and R&D10. By measur-
ing product space with the average probability of new foreign multinational entry
across a domestic firm’s product mix, the entry of multinationals in domestic prod-
uct space leads to a negative market reallocation effect but no effect is found on
productivity, while a significant and positive relationship between product dropping
and multinational entry is found. Although the authors suggest that foreign entrants
increases market competition and hence motivate domestic firms to drop products
and reallocate resources towards other remained products, due to the absence of
competition effects operate at firm’s core product competence in the analysis their
findings may only provide evidence of an indirect mechanism for adjusting product
composition through multinationals.
As mentioned above, the existing literature on FDI has focused rarely on a firm’s
core product competence to explain the features of FDI and the firm’s improvement
in productivity. To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence on how the
presence of foreign ownership affects a firm’s core product competence and results
in an improvement in productivity or how it affects a firm’s core product com-
9The authors run the regression on domestic firms’ productivity throughout the different levels
of TFP distribution, from “All”, “less than 25%”, “between 25%-50%”, “between 50%-75%”, to
“75% and higher” on the predicted multinational corporation entry, lagged revenue, firm’s age,
and so forth.
10The authors follow the literature and use financial shock to take into account the endogeneity
of the foreign presence. They also use different TFPs in quartiles to access the different effects
of multinational entry. To analyse the resource reallocation, they employ the variables mentioned
above. With technology upgrading, the authors separate different R&D groups via R&D intensity.
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petence through product market competition. We believe that establishing these
mechanisms empirically is of particular importance in terms of building a better
understanding of the sources behind productivity gains from multinational firms.
4.3 The Presence of Foreign Ownership and Within-
Firm Productivity
In this section, we present a number of testable hypotheses that describe the mecha-
nisms through which the within-firm productivity improvement occurs via the pres-
ence of foreign ownership. We focus on a firm’s core product competence and
markups as two potentially important mechanisms that may provide links to the
within-firm productivity improvement and distinguish which of these two mecha-
nisms the productivity gains occurs through. We discuss how to disentangle these
mechanisms by exploiting the predictions of a stylized theoretical framework based
on the existing multi-product firms theory.
4.3.1 Framework Illustration and Hypotheses Outlined
The impact of the presence of foreign ownership on firms’ productivity in the host
country can be established using the theoretical model of multi-product firms found
in Eckel and Neary (2010) and Mayer et al. (2014). In these models, consumer
preferences are defined over a continuum-quadratic of differentiated varieties. The
cases of perfect substitutes and the demand for each good, which is completely
independent on other goods, are ruled out (Eckel & Neary, 2010). Consumers are
assumed to have a positive demand for any variety, and the price of a given variety
is the same everywhere.
To produce goods, all firms are assumed to have a core product that uses the most
130
4.3. THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND WITHIN-FIRM
PRODUCTIVITY Chapter 4
efficient production process. Thus, each firm is characterized by a core competence
and flexible manufacturing. The marginal cost varies across varieties but is constant
with quantity produced. As illustrated, the firm’s core product uses the most effi-
cient production process so that the marginal cost is the lowest for the core variety.
Each additional variety entails additional marginal11 and customization costs12 and
pulls a firm away from its core competence. As the multinationals operating in the
host country are likely to motivate domestic firms to reallocate resources towards
more efficient products (Alfaro & Chen, 2018) and lead them to make different de-
cisions in terms of product variety (Brambilla, 2009), we summarize the above as
the effect of the presence of foreign ownership on firms’ core product competences
and therefore formulate the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1. Altering Core Product Competence via the Presence
of Foreign Ownership: Foreign ownership facilitates firms access to technology
and thereby alters the decision in terms of product variety. The presence of foreign
ownership therefore induces host-country firms to drop the least efficient varieties
and reallocate resources across surviving varieties.
In addition, firms’ core product competence may further influence firms’ produc-
tivity, as Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010), Bernard et al. (2011), Mayer et al.
(2014), and Alfaro and Chen (2018) highlight that firms reallocate resources towards
higher-attribute product lines and hence further increase productivity. It has also
been emphasized that varieties further from the firm’s core competence have higher
labour requirements and, in the context of price-weighted output, lower productiv-
11Eckel and Neary (2010) assume that the marginal production cost of each variety is a strictly
increasing function of the mass of products produced, while Mayer et al. (2014) assume that
the marginal cost for the varieties produced by a firm with a core marginal cost is increasing in
customization costs (competence ladder).
12The customization cost is denoted as the cannibalization effect in Eckel and Neary (2010).
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ity (Eckel & Neary, 2010), which implies that the effect of the presence of foreign
ownership on core product competence may consequently raise firms’ productivity.
We summarize this effect with the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2. Productivity Increases as Firms Skew Production To-
wards Core Competences: Firms in the host country become more productive
when the alteration of core product competence induced by the presence of foreign
ownership occurs, as they may benefit from improvements of core production pro-
cesses.
Next, we consider the impact of the presence of foreign ownership on product
market competition (markups), as the presence of foreign ownership is likely to
affect firms’ decision in terms of product market expansion and/or product inno-
vation, which would further increase product market competition. As illustrated
in the model of multi-product firms, openness to foreign market increases market
competition, markups fall as tougher competition lowers average prices across all
products (Mayer et al., 2014). Similarly, the presence of foreign ownership may also
induce product market competition and then lower markups across all products, as
the firm with high foreign ownership may be more able to access external assistance
from its multinational company (getting access export market and/or product inno-
vation, for example), which may also increase competition within an industry. We
summarize this mechanism in the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 3. The Presence of Foreign Ownership Lowers the Markup:
As foreign ownership comes with an increase in market access and/or external
sources for product innovation, the presence of foreign ownership thus increases the
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product market competition through reducing markups across all products.
The extent of the effect of product market competition (reducing markups) in-
duced by the presence of foreign ownership could further alter firms’ core product
competences, making firms become skewed towards better-performing product lines.
Assuming a Cournot competition, as in Eckel and Neary (2010), greater competition
results in a negative correlation between industry output and equilibrium output.
Given its total output and the symmetric structure of demand, a firm charges higher
prices for products when less of each variety is produced. However, greater product
market competition from rival firms reduces the prices that firms can charge for their
varieties. Therefore, this effect would encourage firms to choose their most valuable
product lines to concentrate on based on the assumption that a firm uses the most
efficient product process to produce their core products with the lowest marginal cost
(Eckel & Neary, 2010). This reflection may be amplified once we consider the multi-
national competition in the host country, as highlighted in Mayer et al. (2014), which
increases the market size, technology improvements (which may occur through the
presence of foreign ownership), and product substitutability (within the expanded
product range), all of which lead to tougher competition and thus further encour-
age firms to skew their production towards their better-performing products13. We
summarize this mechanism in the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 4. Product Market Competition Induces Firms to Skew
Towards Core Variety: The effect of reduced markups due to the presence of for-
eign ownership alters the distribution of firms’ core product competences ultimately.
13It can also be seen in Eckel and Neary (2010) that the net effect of globalization is a fall in
product scope, i.e., it encourages firms to prune their product lines by concentrating on their core
competencies in order to respond to the greater market competition effects.
133
4.4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY Chapter 4
Having established testable hypotheses, we then examine these hypotheses empiri-
cally in Section 4.6 with both the stylized facts and econometric analyses.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy involves the estimation of the impact of foreign ownership on
the changes in firms’ core product competences, productivity, and markups follow-
ing our outlined hypotheses 1 to 4. Therefore, we first examine a firm’s core product
competence as a function of the presence of foreign ownership and control for firm
characteristics and time-invariant factors across countries, sectors, and years. Pri-
marily, we regress the core product competence, as defined below, on the foreign
ownership across each firm, sector, and country throughout the 2006-2016 period,
whilst controlling for firm size, sector, country, and year fixed effects to mitigate the
bias as much as possible. The specification can be written as follows:
CoreProductCompetencei,s,c,t = β0 + βFFi,s,c,t
+ βsizesizei,s,c,t + ds + dc + dt + ξi,s,c,t
(4.1)
where the dependent variable is the core product competence measured as the share
of total sales. The F represents the Foreign Ownership Share and, alternatively, the
Foreign Dummy for each firm i across sector s in country c at time t. The former
is measured in percents (%), while the latter is defined as a dummy which is equal
to 1 if the firm has foreign ownership of at least 50%. The size denotes the firm’s
size. Given the fact that Eq. (4.1) does not allow us to access the effects of the
skewness of core product competence on productivity, namely, examine hypothesis
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2, we therefore estimate the following equation:
TFPi,s,c,t = β0 + βcore ̂CoreProductCompetencei,s,c,t
+ γX
′
i,s,c,t + ds + dc + dt + ξi,s,c,t
(4.2)
where the ̂CoreProductCompetence is the index of core product competence in-
strumented by either the foreign ownership shares or the foreign dummy from the
first-stage Eq. (4.1). The vector X denotes the covariates including the firm’s
age, total sales, and sales three-years lagged. The TFP is the firm’s productivity
measured by using the two-step production function and also the one by using the
value added (Commander & Svejnar, 2011). We discuss the estimation of TFP in
subsection 4.4.2.
However, one remaining concern is the issue of selection, i.e., whether multina-
tionals target local firms based on productivity (cherry-picking) or some unobserv-
able characteristics. To address this selection bias, we follow the procedure adopted
by Khandker, Koolwal, and Samad (2010), Guadalupe et al. (2012), Mallick and
Yang (2013), Borin and Mancini (2016), Javorcik and Poelhekke (2017), and Webster
and Piesse (2018) and employ propensity score matching. As noted by Mallick and
Yang (2013) and Webster and Piesse (2018), propensity score matching can allevi-
ate the issue of selection bias by creating treatment and control groups with similar
characteristics. We discuss this approach in Subsection 4.4.3.
Second, we estimate the effect of the presence of foreign ownership on product
market competition using the following equation:
Markupsi,s,c,t = β0 + βFFi,s,c,t + βsizesizei,s,c,t + ds + dc + dt + ξi,s,c,t (4.3)
where the dependent variable is the mark-up for firm i in sector s and country c at
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time t and is a preferred competition indicator following the empirical literature (e.g.,
Weche, 2018). We control for all sector, country, year, year-country, and year-sector
fixed effects. For firm-level markups, we follow the mark-up estimation developed
by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). We detail our mark-up estimation in Section
4.4.1. Note that it is important that firms are assigned to the foreign-owned group
in a manner not driven entirely by selection bias . As previously mentioned, we use
propensity score matching to mitigate this issue. To assess the impact of the market
competition due to the presence of foreign ownership on the change in core product
competence, we estimate the following equation:
CoreProductCompetencei,s,c,t = β0 + βcore ̂Markupsi,s,c,t
+ γX
′
i,s,c,t + ds + dc + dt + ξi,s,c,t
(4.4)
where ̂Markups represents the markups instrumented by either the foreign owner-
ship shares or the foreign dummy variable from the first- stage Eq. (4.3), and the
vector X is as defined above. Again, we control for sector, country, and year fixed
effects. Firm clustering is also used in all regressions to allow for the correlations of
errors within each firm (Alfaro & Chen, 2018).
4.4.1 Estimated Mark-up based on Output Elasticity
A preferred market competition indicator in the literature is the measured markups
at the firm-level (Weche, 2018). However, markup estimation developed in the
industrial organization literature often relies on the availability of very detailed
market-level data in terms of input prices, physical output, and quantities of firms’
products, which makes the markups estimation an intractable and demanding task.
To overcome such difficulties, early studies such as Hall (1986) and Klettle (1999),
for example, developed a simple way to estimate markups using production data
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with information on the firm or industry-level usage of inputs and the total value of
shipments. After that, De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) developed a new framework
to calculate markups by using the share of expenditures on material inputs in the
total value of production. Their mark-up estimation does not require data on the
price differences as well as the cost of capital. Instead, only deflated revenue data
are required. This approach leads to a flexible methodology and reliable estimates.
The estimation in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) has been widely applied in
the recent FDI literature14. For instance, Stiebale and Vencappa (2018) study the
effects of the domestic and foreign acquisition on markups, Weche (2018) studies
the competitive effects of FDI focusing on the change in markups, and Javorcik
and Poelhekke (2017) study the determinants of foreign divestments by estimating
the impact of markups, TFP, and output. We therefore follow De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012) to estimate firm-level markups.
In order to obtain markups, first we need to calculate the output elasticity for
labour, capital, and material. Following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), we
estimate the production function for each firm across sectors using the translog
production function. The estimation is done in two-steps. The first step is the
14One additional study closely related to De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) is the study
De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2016). Although they do not focus on the rela-
tionship between markups and FDI, they provide a simple framework on the estimation of firm’s
markups, formalizing how markups, prices, and cost components would adjust during the trade
liberalization. The approach used in De Loecker et al. (2016) is based on De Loecker and Warzyn-
ski (2012), but the authors extend their methodology to address the so-called input price bias.
This bias stems from the unobserved allocation of inputs across products within multi-product
firms and stems from unobserved input prices. They highlight the importance of assuming non-
constant markups in trade models when quantifying the gains from trade. By using data for a large
number of firms based on India’s trade liberalization, they find a sharp decline in marginal costs
due to input tariff liberalization, while prices do not fall by as much (as so-called the imperfect
pass-through). They suggest that this result occurs since firms offset the cost declines by raising
markups, while trade liberalization has a large effect on marginal costs and markups.
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following:
yi,s,c,t = βlli,s,c,t + βlll
2
i,s,c,t + βkki,s,c,t + βkkk
2
i,s,c,t + βmmi,s,c,t
+ βmmm
2
i,s,c,t + βlkli,s,c,tki,s,c,t + βlmli,s,c,tmi,s,c,t
+ βmkmi,s,c,tki,s,c,t + βlmkli,s,c,tmi,s,c,tki,s,c,t + ωi,s,c,t + εi,s,c,t
(4.5)
where we obtain estimates of expected output (yˆi,s,c,t) and an estimate for εi,s,c,t.
The expected output is then estimated alongside variables potentially affecting input
demand, described below:
yˆi,s,c,t = βˆlli,s,c,t + βˆlll
2
i,s,c,t + βˆkki,s,c,t + βˆkkk
2
i,s,c,t + βˆmmi,s,c,t+
+ βˆmmm
2
i,s,c,t + βˆlkli,s,c,tki,s,c,t + βˆlmli,s,c,tmi,s,c,t+
+ βˆmkmi,s,c,tki,s,c,t + βˆlmkli,s,c,tmi,s,c,tki,s,c,t + ht(mi,s,c,t, ki,s,c,t, zi,s,c,t)
(4.6)
Where ωi,s,c,t = ht(mi,s,c,t, ki,s,c,t, zi,s,c,t) (De Loecker, 2011, p.1425; De Loecker &
Warzynski, 2012, p.2447). Under a translog production function, the output elastic-
ities for labour, capital and material are computed using the estimated coefficients
and current inputs after the first stage:
θˆMi,s,c,t = βˆm + 2βˆmmmi,s,c,t + βˆlmli,s,c,t + βˆmkki,s,c,t + βˆlmkli,s,c,tki,s,c,t (4.7)
θˆLi,s,c,t = βˆl + 2βˆllli,s,c,t + βˆlkki,s,c,t + βˆlmmi,s,c,t + βˆlmkki,s,c,tmi,s,c,t (4.8)
θˆKi,s,c,t = βˆm + 2βˆkkki,s,c,t + βˆkmmi,s,c,t + βˆklli,s,c,t + βˆlmkmi,s,c,tli,s,c,t (4.9)
138
4.4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY Chapter 4
We use these output elasticities to calculate the firm’s markups. Following De Loecker
and Warzynski (2012) and De Loecker et al. (2016), the markup estimation at the
firm-level is described below:
µi,s,c,t = θˆ
X
i,s,c,t
Pi,s,c,tQi,s,c,t
Pi,s,c,tXi,s,c,t
= θˆXi,s,c,t(α
X
i,s,c,t)
−1
(4.10)
where Xi,s,c,t denotes the firm’s expenditure on inputs. α
X
i,s,c,t is the share of expen-
ditures on input Xi,s,c,t in total sales (De Loecker & Warzynski, 2012; De Loecker et
al., 2016), Pi,s,c,tXi,s,c,t denotes the input allocation, and θˆ
X
i,s,c,t is the output elasticity
for firm i in sector s, country c at time t.
As noted by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), input allocation Pi,s,c,tXi,s,c,t
is unobservable due the fact that firms do not report this information. No price
data are available either15. Therefore, following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012),
we replace it by using data on input expenditure shares (αXi,s,c,t) and only estimate
markups using production data with output elasticity of one input (material) of
production and data on the material expenditures share of total revenue. Note that
this is important to add one more stage to eliminate any variation in expenditure
shares (αXi,s,c,t) that comes from variation in output not related to the elasticity of
demand and productivity (De Loecker & Warzynski, 2012). We follow De Loecker
and Warzynski (2012) to correct this variation as follows:
αˆXi,s,c,t = αi,s,c,t × exp(˜i,s,c,t) (4.11)
15Note that as pointed out by Alfaro and Chen (2018), the relationship between prices and
markups would still be unclear even if the price or physical output information were observable.
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) also show that only the level of the markups is potentially affected
when such data on physical output are not available. Further to this, Javorcik and Poelhekke
(2017), who do not observe any physical measures of output and price data, follow the same
markup estimation of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).
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where the i,s,c,t is provided by the first stage of the procedure from Eq. (4.15).
We take the correction into account by multiplying the expected value of estimated
productivity residual and then use the above equations to compute the markups,
based on material, labour and capital elasticities, respectively:
µMi,s,c,t = θˆ
M
i,s,c,t(αˆ
M
i,s,c,t)
−1 (4.12)
µLi,s,c,t = θˆ
L
i,s,c,t(αˆ
L
i,s,c,t)
−1 (4.13)
µKi,s,c,t = θˆ
K
i,s,c,t(αˆ
K
i,s,c,t)
−1 (4.14)
Equations (4.12) to (4.14) are therefore the mark-up estimation from the material
elasticity, labour elasticity. and capital elasticity. We prefer to use the mark-up
estimation from materials Eq. (4.12), as highlighted by Bircan (2019) that material
elasticity is less likely to be adjusted compared with the labour’s share of expendi-
ture, capital’s share of expenditure as well as labour and capital’s elasticities. We
provide the results of the estimated mark-up in Section 4.6.1.
4.4.2 Estimating TFP
Our analysis requires the estimation of firm-level productivity. The standard ap-
proach uses OLS estimation following a two-step procedure to extract the estimated
productivity (Marin & Sasidharan, 2010; Van Beveren, 2012; Gorodnichenko et al.,
2014). However, there are debates over OLS estimation regarding its assumption
of the independence of inputs from firm’s efficiency (Wooldridge, 2009; Smeets &
Warzynski, 2013; Olley & Pakes, 1992; Ackerberg, Caves, & Frazer, 2006). Never-
theless, data limitation forces our productivity estimation to rely on the standard
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OLS estimation, as the approaches including Olley and Pakes (1992), Ackerberg et
al. (2006), and Wooldridge (2009) require a long-term panel data structure to be
used in the productivity estimation. Therefore, we follow the studies Javorcik and
Poelhekke (2017) and Bircan (2019) to estimate the firm-level productivity based
on Eq. (4.5), including squared terms, all interactions and year, sector, and country
fixed-effects at the first-step to control for any heterogeneity over time in the pro-
duction function. In the second step, we extract the predicted productivity $ˆi,s,c,t
once we obtain estimators for each factor by running the following equation
$ˆi,s,c,t = lnyi,s,c,t − βˆlli,s,c,t − βˆlll2i,s,c,t − βˆkki,s,c,t − βˆkkk2i,s,c,t − βˆmmi,s,c,t − βˆmmm2i,s,c,t
− βˆlkli,s,c,tki,s,c,t − βˆlmli,s,c,tmi,s,c,t − βˆmkmi,s,c,tki,s,c,t − βˆlmkli,s,c,tmi,s,c,tki,s,c,t
(4.15)
Alternatively, as highlighted by the studies Commander and Svejnar (2011) and
Newman et al. (2015), we can use the natural logarithm of value added to check for
the robustness of the results. In doing so, the variable lnyi,s,c,t is replaced by the log
value added, which is defined as the difference between total sales and the material
inputs (Commander & Svejnar, 2011, p.313):
V alueAddedi,s,c,t = yi,s,c,t −mi,s,c,t
We take the natural logarithm of V alueAdded and re-estimate equations (4.15) to
obtain the firm-level productivity estimate. For simplicity, we denote the productiv-
ity provided by Eq. (4.15) as lnTFP1, whereas the one provided by the value added
is denoted as lnTFP2. The distribution of lnTFP1 and lnTFP2 over the foreign-
owned and domestic-owned firms is provided in Figure 4.1. The figure shows that
foreign-owned firms are more skewed towards the right-tail of the productivity dis-
tribution with higher productivity performance, regardless of which TFP measure
is used. This is in line with the existing literature, for example, Borin and Mancini
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Figure 4.1: The Kernel Density of Productivity across Foreign-Owned Firms and
Domestically-Owned Firms
(2016) show that TFP distribution of multinationals dominates that of exporters,
which in turn dominates the productivity distribution of domestic firms.
4.4.3 Roy-Rubin Causal Model
One of the features in our empirical analysis is to examine the impact of the presence
of foreign ownership on firms’ core product competence, TFP, and markups, to the
counter-factual had the firm not been foreign-owned. To do this we employ the
Roy-Rubin model (Roy, 1951; Rubin, 1974; Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008).
4.4.3.1 The Average Treatment Effects
We begin by defining a binary random variable Di = 0, 1 with Di = 1 if a firm
is foreign-owned and Di = 0 if a firm is domestically owned, and i = 1, 2, ..., N .
The outcomes of interest include the firm’s main products competence, firm-level
markups, and productivity, where we denote each alternative outcome as Yi. For a
firm picked at random from the population, the observed outcome is the potential
outcome associated with the treatment received:
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Yi =

Y1,i, if Di = 1
Y0,i, if Di = 0
= Y1,iDi + Y0,i(1−Di)
= Y0,i + (Y1,i − Y0,i)Di
(4.16)
A firm is either treated (foreign-owned) or not treated (domestically-owned), so we
only observe one potential outcome for each firm. We can now estimate the average
difference in observed outcomes by treatment status as follows:
E(Yi|D = 1)− E(Yi|D = 0) = E(Y1,i|D = 1)− E(Y0,i|D = 0) (4.17)
We first estimate the average treatment effect (henceforth, ATE) for a firm drawn
at random from the population:
τ = E(Y1,i − Y0,i)
= E[E(Y1,i − Y0,i|Xi = x)]
=
∑
x
E(Y1,i − Y0,i|Xi = x)p(Xi = x)
(4.18)
In order to identify the ATE, the following conditions should be made:
i. Unconfoundedness (or Conditional independence)
(Y0,i, Y1,i) ⊥ Di, Xi
where Y0,i represent outcomes for nonparticipants and Y1,i outcomes for participants.
This assumption implies that the uptake of the program is based entirely on observed
characteristics. Therefore, given a set of observable covariates, X are not affected
by treatment and potential outcomes Y are independent of treatment assignment
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D. ii. Overlap
0 < p(Di = 1|Xi = x) < 1
This condition ensures that treatment observations have comparison observations
nearby in the propensity score distribution (Heckman, LaLonde, & Smith, 1999;
Khandker et al., 2010).
iii. Only one treatment occurs for each firm and the potential outcomes for each
firm i are unaffected by other firms receiving the treatment.
We then define x as the treatment effects for the firm with a value of the random
variable X equal to x:
τ(x) = E(Y1,i − Y0,i|Xi = x) = E(Y1,i|Xi = x)− E(Y0,i|Xi = x) (4.19)
under unconfoundedness the treatment is unrelated to potential outcomes condi-
tional on X and therefore we can rewrite above equation as follows:
τ(x) = E(Y1,i|Xi = x,Di = 1)− E(Y0,i|Xi = x,Di = 0)
= E(Yi|Xi = x,Di = 1)− E(Yi|Xi = x,Di = 0)
(4.20)
and hence
τ = E(τ(Xi)) =
∑
x
τ(x)p(Xi = x) (4.21)
4.4.3.2 The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
The average treatment effect on the treated (henceforth, ATET) focus on the effects
of treatment for a firm drawn at random from those firms who receive the treatment.
It is the average difference in potential outcomes for firms who receive the treatment,
144
4.4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY Chapter 4
hence:
τtt = E(Y1,i − Y0,i|Di = 1)
= E[E(Y1,i − Y0,i|Xi = x,Di = 1)|Di = 1]
=
∑
x
E(Y1,i − Y0,i|Xi = x,Di = 1)p(Xi = x|Di = 1)
(4.22)
Note that the ATET would be the same as ATE if the treatment effects are homoge-
neous. The same conditions we described previously should also be made to ensure
the validity of ATET.
To define τ(x) as the treatment effect for a firm with values of the random
variables X equal to x and D equal to 1:
τ(x) = E(Y1,i − Y0,i|Xi = x,Di = 1)
= E(Y1,i|Xi = x,Di = 1)− E(Y0,i|Xi = x,Di = 1)
(4.23)
and under unconfoundedness the treatment is unrelated to potential untreated out-
comes conditional on X so we can write as follows:
= E(Y1,i|Xi = x,Di = 1)− E(Y0,i|Xi = x,Di = 0)
= E(Yi|Xi = x,Di = 1)− E(Yi|Xi = x,Di = 0)
= E(τ(Xi)) =
∑
x
τ(x)p(Xi = x)
(4.24)
4.4.3.3 Propensity Score Matching
As for each firm only one treatment outcome can be observed at a time, domestically-
owned firms (control group) that are similar to foreign-owned firms (treated group)
in everything but treatment receipt is used as proxies for the counter-factual. There-
fore, it is important to ensure that the treatment assignment is random. The treat-
ment assignment in survey data may, however, not be random, which might lead
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to sample selection bias, where firms’ observed (measured) and unobserved (un-
measured) characteristics are associated with the likelihood of receiving treatment
and with the outcomes. In other words, the performance of being a foreign-owned
firm and the probability of being invested by a multinational firm are likely to be
co-determined.
Although the two-step Heckman approach helps alleviate the sample selection
bias, a strong assumption that error terms in the foreign-owned firms and outcome
specifications are jointly normal-distributed with zero means and constant variances
is required (Greene, 2003; Mallick & Yang, 2013). This assumption may however
be invalid. By contrast, Propensity Score Matching (henceforth, PSM) can be an
appropriate estimation strategy when selection bias is likely due to non-random
treatment assignment. As noted by Mallick and Yang (2013) and Webster and Piesse
(2018), the PSM adjusts for observable differences in firm characteristics between
foreign-owned firms and domestically-owned firms, allowing a similar comparison
between the two groups. Under certain assumptions, matching on P (X) = Pr(T =
1|X) is as good as matching on the covariates X (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). This
is naturally a powerful method to create an unobservable counterfactual outcome
using a firm with similar characteristics in all respects but being a foreign-owned
firm, whilst increasing the balance between the treatment and control groups (Borin
& Mancini, 2016; Webster & Piesse, 2018).
With our cross-section data and within the common support, the treatment
effect on the treated with propensity score matching can now be rewritten as follows
(Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1997; Smith & Todd, 2005; Khandker et al., 2010):
ATTpsm = EP (X)|T=1
[
E
[
Y T |T = 1, P (X)
]
− E
[
Y C |T = 0, P (X)
]]
=
1
NT
[∑
i∈T
Y Ti −
∑
j∈C
ω(i, j)Y Cj
] (4.25)
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where NT is the number of treated firms i and ω(i, j) is the weight used to aggregate
outcomes for the matched control firms j. The ATTpsm refers to the average outcome
difference between matched treatment (foreign-owned firms) and control (domestic-
owned firms) groups. Y T refers to outcome of firm i in sector s country c and time
t. T denotes a dummy equal to one if firm i is foreign-owned and zero otherwise.
The propensity score P of each firm is calculated as below (Mallick & Yang, 2013):
P = Pr(T = 1|Xi,s,c,t) = exp
λXi,s,c,t
1 + expλXi,s,c,t
(4.26)
where P is the probability of being a foreign-owned firm based on the given firm
characteristics. For this matching procedure, we first need to select variables (Xi,s,c,t)
that can be included in the propensity score. As highlighted by Khandker et al.
(2010), the samples of treated and non-treated firms should be pooled and the
treatment should be estimated on all the observed covariates Xi,s,c,t in the data
that are likely to determine the treatment. The selection of variables used for
the matching procedure is guided by the recent studies of Javorcik and Poelhekke
(2017) and Webster and Piesse (2018). The following variables are therefore selected:
firm’s age, employment, large establishment, direct export, national sales, foreign
licensing, production location, product code, net inflow of FDI (% of GDP), GDP
growth rate, trade openness and the total natural resources rents (% of GDP).
We also consider transformations of age-square, age-cube, employment-square and
employment-cube in order to obtain a more precise correspondence in the matching
procedure (Mallick & Yang, 2013; Javorcik & Poelhekke, 2017). As the matching
covariates for both treatment and non-treatment stem from the same data provider,
it is expected to credibly justify the conditional independence assumption (CIA)16
16Conditional on the observable variables, the performance of the control firm must be equal to
that of the treated firm had it not been treated.
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and the matching procedure (Heckman et al., 1999). We then provide evidence to
support the assumption of common support by showing the results of the Balancing
Test (in the Appendix). Formally, we want to check if the following is valid:
Pˆ (X|T = 1) = Pˆ (X|T = 0)
where Pˆ (X) is the estimated propensity score. The results of the balancing test are
provided in Table 4.15 in the Appendix.
Once we have the propensity score, the inverse probability weighting estimator
(henceforth, IPW) is then employed. The IPW estimator is well known and has a
long tradition in the literature of missing data, treatment effects, and measurement
error (Cattaneo, Drukker, Holland, et al., 2013). The inverse probability weighting
tries to correct for non-random sampling. The IPW gives less weight to the outcomes
of firms with high productivity in the treatment group, whilst giving more weight to
the outcomes of firms with low productivity in the same group. On the other hand,
it gives more weight to the outcomes of firms with higher productivity in the control
group, whilst giving less weight to the outcomes of firms with low productivity. As
can be seen in the study of Busso, DiNardo, and McCrary (2014) which concludes
that “reweighting is a much more effective approach to estimating average treatment
effects than is suggested by the analysis in Fro¨lich (2004)..., and is often competitive
with the more sophisticated matching estimators in data generating processes where
overlap is good” (p. 885), we employ this approach and provide results as robustness
test.
Following Cattaneo et al. (2013) and Wooldridge (2010), the IPW estimator
consists of three steps: the first is to estimate the parameters of the treatment model
and compute inverse-probability weights; the second step is to use the estimated
inverse-probability weights and fit weighted regression models of the outcome for
each treatment level and obtain the treatment-specific predicted outcomes for each
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Table 4.1: Example of Sectors s and Products p Classifications
ISIC Rev 3.1 ISIC-sector 4-digit ProductCode Description
15 Food, beverage and tobacco, sector(s) Product(p):
1 1541 15 bread production
1 1541 75916 production of oil
17-19 Textile and apparel, sector(s) Product(p):
2 1712 9 Manufacture yarn
2 1810 11 Manufacturing Leather Jackets
2 1810 14857 Female wears
2 1920 10 Manufacturer of plastic footwear
23-25 Coke, chemicals and plastics, sector(s) Product(p):
4 2519 6 HDPE pipe
4 2520 15218 Fundas plastics
4 2520 26535 Manufacturer of plastic materials
26 Nonmetallic mineral products, sector(s) Product(p):
5 2692 3 Constructing Parasitical Products
5 2695 18 Iron Pieces
27 Basic metals, sector(s) Product(p):
6 2720 16 copper smelt production
6 2720 58132 Tin frame
28 Fabricated metal products, sector(s) Product(p):
7 2893 7 Iron processing
31-33 Electrical machinery,communications, sector(s) Product(p):
9 3150 4 Devices for illumination
9 3330 81239 Watch
45-other Others, sector(s) Product(p):
12 4520 20 roads construction
12 5122 2 Whole sales of dairy products
12 5121 62376 Export of Agricultural Products
12 5211 17 food distribution
12 5219 64972 cafes
12 5510 18455 Hotel
12 5520 44495 Restaurant
12 5520 14 Retail sale of cup of coffee
Notes: Sector code 45-others includes Construction, Sales, maintenance and repair, Whole trade and commission trade, Retail and household goods,
Hotel and restaurant, Land, water and air transport, Auxiliary transport, Telecommunication, insurance and others. The products classification
follows ISIC Rev. 3.1. Data version follows WBES November 6th, 2017. Product description follows data initial record. Sectors are 12 in total; the
Table only shows some examples, it does not show all sectors.
Source: Author’s calculation.
subject; the final step is to compute the means of the treatment-specific predicted
outcomes .
4.5 Data
The analysis in this chapter is based on cross-sectional survey data drawn from the
World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES17). The WBES dataset has been used in
recent FDI studies, e.g., Webster and Piesse (2018). The WBES, which provides a
raw, firm-level dataset, collects data from key manufacturing and service sectors cov-
17Data version: All Economies 2006-2016 core4 http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/survey-
datasets.
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ering a wide range of firm-level information, including information on competition,
innovation, output sales, input supplies, capital, business-government relationships,
finances, and labour productivity. The surveys use standardized instruments and a
uniform sampling methodology to minimize measurement errors and yield data that
are comparable across developing economies. The sample includes firms in rural
areas and cities with population levels below 50,000 as well as firms’ sizes from 20
employees on up. There are 112 developing countries in the dataset, which are listed
in the Appendix (Section 4.8).
The dataset follows a four-digit ISIC Rev. 3.1 classification and provides ini-
tial product codes with product descriptions. The product codes describe narrow
product categories, and some examples of the product descriptions from the sectors
are provided here: 1) Coke, chemicals, and plastics (sectors 23-25) producing the
products HDPE pipe (product code 6) and Fundas plastic (product code 15218);
2) Electrical, machinery, communication (sectors 31-33) with products including
watches (product code 81239), and so on. Table 4.1 provides examples of the prod-
uct codes used in our dataset, which are then incorporated into the propensity score
matching procedure using the inverse probability weighting approach in an attempt
to mitigate potential bias.
We extracted data spanning the period from 2006 until 2016. In our data, 9.248%
of the firms are foreign-owned, while 90.752% are domestic. To define the foreign-
owned firms, we follow Kokko (2004), Sembenelli and Siotis (2008), Guadalupe et
al. (2012), and Weche (2018), who define a foreign-owned firm as a firm that has
foreign equity of 50% or more. Guadalupe et al. (2012) further note that a sufficient
indicator of foreign control is that at least 50% of a firm’s capital is owned by
a foreign company. Thus, we define a firm as a foreign-owned if it has foreign
ownership of at least 50%; otherwise, it is listed as a domestic firm. The data do
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not cover any further information related to the types of FDI projects. Instead,
our data cover other characteristics of a firm such as whether it is a part of a large
establishment and its size. In terms of large establishment, about 18.2% of the firms
report being part of a large establishment, and around 3% of large establishments are
attributed to foreign-owned firms. About 26% of the firms are large firms (number
of employees ≥ 100), 37% are small (number of employees < 20), and the rest are
medium (number of employees between 20 and 99). Approximately 73% of the firms
are in manufacturing (22,226 firms), and 27% are in the service sector (8,005 firms).
One of the interesting variables is the proxy for “Core Product Competence”.
The WBES contains a question asking respondents: “What were this establishments’
main products as represented by the largest proportion of annual sales?” It then
records this variable as percent of total sales. We use this variable to indicate
whether the firm is concentrating more on their core product lines. This crucial
feature allows us to examine the alteration of a firm’s core product competence
when the presence of foreign ownership is introduced and causes the local firms’
production lines to become skewed towards the most profitable products, reflecting
the theoretical prediction found in Bernard et al. (2011), Eckel and Neary (2010),
and Mayer et al. (2014). On average, the surveyed firms’ main products contribute
around 79% to their total sales. If there is a linkage supporting the above theories, we
would then expect a positive association between the presence of foreign ownership
and firms’ core product competences. We plot the distribution of this variable over
the domestic firms and foreign firms in Figure 4.2 of Section 4.6.1.
The dataset also contains other informative details regarding firms’ activities
that allow us to complement this study by mitigating potential endogeneity. In par-
ticular, we can see the number of employees that each firm had during the survey
year and three years prior to the survey. It also provides records on the total sales
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics based on 112 Developing Countries 2006-2016
Variable Definition Mean SD Min Max Obs
WEBS: Firm-level dataset
Foreign Ownership Share The foreign ownership in percent from 0 to 100(%) 9.248 26.943 0 100 30,231
Foreign Dummy The dummy equals one if the firm has at least 50 percent foreign ownership 0.095 0.293 0 1 30,231
Core Product Competence The index recorded in share of core product sales over the total sales (in %) 79.324 23.649 0 100 30,231
lnmprod The natural logarithm of real core product sales 17.053 3.208 0 32.929 30,231
lnSales The natural logarithm of real sales 17.358 3.185 7.031 33.845 30,231
lnSales3years The natural logarithm of real sales three years ago 17.015 3.360 -0.377 37.132 30,231
Markups The natural logarithm of markups for all firms 2.701 0.990 -2.985 10.398 30,231
lnTFP1 The natural logarithm of TFP 4.195 1.200 -2.858 22.711 30,231
lnTFP2 The natural logarithm of TFP measured in value added 4.049 1.239 -4.038 22.708 30,231
lnK The natural logarithm of capital stock 12.433 5.563 -0.377 28.646 30,231
lnM The natural logarithm of material uses 12.942 3.286 0 27.170 30,231
lnL The natural logarithm of labour cost 15.300 3.112 -0.377 27.665 30,231
Industry Industry denotes 1 for Manufacturing 2 for Service 1.264 0.441 1 2 30,231
Sector Sector is the ISIC 4-digit sectors classified 6.265 4.339 1 12 30,231
Size Firm’s size; 1 if small firm (<emp20); 2 if medium firm (emp20-99); 3 if large firm (<=emp100) 1.916 0.788 1 3 30,231
Age Firm’s age; the established year (the survey year minus the year established) 27.063 16.354 5 218 30,231
For Matching Procedure
DExport The share of direct export over total sales 7.391 21.952 0 100 121,100
FLicenced The license from foreign-owned firms 1 for yes 0 for no 1.854 0.352 1 2 79,971
mplinelocat The main product sales location 1.657 0.658 1 3 76,973
emp The number of employees 119.996 8676.73 0 999,999 106,491
emp3years The number of employees three years ago. 97.587 815.683 0 170,000 110,650
Sibling The dummy equals to 1 if part of large establishment 0.178 0.382 0 1 119,314
WBDI: Country-level dataset
fdini The FDI net inflows in % of GDP 3.569 4.129 -5.670 37.249 121,855
gdpg The growth rate of GDP 4.473 4.094 -14.814 20.880 122,042
Notes: mplinelocat refers to the question: From the beginning to the end of fiscal year, what was the main market in which this establishment sold its main product line or main line of services: 1 if Local
(products sold mostly in same municipality where establishment is located), 2 if National (products sold mostly across nation where establishment is located), 3 if International (products sold mostly to nations
outside country where establishment is located). All real variables are deflated by the consumer price index (2010=100), provided by the World Bank World Development Indicators database.
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each firm had three years before the survey took place. In addition, the WBES data
includes a variable indicating whether a firm uses a license authorised by multina-
tional firms, and about 13% of the firms held this license. Firms’ export shares
are also available, with a mean value of 7.291% of the total sales recorded by the
firms. Production location is provided, along with the information gleaned from
the following survey question: “From the beginning to the end of the fiscal year,
what was the main market in which this establishment sold its main product line
or main line of services? 1 if Local (products sold mostly in the same municipality
where the establishment is located), 2 if National (products sold mostly across the
nation where the establishment is located), 3 if International (products sold mostly
to nations outside the country where the establishment is located).” The above
information is employed for the matching procedure. Additionally, we merged our
dataset with the World Bank Development Indicators and used country-level vari-
ables for the matching procedure, following the study done by Weche (2018). The
variables include FDI net inflows (fdini), the growth rate of GDP (gdpg), the trade
openness (Trade), and the share of natural resource rents over GDP (tnrr). See
Table 4.2 for the summary statistics.
4.6 Empirical Analysis
The first set of predictions arising from our outlined hypotheses reveals the alteration
of core product competence via multinational firms. Our hypotheses suggest that
the presence of foreign ownership will alter the core product distribution by skewing
production towards the core product lines; the presence of foreign ownership will
also induce product market competition and therefore further skew firm’s production
towards their most profitable products. Thus, we require data on a firm’s core
product sales, as measured by the share of total sales, to complete our investigation.
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Figure 4.2: Core Product Competence for Foreign and Domestically-Owned Firms
Notes: Core product competence is measured by the core product sales share over the total sales.
The figure shows the fraction of core product competence (as the index of core product competence)
of foreign-owned firms (the grey bar-chart) and domestic-owned firms (the red bar-chart).
We will also provide some informative, stylized facts regarding our hypotheses before
moving onto the econometric analysis.
4.6.1 Some Stylized Facts
4.6.1.1 Skewness of Core Product Competence
Initially, we investigate whether the production of foreign-owned firms is skewed
more towards better-performing products than it would have been had these firms
been domestically owned.
To first visualise the idea of skewness towards core competence via the pres-
ence of foreign ownership, we plot the distribution (with densities and fractions) of
core product competence across foreign-owned firms and domestically-owned firms
through 2006-2016. The core product competence, measured as a share of firm’s
total sales, is depicted in Figures 4.2, which shows that the foreign-owned firms do
indeed focus more on their core product lines compared to the domestically-owned
firms, as, on average, the trend is a bit skewed towards the right-hand side of the
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of Core Product Competence for Foreign and Domestically-
Owned Firms
Notes: Core product competence is measured by the ppp adjusted real core product sales in natural
logarithm. This measure is only used to provide some data feature. The figure on the left red
dashed line shows the density function of core product sales in natural logarithm of foreign-owned
firms and blue dashed line shows the pdf of domestically owned firms. The figure on the right
shows the fraction of core product competence of foreign-owned firms (grey) and domestic-owned
firms (red).
distribution for foreign-owned firms (the grey chart). We further plot the density
distribution of the core product competences, measured here as the logarithm of real
core product sales, of foreign-owned firms and domestically-owned firms in Figure
4.3. This figure shows more clearly that the distribution of real core product sales
is skewed towards the core product lines for the foreign-owned firms. Primarily,
our data provide stylized facts that are consistent with the literature, for example,
Eckel and Neary (2010) and Mayer et al. (2014), although these findings do not
rule out unobserved and other time-invariant effects, especially in the case that the
net productivity improvement within firms occurs because of the spillovers effects
brought by the multinationals.
4.6.1.2 Firm-Level Markups
To see how the presence of foreign ownership influences firms’ markups, we need to
obtain unbiased estimates of output elasticities, including those for labour, materials,
and capital, from our firm-level production function estimations shown in equations
(4.7), (4.8), and (4.9), respectively. Further, following De Loecker and Warzynski
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Table 4.3: Average Output Elasticities
ISIC 3.1 Rev ISIC-Sector Observations in Labour Materials Capital Returns to
code Production Function θˆl θˆm θˆc Scale
Sector # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
15-16 Food, beverages and tobacco 1 4,750 0.626 0.195 0.132 0.953
[0.141] [0.043] [0.142]
17-19 Textile and apparel 2 4,798 0.650 0.183 0.112 0.945
[0.138] [0.040] [0.139]
20-22 Wood, paper and printing 3 1,688 0.618 0.186 0.149 0.953
[0.135] [0.041] [0.128]
23-25 Coke, chemicals and plastics 4 3,239 0.631 0.190 0.145 0.966
[0.132] [0.044] [0.128]
26 Nonmatallic mineral products 5 1,330 0.609 0.186 0.147 0.942
[0.120] [0.043] [0.125]
27 Basic metals 6 535 0.591 0.202 0.176 0.969
[0.105] [0.042] [0.089]
28 Fabricated metal products 7 2,060 0.613 0.187 0.148 0.948
[0.130] [0.044] [0.119]
29-30 Machinery and equipment 8 1,130 0.615 0.185 0.149 0.949
[0.118] [0.042] [0.111]
31-33 Electrical machinery and communications 9 885 0.627 0.188 0.145 0.960
[0.121] [0.042] [0.118]
34-35 Motor vehicles, trailers 10 431 0.586 0.195 0.183 0.964
[0.084] [0.039] [0.050]
36-37 Furnitures and recycling 11 1,171 0.639 0.187 0.096 0.922
[0.154] [0.043] [0.152]
45-others 12 8,214 0.588 0.182 0.181 0.951
[0.116] [0.049] [0.076]
Notes: Table reports the output elasticities from the production function. Estimation is based on the translog production function used in De Loecker
et al. (2016) and Bircan (2017). Product-sector code 45-others includes Construction, Sales, maintenance and repair, Whole trade and commission trade,
Retail and household goods, Hotel and restaurant, Land, water and air transport, Auxiliary transport, Telecommunication, insurance and others. Column
(1) reposts the number of observations for each production function estimation. Columns (2) to (4) report the average estimated output elasticity with
respect to each factor of production for the translog production function for all firms. Standard deviation of the output elasticities is reported in bracket.
Column (5) reposts the average returns to scale, which is the sum of the three preceding columns. The products classification follows ISIC Rev. 3.1. Data
version follows WBES November 6, 2017.
Source: Author’s calculation.
(2012) and De Loecker et al. (2016), we estimate a translog specification with a
correction for unobserved input price variation to obtain markups based on Eq.
(4.12). We report both the averages and standard deviations of the elasticities in
Table 4.3. The variations in the output elasticities are estimated to be reasonably
small across all products. A nice feature here is that almost all of the product sectors
have their estimates of constant returns to scale close to 1, on average. These results
are very similar to the firm-level output elasticities reported by De Loecker et al.
(2016), Stiebale and Vencappa (2018), and Bircan (2017) for data involving large
Indian manufacturing firms and Turkish manufacturing firms, respectively.
The markups are reported in Table 4.418. The mean markup is 2.701, which is
18As stated in Section 4.4.2, we prefer to use the markup estimation based on material elasticities
sown in Eq.(4.12)sinceBircan (2019) states that material elasticity is less likely to be adjusted
compared with labour’s share of expenditures, capital’s share of expenditures, and labour and
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Table 4.4: Markups, by ISIC Product-Sector
ISIC 3.1 Rev Markups
Sector (Mean) (Median)
15-16 Food, beverages and tobacco 2.484 2.443
17-19 Textile and apparel 2.718 2.735
20-22 Wood, paper and printing 2.727 2.715
23-25 Coke, chemicals and plastics 2.527 2.531
26 Nonmatallic mineral products 2.658 2.598
27 Basic metals 2.214 2.229
28 Fabricated metal products 2.692 2.690
29-30 Machinery and equipment 2.747 2.710
31-33 Electrical machinery and communications 2.611 2.601
34-35 Motor vehicles, trailers 2.423 2.400
36-37 Furnitures and recycling 2.818 2.815
45-others 2.922 2.972
Total 2.701 2.694
Notes: Table displays the mean and median markups by ISIC product-sector for the
sample 2006-2013.
Source: Author’s calculation.
very similar to the 2.70 provided by De Loecker et al. (2016), while it is higher than
the 1.60 provided by Bircan (2017). We now show how markups are distributed
across firms. We begin by pooling data and plotting the distribution of markups for
foreign-owned firms versus domestically-owned firms in Figure 4.4. The figure shows
that there is little difference in the distribution of markups between foreign and do-
mestic firms, but foreign-owned firms do have a slightly lower mark-up. This finding
is consistent with theories in the trade literature (Eckel & Neary, 2010; Bernard et
al., 2011; Mayer et al., 2014), suggesting that the presence of foreign ownership does
indeed increase the competition in the domestic production market. More competi-
tion reduces the prices that firms can charge in the market and so results in reduced
product markups for all product lines. However, as a first pass, these results do
not control for any sector-specific, firm-specific, time-specific, country-specific, or
other factors that could potentially influence markups. Therefore, we control for
the above factors and progress to the regression analysis in the next sub-section.
capital’s elasticities. Stiebale and Vencappa (2018) is another study that used the material elasticity
of output to obtain the markups.
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Figure 4.4: The Markups Distribution across Firms
Notes: The gray bar chart represents foreign-owned firms.
4.6.2 OLS Results
In this section, we evaluate the hypotheses outlined in Section 4.3.1. We assess
empirically the effect of the presence of foreign ownership on productivity in two
steps. First, as we will show in the next sub-section, we regress the change in firms’
core product competences on foreign ownership, which is measured in the share of
ownership and in the foreign dummy variable (equals 1 if a firm has foreign owner-
ship of at least 50% and zero otherwise). Then we estimate the effect of skewness
of the core product competences induced by the presence of foreign ownership on
firms’ productivity by using the two-stage estimator, where the core product com-
petences are instrumented by the presence of foreign ownership. Doing so allows us
to identify one of the mechanisms behind the increased productivity by the multi-
national firms. We provide results in Sub-section 4.6.2.1. Second, we regress the
change in a firm’s markups against the change in the firm’s foreign ownership and
the foreign dummy variable, respectively. Doing so allows us to see if the presence of
foreign ownership increases product market competition by reducing markups across
all products. To estimate the effect of product market competition on a firm’s core
product competence induced by the presence of foreign ownership, we again employ
the two-stage estimation approach in order to extract the effect generated by the
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foreign ownership on markups and then regress the firm’s core product competence
on the extracted variable markups. The results are provided in Sub-section 4.6.2.2.
4.6.2.1 Alteration of Core Product Competence and Productivity
Motivated by the multi-product theories (Eckel & Neary, 2010; Mayer et al., 2014)
and the stylized facts found in our data, our empirical strategy begins by examining
the relationship between foreign ownership and core product competence. In doing
so, it is important to ensure that a firm’s core product competence is not driven by
the firm’s productivity but instead by the presence of foreign ownership. Guadalupe
et al. (2012) suggest that firms with a high level of productivity are more likely to
be acquired by multinational firms and hence are more likely to concentrate on their
core product lines. Thus, we control for a firm’s TFP19, total sales, age, and size in
the following specifications.
The first set of results regresses firms’ core product competences on firms’ foreign
ownership and the dummy variable of foreign-owned firms, as shown in Eq. (4.1).
Taking into account the potential variation in a firm’s productivity, the estimated
coefficients reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.5 show that both foreign
ownership (Panel A) and the foreign dummy (Panel B) are statistically significant
and positively associated with core product competence. The specifications control
for firm’s characteristics, country, and sector fixed effects, but the year, sector-year,
and country-year fixed effects are not included. We find that the presence of foreign
ownership indeed alters the distribution of firms’ core product competence, perhaps
through the mechanism of decision in core product production. The estimated
coefficients are 0.011 for panel A and 1.212 for panel B, suggesting that, holding
19Note that the TFP is either measured by using the lnTFP1 or lnTFP2. The latter is defined as
the difference between the total sales and the material input variable, following studies Commander
and Svejnar (2011) and Newman et al. (2015). Please see Section 4.4.2 for information on estimating
the TFP.
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Table 4.5: Foreign Ownership and Core Product Competence
Core product competence: share of core product sales over total sales
Dependent variable: (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) (7a) (8a)
Panel A
Foreign Ownership Share 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010** 0.010*** 0.009* 0.009* 0.011** 0.011**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
lnTFP1 0.250 0.070 0.062 -0.119
(0.150) (0.151) (0.150) (0.157)
lnTFP2 0.292** 0.107 0.087 -0.094
(0.143) (0.145) (0.144) (0.150)
R-squared 0.1452 0.1452 0.1497 0.1498 0.1586 0.1586 0.1733 0.1733
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b) (7b) (8b)
Panel B
Foreign Dummy 1.212*** 1.219*** 1.061** 1.067** 0.996** 0.999** 1.250*** 1.254***
(0.447) (0.447) (0.478) (0.478) (0.478) (0.478) (0.476) (0.475)
lnTFP1 0.252* 0.073 0.064 -0.115
(0.150) (0.151) (0.150) (0.157)
lnTFP2 0.294** 0.109 0.089 -0.090
(0.143) (0.145) (0.144) (0.150)
R-squared 0.1452 0.1453 0.1498 0.1498 0.1586 0.1586 0.1734 0.1734
Firm’s age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm’s size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sales controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE No No No No No No Yes Yes
observations 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of core product sales over total sales. Foreign dummy equals 1 if the firm has at least
50% foreign ownership and zero otherwise, following the study of Guadalupe et al. (2012). Firm’s age and size are always controlled
for in all columns. Sales control for total sales. TFP denotes the lnTFP1 and lnTFP2, wherein columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) we
control for lnTFP1, whereas lnTFP2 is controlled for in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). The results are robust to control for the
lagged three-year total sales in natural logarithm. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are provided in the parentheses. *, **,
*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
other variables constant, if foreign ownership changes by one then we would expect
core product competence to change by 0.011, or, regarding panel B, foreign-owned
firms are about 1.212% higher in core product competence compared to domestic-
owned firms. Although currently we cannot see how many product lines a firm has
due to the fact that each firm only reported the description of their core product, it is
likely that for the firms who participate in the production on “Female wears (product
code 14857)”, “Bread production (product code 15)”, “food distribution (product
code 17)”, and “Whole sales of dairy products (product code 2)”, etc. might tend to
have more products then the firms who participate in the more specific production
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on “tin frame (product code 58132)”, “Copper smelt production (product code 16)”,
“HDPE pipe (product code 6)”, and “Fundas plastics (product code 15218)”, etc.
Therefore, the 1.212% points resulted from panel B would refer to a large effect on
a firm’s core product competence if the firm only has few product lines with few
product varieties such as in HDPE pipe, Fundas plastics or tin frame production.
By contrast, it would refer to a small effect if the firm has many product lines with
many product varieties in terms of foods and dairy products.
In columns (3) to (8), we control for year fixed effects, sector-year fixed effects
and the country-year fixed effects step-by-step. The results show that the estimated
coefficients are very robust across specifications, with statistical significance through-
out the columns. We also find that the effect of the presence of multinational firms
(via shared ownership or mere presence) is not influenced by firm’s productivity -
regardless of which TFP measure is used, we always find that multinational firms
induce firms to skew production towards the core product lines. For example, the
estimated coefficients in panel A imply that if foreign ownership share changes by
one then we would expect core product competence to increase by 0.009 to 0.012,
while the estimates in panel B imply that foreign-owned firms are 0.996 to 1.254
percent more into their core competences compared to domestically-owned firms. It
is important to note that a firm’s TFP in the current specifications is confirmed to
be an unimportant determinant of a firm’s core product competence. This finding
is supported by the theory of multi-product firms, i.e., that a firm’s productivity
is influenced by a firm’s core product competence (Eckel & Neary, 2010; Mayer et
al., 2014). Overall the skewness effect created by the presence of foreign ownership
persists, and the estimates are robust.
While the results in a number of studies point to the skewness of core product
concentration being influenced by openness to trade, for instance, as documented
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Table 4.6: Foreign Ownership and Core Product Competence
Core product competence: share of core product sales over total sales
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign Ownership Share 0.010** 0.012**
(0.005) (0.005)
Foreign Dummy 1.109*** 1.370***
(0.475) (0.472)
Size -1.145*** -1.083*** -1.154*** -1.095***
(0.179) (0.180) (0.178) (0.179)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Year FE No Yes No Yes
Country-Year FE No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.1472 0.1711 0.1473 0.1711
First-stage F-test 20.61 18.80 21.47 20.13
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
observations 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of core product sales over total sales. Robust standard errors clustered
by firms are provided in the parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
by Bernard et al. (2011) and Eckel and Neary (2010), trade liberalization leads
a substantial reduction in the number of varieties managed by firms, on average.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study demonstrate empirically the
effect of foreign ownership on firms’ core competence in the FDI literature. Our
finding suggests that the skewness of core product competence reflects an underlying
complementarity with the presence of foreign ownership, controlling for all firms’
observable characteristics. As we will show in the rest of the analyses, this finding has
economically significant implications for the theory of FDI and firms’ productivity.
For now, based on the estimates we have obtained, we want to see how the effect
of the skewness of core product competence induced by the foreign multinationals
would be passed on to firms’ productivity.
In doing so, we adopt the two-stage least squares (henceforth, 2SLS) estimation
(see equations 4.1 and 4.2), where a firm’s core product competence is instrumented
by either the foreign ownership share (columns 1 and 2 in Table 4.6) or the for-
eign dummy (columns 3 and 4 in Table 4.6), respectively. In the 2SLS estimation,
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Table 4.7: Core Product Competence and Change in Firms’ Productivity
Change in firm TFP
All 25th quartile 50th quartile 75th quartile 99th quartile
Dependent variable: (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) (7a) (8a) (9a) (10a)
Panel A
CoreProdCom(predicted) 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.053*** 0.052***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
Age -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.007***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0009)
lnSales 0.345*** 0.476** 0.275** 0.334*** 0.308*** 0.404*** 0.361*** 0.521*** 0.578*** 0.690***
(0.004) (0.014) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011)
Lagged lnSales -0.140*** -0.060*** -0.099*** -0.168*** -0.136***
(0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009)
R-squared 0.4161 0.4328 0.2765 0.2932 0.2777 0.2779 0.2846 0.2937 0.4799 0.4892
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b) (7b) (8b) (9b) (10b)
Panel B
CoreProdCom(predicted) 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.053*** 0.051***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Age -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0009)
lnSales 0.345*** 0.476*** 0.275*** 0.334*** 0.308*** 0.404*** 0.361*** 0.520*** 0.577*** 0.690***
(0.004) (0.014) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.0003) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013)
Lagged lnSales -0.140*** -0.060*** -0.099*** -0.168*** -0.137***
(0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010)
R-squared 0.4161 0.4340 0.2674 0.2792 0.2777 0.2821 0.2845 0.2937 0.4799 0.4892
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231
Notes: In Panel A core product competence is instrumented by the foreign ownership share and firm’s size, while it is instrumented by the foreign dummy and firm’s size
in Panel B. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are provided in the parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
we control for the sector, country, year, sector-year and country-year effects in all
regressions, but we do not control a firm’s TFP in the first-stage regression since
TFP is neither expected theoretically to be a determinant of a firm’s core product
sales nor empirically supported by our data. Furthermore, a firm’s age and sales
are not controlled for in the first-stage regression, as they do not affect the firm’s
concentration on the core product lines. We provide a weak identification test to
detect the weak instrumental variable issue. The results provided in Table 4.6 reject
the null hypothesis of weak identification. The relevant condition is also satisfied,
as the instruments are statistically significant at 1% significance level throughout.
We then obtain the predicted values of firms’ core product competences, which will
be used in the following analysis.
We now move on to the estimation of the effect of core product competences on
firms’ performances, taking into account the effect of the presence of foreign owner-
ship on core product competences. Table 4.7, panel A provides the results based on
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core product competence instrumented by foreign ownership, while panel B provides
the results based on core product competence instrumented by the foreign dummy.
We control for a firm’s age, sales, and the sales lagged three years throughout the
specifications. Columns (1) and (2) in panel A suggest that, on average, core prod-
uct competence is positively associated with a firm’s productivity. The greater the
skew in production towards the most profitable product lines, the higher the firm’s
productivity. A 1% increase in core product competence would lead a 2% (or 1.8%)
increase in productivity. Turning to panel B in Table 4.7, column (1), the estimated
coefficient remains highly statistically significant and identical.
We also distinguish our regressions by the quantiles from the 25th to the 99th.
The results reveal that firms in the upper middle of the productivity distribution ex-
perience substantially more productivity gains from the skewness of core production
compared to the firms in the lower middle of productivity distribution. For example,
in column (4a), a 1% increase in the core product competence is associated with a
0.8% increase in the lowest productivity group, while, in column (8a), a 1% increase
in core product competence would increase the TFP of the 75th quartile group by
1.8%.
The results obtained so far are consistent with the existing literature (Eckel &
Neary, 2010; Mayer et al., 2014; Alfaro & Chen, 2018). For example, focusing on the
supply side in the model for multi-product firms, Eckel and Neary (2010) suggest
that the productivity of a multi-product firm will be reduced by increasing product
range. Similarly, Mayer et al. (2014) assume firms face a product ladder, where
productivity declines discretely for each additional variety produced. Alfaro and
Chen (2018), in one of the most recent studies, suggest that the effect of the entry
of multinationals on the survival rate of domestic firms is particularly strong at the
left tail of the productivity distribution, indicating that the less productive firms
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Table 4.8: The Multinationals Selection Decision: Pooled Linear Probability Model
Foreign-owned firms dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
The probability of being assigned as foreign-owned during the sample period
Productivity measured: lnSales 0.032***
(0.0009)
2nd quartile lnSales -0.023***
(0.006)
3rd quartile lnSales 0.032***
(0.004)
4th quartile lnSales 0.054***
(0.004)
Productivity measured: lnTFP1 0.021***
(0.001)
2nd quartile lnTFP1 0.001
(0.007)
3rd quartile lnTFP1 0.022***
(0.004)
4th quartile lnTFP1 0.010***
(0.004)
Productivity measured: lnTFP2 0.019***
(0.001)
2nd quartile lnTFP2 -0.002
(0.007)
3rd quartile lnTFP2 0.021***
(0.004)
4th quartile lnTFP2 0.011***
(0.004)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.1439 0.1258 0.1040 0.1063 0.1035 0.1058
Observations 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231
Notes: Dependent variable is the foreign-owned dummy, where the dummy equals to 1 if foreign-owned and 0 otherwise. Robust
standard errors are clustered by firms and provided in the parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
are less likely to access the pass-through gains from the multinational firms.
While these findings offer strong support for the mechanism whereby the pro-
ductivity gains are passed through the presence of foreign ownership, one concern
remains, i.e., whether the results are driven by selection bias. As demonstrated
by Guadalupe et al. (2012), multinational firms prefer to acquire more productive
domestic firms via “cherry-picking”20. Since we employ a dummy in some regres-
20Note that, in the study by Guadalupe et al. (2012), they show that multinational firms tend to
invest in more productive domestic firms and refer to this strategy as “cherry-picking”. Therefore,
we follow the investigation strategy used by Guadalupe et al. (2012) to examine whether there are
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sions to control for the changes in foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms, the
estimates provided in Panel B of Table 4.7 may be driven partially by multinational
firms’ selections. In order to investigate this issue, we examine in more detail the
differences between foreign-owned firms and domestically-owned firms. As we focus
on the effect of multinational firms on firm core product competence, it is therefore
important to ensure that the assignment between foreign and domestic groups is not
entirely driven by multinationals’ selections.
To perform the test, we follow Guadalupe et al. (2012) to estimate a linear
probability model. We first place the ownership dummy variable (1 if foreign-owned
and 0 otherwise) as the dependent variable regressed on the measures of firm-level
productivity, including firm’s sales, lnTFP1, and lnTFP2. All regressions include
sector, year, and country fixed effects to control for the time-invariant effects. Table
4.8 provides the results. In column (1), we find that more productive firms are
indeed more likely to become foreign-owned, with a coefficient of 0.032 statistically
significant at 1% significance level. This estimate suggests that, ceteris paribus, a 1%
increase in productivity (lnSales) would increase the probability of being foreign-
owned by 0.032. In column (2), we replace the productivity lnSales by indicator
variables for the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quartiles. The results indicate that being in the
second sales quartile does not increase the probability of becoming foreign-owned,
while being in the third and fourth sales quartiles increase the probability by about
3.2 and 5.4 percentage points relative to firms in the first quartile, respectively.
In columns (3) and (4,) we replace the productivity variable by lnTFP1. The
results do not change by much. For example, in column (3), the coefficient 0.021
implies that, conditional on being domestic the year the firm in the sample, a one
standard deviation increase in productivity makes a firm 2.5 percentage points more
likely to be assigned as being foreign-owned in the sample, while being in the third
any positive selection patterns across industries.
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Table 4.9: Core Product Competence and Change in Firms’ Productivity (IPW
Estimation)
Change in firm TFP
All 25th quartile 50th quartile 75th quartile 99th quartile
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CoreProdCom(predicted) 0.011*** 0.009** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.034*** 0.035***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Age -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.007***
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0007)
lnSales 0.353*** 0.463*** 0.261*** 0.317*** 0.288*** 0.371*** 0.336*** 0.485*** 0.556*** 0.678***
(0.013) (0.029) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
Lagged lnSales -0.117*** -0.056*** -0.085*** -0.153*** -0.147***
(0.032) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pscore weighting Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.4009 0.4106 0.2897 0.2923 0.2868 0.2905 0.2898 0.2973 0.4550 0.4657
observations 23,565 23,565 23,565 23,565 23,565 23,565 23,565 23,565 23,565 23,565
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by firms are provided in the parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
and fourth TFP quartiles increase the probability of being foreign-owned by 2.2 and
1 percentage points, respectively, relative to firms in the first quartile. This pat-
tern can be found in the remainder of the analysis using productivity measured by
lnTFP2. Therefore, the results confirm that firms at the upper end of the produc-
tivity distribution are more likely to be selected as the multinational subsidiaries.
The finding is consistent with Guadalupe et al. (2012), who find that firms in the
upper quartile have a much higher probability of acquisition in Spain.
As shown in Table 4.8, we find evidence of a potential selection effect; thus,
one way to alleviate this issue is to use the propensity score matching with inverse
probability weighting. We follow empirical studies such as Guadalupe et al. (2012),
Mallick and Yang (2013), Weche (2018), Stiebale and Vencappa (2018), and Bircan
(2019), to process the matching procedure. We pool foreign-owned and domestically-
owned firms and control observations across all years to estimate the probability that
a firm is designated a foreign-owned firm as a function of a number of characteristics.
Table 4.15 in the Appendix reports on the results of the balancing test for the 23,565
firms for which appropriate matches are found. The t-test indicates that foreign
firms and domestic firms are balanced for all the results reported in the following
analysis. The results provided in Table 4.9 remain as consistent with the previous
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findings.
However, in the current specification, product market competition (markups)
is assumed to be constant, which makes us unable to determine if the presence of
foreign ownership comes with an increase in market access (market expansion) and
so indirectly increases product market competition and motivates host country’s
firms to become skewed towards the most profitable product lines. Therefore, in the
following analysis, we examine the impact of the presence of foreign ownership on
firm-level markups. Specifically, we want to see if foreign ownership increases prod-
uct market competition and passes its effect onto firms’ core product competences.
4.6.2.2 Product Market Competition and Core Product Competence
Our hypothesis suggests that the presence of foreign ownership would enhance
product-market competition by increasing costs and decreasing the average prices
of varieties supplied by competing firms and dropping markups across all products.
Therefore, we examine this mechanism by regressing firm’s markups against the
foreign ownership share and the foreign dummy variable. Here we include a firm’s
total sales measured in the natural logarithm, while we control for all sector, country,
year, sector-year, and country-year fixed effects throughout the specifications.
The results are provided in Table 4.10. As before, panel A reports the estimates
with foreign ownership shares, while panel B reports the estimates with a foreign
dummy variable. In column (1) of panel A, the effect of the presence of foreign
ownership is statistically significant at the 1% significance level, with an estimated
coefficient of -0.0006. This result implies that a 1% increase in foreign ownership
would decrease markups by about 0.06%, other things being equal. This negative
effect on markups remains when the independent variable is the foreign dummy
used to estimate the effect of the presence of multinationals on product market
competition, with an estimated coefficient -0.0005 at the 1% significance level. In
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Table 4.10: Foreign Ownership and Change in Markups and Core Product Compe-
tence
Markups (in natural logarithm) Core product competence share
Dependent variable: (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
Panel A
lnSales -0.015*** -0.012*** 0.002 -0.063
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.092)
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.075***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.009))
Size -0.057*** -0.059*** -0.574***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.244)
Foreign Ownership Share -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0008***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Markups (predicted) -13.461***
(6.192)
F-test 18.84 17.80 21.57 37.87 15.36
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pscore weighting No No No No No No
R-squared 0.1673 0.1677 0.1686 0.1683 0.1665 0.1733
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
Panel B
lnSales -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.002 -0.067
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.092)
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.075***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.009)
Size -0.057*** -0.059*** -0.578***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.244)
Foreign Dummy -0.052*** -0.056*** -0.051*** -0.047*** -0.076***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Markups (predicted) -16.642**
(6.224)
F-test 18.89 17.84 21.61 37.96 14.83
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pscore weighting No No No No No No
R-squared 0.1673 0.1677 0.1686 0.1683 0.1665 0.1734
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Ye Yes Yes
Sector-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
observations 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1) to (5) is the markups, while core product competence share is the dependent variable in column (6).
Robust standard errors clustered by firms are provided in the parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
the rest of the regressions, we control for a firm’s age and size, respectively, and
both panels A and B show the robustness of the results. The product market
competition effect, as anticipated in Hypothesis 3, exists and is perhaps introduced
by the presence of foreign ownership accompanied with potential market access
and/or product innovation in the host country. This effect lowers markups across
all product lines, as the results in panel A suggest that a 1% increase in foreign
ownership leads to a 0.05% to 0.08% decrease in markups, while Panel B shows that
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foreign-owned firms exert a negative effect on the markups by making the markups
0.047% to 0.076% lower than the domestic firms would. In both cases, we find its
effect to be statistically significant21.
This finding is again consistent with the existing literature. De Loecker et al.
(2016), for example, find that trade liberalization lowers factory-gate prices. Bernard
et al. (2011) suggest that opening a country to international trade increases the
number of firms in the market, which enhances product-market competition. Thus,
the increase in the product market competition reduces the average price of varieties
and markups fall. However, as we outlined previously, such an effect on reducing
markups by the presence of foreign ownership may be passed onto firms’ production
reallocations. When the market becomes more competitive, marginal costs may
increase and markups fall. In addition, the falling mark-up means that, in relative
terms, greater competition leads those varieties to be produced at higher marginal
cost, which implies the marginal varieties become unprofitable and so firms drop
those products and become skewed towards their core varieties (Eckel & Neary, 2010;
Bernard et al., 2011). In principle, we would expect to find the above prediction from
our empirical specification, which describes explicitly how multinational firms alter
firms’ core product competences through firms’ markups. To see this, we again use a
two-stage estimator, where we instrument a firm’s markups by the foreign ownership
share and foreign dummy variable, respectively. The results of the first stage and
the weak identification test are provided in columns (4a),(5a), (4b), and (5b) in
Table 4.10. The results reject the null hypothesis that all instruments are weakly
identified (Staiger & Stock, 1997; Alfaro & Chen, 2018). Based on the estimates,
21An alternative explanation for the compressed markups could be the distant investment. If
multinationals decide to locate distantly from incumbent firms, such agglomeration benefits might
not be available and the competitiveness might reduce markups across firms (Myles Shaver & Flyer,
2000). It might also be the case that investment mode causes the variation in markups. Chang
et al. (2013) suggests that investment mode alters firms’ output capacity, which might further
influence costs and price and result as a shrink in markups.
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Table 4.11: Foreign Ownership and Change in Markups and Core Product Compe-
tence (IPW Estimation)
Markups (in natural logarithm) Core product competence share
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
psm with inverse weighting
lnSales -0.018*** -0.016*** 0.002 -0.121
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.108)
Age -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.076***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.010)
Size -0.082*** -0.085*** -0.514*
(0.024) (0.017) (0.284)
Foreign Dummy -0.075*** -0.077*** -0.081*** -0.080*** -0.083***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023)
Markups (predicted) -11.515*
(6.186)
F-test 10.17 7.72 9.76 18.58 11.18
Prob>F 0.001 0.0007 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pscore weighting Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.1842 0.1844 0.1859 0.1858 0.1832 0.1673
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Ye Yes Yes
Sector-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
observations 23,565 23,565 23,565 23,565 23,565 23,565
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1) to (5) is the markups, while core product competence share is the dependent variable in column
(6). Robust standard errors clustered by firms are provided in the parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
we then obtain the predicted value of markups and regress a firm’s core product
competence on the predicted markups to examine the Hypothesis 4 - product market
competition induced by the presence of foreign ownership leads firms to skew their
production towards the core product lines.
Considering the impact of multinational firms on product market competition,
we find that the effect of product market competition is indeed passed on to firms’
core product competences. As shown in Table 4.10 in columns (6a) and (6b), the
estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1% significance level, with coef-
ficients of -13.461 and -16.642 in Panels A and B, respectively. Therefore, the results
suggest that, holding other things fixed, a 1% decrease in markups would increase
a firm’s core product competence by 0.13461 to 0.16642 units. To test the robust-
ness of this finding further, we process the propensity score matching with inverse
probability weighting approach. The results are provided in Table 4.11. Again, the
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results remain similar to those of the full sample, shown in Table 4.10.
Our results are remarkably consistent with the existing theories on multi-product
firms. Recalling the papers of Eckel and Neary (2010) and Mayer et al. (2014), the
models predict that competition alters the distribution of multi-product firms’ core
product production, as the “core variety” has the lowest marginal cost, and the
marginal costs rise with products’ distance from the core competence. This result
is also in line with De Loecker et al. (2016), who show that marginal costs rise
and markups fall as a firm moves away from its core competence. Although such
findings are supported theoretically by the literature, we offer one further step to
support the mechanisms through which multinational firms alter the firms’ core
product lines in the host country by assessing the effect of increased product market
competition induced by the presence of foreign ownership, i.e., ̂Markups, on core
product competence.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we use rich and detailed cross-sectional firm-level data from 112
developing economies over the period 2006-2016 to identify the mechanisms through
which the presence of foreign ownership generates productivity improvements through
the alteration of firms’ core product competence and tougher market competition.
Our focus is on the question of how and through which mechanisms does the pres-
ence of foreign ownership influence the distribution of host country’ firms in terms of
productivity and core competence. We incorporate characteristics of multinational
firms and utilize our empirical framework, which is based on the theories of multi-
product firms from Eckel and Neary (2010) and Mayer et al. (2014) and predicts
that firms skew production towards their core varieties, which then increases their
productivity when facing pressure from increasing product market competition.
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Controlling for a firm’s productivity, characteristics, and the sector, country,
and year fixed effects, we find that the presence of foreign ownership is a significant
source of motivation for firms in the host country to skew their production towards
the better-performing products. Our results suggest that the skewness towards main
product competence is attributed to the product market competition induced by the
presence of foreign ownership. The mechanism behind this finding is that the in-
crease in product market competition is accompanied by the presence of foreign
ownership by raising the marginal costs and lowering markups for all products pro-
duced. Therefore, firms respond to this effect by altering their product varieties,
dropping the low-attribute products and focusing more on the high-attribute prod-
uct lines, which leads to an increase in overall core product competence. By taking
into account the increased product market competition brought on by the presence
of foreign ownership, in our empirical results, we observe a statistically negative and
significant association between a firm’s markups and their core product competence.
The contribution of this chapter is to illustrate empirically the mechanism be-
hind productivity gains and quantify it as works its way from multinational firms
to the host-country firms. Since the results show a significantly important effect
of the skewness of core product lines on firms’ productivity, it implies that such
productivity gains are generated within the process in which local firms in the host
country respond to the impact of an increase in product market competition from the
multinational firms by adjusting in product diversity. Thus, this finding underlines
the importance of the product range adjustment and competition in explaining and
assessing the productivity gains from multinational firms in developing countries.
Empirically, we showed how foreign ownership alters a firm’s core product com-
petence and performance and how such an increase in product market competition
contributes to a firm’s core product competence. However, how an increase in prod-
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uct market competition induced by the presence of foreign ownership alters firms’
performance, and how the presence of foreign ownership alters product market com-
petition through altering firms’ decision in market expansion (e.g., to participate in
the export market) and product innovation have not been empirically examined in
this chapter. Further to this, our analysis can be complemented by building up a
theoretical framework that incorporates foreign ownership in the model and extends
the model of multi-product firms in Eckel and Neary (2010), Mayer et al. (2014)
and Eckel, Iacovone, Javorcik, and Neary (2015), where the quality of core products
may be endogenously determined by a firm’s profit decisions. Thus, the presence of
foreign ownership may motivate local firms to invest more in the quality of their core
products and, as highlighted in Eckel et al. (2015), the effect of skewness towards
core product competence induced by the multinational firms may therefore have
two different effects - the “cost-based” and “quality-based” - on firms’ productivity.
In addition, it would be useful to investigate the mechanism between multinational
firms, product market competition, and core product competence when longer-time
and cross-country panel data are available so that such biases can be alleviated.
All the points mentioned above will be implemented in our future work in order to
provide additional insights into productivity gains from multinational firms.
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4.8 Appendix
Table 4.12: Country List
Domestically-owned Foreign-owned Country-code
Albania 585 79 2
Angola 612 173 3
Armenia 662 72 6
Bangladesh 2,878 68 9
Benin 245 55 13
Bhutan 474 29 14
Bolivia 1,174 165 15
Bosni and Herzegovina 662 59 16
Botswana 327 283 17
Brazil 1,144 658 18
Bulgaria 1,419 177 19
Burkina Faso 337 57 20
Burundi 350 77 21
Cambodia 652 193 22
Cameroon 635 89 23
Cape Verde 132 24 24
Chad 106 44 26
Chile 1,844 206 27
China 2,532 168 28
Colombia 1,830 112 29
Costarica 450 88 31
Croatia 899 94 32
Czech Rep 415 89 33
Cote dIovire 700 187 34
Djibouti 224 42 36
Ecuador 1,173 212 39
Egypt 4,325 386 40
El Salvador 1,521 251 41
Estonia 455 91 43
Ethiopia 1,276 216 44
Fiji 133 31 45
Fyr Macedonia 647 79 46
Gambia 124 50 48
Georgia 683 50 49
Notes: This table provides information on the number of domestic-owned and
foreign-owned firms across countries.
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Table 4.13: Country List
Domestically-owned Foreign-owned Country-code
Ghana 1,073 141 50
Guatemala 976 136 52
Guinea 331 42 53
Guinea Bissau 144 15 54
Honduras 986 142 56
Hungary 508 93 57
India 9,200 81 58
Indonesia 2,531 233 59
Irag 748 8 60
Israel 450 33 61
Jamaica 301 75 62
Jordan 508 65 63
Kazakhstan 1,088 56 64
Kenya 1,259 179 65
Kosovo 470 2 66
Kyrgyz Rep 424 81 67
Lao PDR 858 140 68
Latvia 505 102 69
Lebanon 512 49 70
Lesotho 206 95 71
Lithuania 478 68 73
Madagascar 634 343 74
Malawi 458 215 75
Malaysia 832 168 76
Mali 894 141 77
Mauritania 335 52 78
Mauritius 346 52 79
Mexico 2,704 256 80
Moldova 649 74 82
Mongolia 677 45 83
Montenegro 253 13 84
Morocco 343 64 85
Mozambique 385 94 86
Myanmar 1,188 51 87
Namibia 753 156 88
Nepal 825 25 89
Nicaragua 1,001 146 90
Niger 241 60 91
Nigeria 4,093 474 92
Pakistan 2,080 102 93
Notes: This table provides information on the number of domestic-owned
and foreign-owned firms across countries.
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Table 4.14: Country List
Domestically-owned Foreign-owned Country-code
Panama 828 141 94
Papua New Guinea 20 45 95
Paraguay 1,190 148 96
Peru 1,438 194 97
Philippines 2,054 607 98
Poland 888 109 99
Romania 917 164 100
Russia 5,028 196 101
Rwanda 368 85 102
Samoa 85 24 103
Senegal 1,009 98 104
Serbia 668 80 105
Slovak Rep 462 81 108
Slovenia 468 78 109
Solomon Islands 80 71 110
South Africa 816 121 111
South Sudan 443 295 112
Sri Lanka 576 34 113
Sudan 648 14 117
Swaziland 301 156 119
Tanzania 1,092 140 122
Thailand 901 99 123
Timor-Leste 248 28 124
Togo 209 96 125
Tonga 127 23 126
Trinidad and Tobago 324 46 127
Tunisia 506 86 128
Turkey 2,375 121 129
Uganda 1,117 208 130
Ukraine 1,702 151 131
Uruguay 1,081 147 132
Vanuatu 83 45 134
Venezuela 278 542 135
Vietnam 1,826 223 136
West Bank and Gaza 421 13 137
Yemen 788 42 138
Zambia 882 322 139
Zimbabwe 974 225 140
Notes: This table provides information on the number of domestic-owned and
foreign-owned firms across countries.
177
4.8. APPENDIX Chapter 4
Table 4.15: Balancing Test of the Variables: Before and After Matching
Treated Control %bias t-test p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFP 4.434 4.444 -0.9 -0.24 0.809
size 2.338 2.326 1.6 0.51 0.613
Sibling 0.304 0.302 0.5 0.14 0.891
age 26.211 26.248 -0.2 -0.07 0.945
age2 961.74 986.78 -1.6 -0.43 0.670
age3 51,604 56,513 -2.3 -0.60 0.546
DExport 28.239 27.816 1.3 0.35 0.727
NatSales 65.579 65.72 -0.4 -0.11 0.912
FLicenced 1.649 1.644 1.2 0.33 0.741
mplinelocat 2.034 2.025 1.2 0.35 0.728
fdini 4.421 4.331 2.0 0.59 0.552
gdpg 4.493 4.516 -0.6 -0.16 0.871
trade 77.854 77.628 0.7 0.21 0.831
tnrr 7.648 7.863 -2.6 -0.74 0.457
productcode 40,881 41,842 -3.9 -1.25 0.211
Notes: This table reports t-tests of equality of mean for variables used
in the logit estimation for predicting treated firms after constructing
our local linear control group. Column (1) reports means for foreign-
owned firms, while column (2) reports means for their matched controls.
Columns (4) and (5) report the results of a t-test between the two
groups. The results indicate that both groups are very similar and the
matching was effective in building a good control group (Rosenbaum &
Rubin, 1985; Bircan, 2019).
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Table 4.16: Three-Step Estimation: Change in TFP
Core product competence share All 25th 50th 75th 99th
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
Panel A
lnSales -0.355*** 0.469*** 0.413*** 0.455*** 0.508*** 0.673***
(0.068) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011)
Age -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0009)
Size -0.540*** -0.484*** -0.525*** -0.593*** -0.620***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.025)
Markup(predicted) -15.196***
(6.187)
Core product competence (predicted) 0.007*** 0.0006 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.045***
(0.001) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.005)
F-test 14.28
Prob>F 0.000
R-squared 0.1708 0.4696
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
Panel B
lnSales -0.360*** 0.469*** 0.412*** 0.455*** 0.508*** 0.672***
(0.068) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011)
Age -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.001)
Size -0.540*** -0.484*** -0.526*** -0.593*** -0.618***
(0.012) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.025)
Markup(predicted) -18.474***
(6.220)
Core product competence (predicted) 0.007*** 0.0005 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.045***
(0.001) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.005)
F-test
Prob>F
R-squared 0.1709 0.4696
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231 30,231
Notes: This table reports results by using three-step estimation. In the first-stage regression we regress Markups on foreign ownership across firms
controlling for sector- year- and country-fixed effects. In the second-stage regression we regress core product competence on predicted markups extracted
from the first-stage regression. In the third-stage regression we regress firms’ TFP on predicted core product competence extracted from the second-stage
regression.
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Conclusion
We employ three types of data throughout the essays, i.e., panel data at the coun-
try level, pooled firm-level data, and data that is cross-sectional at the firm level.
Overall, this thesis focuses on three important nexuses that are very relevant to FDI
and productivity gains: (1) the impact of FDI on economic growth; (2) the vertical
spillovers from multinational firms to domestic firms; and (3) the mechanisms by
which the productivity gains occur through core product competences and market
competition. By having established an endogenous growth model in which FDI is
suggested to be determined by the differences in countries’ abilities and is predicted
to have a positive growth effect, the first essay addresses the endogeneity of FDI
and finds evidence supporting the growth effect of FDI on GDP per capita and
demonstrates that countries’ abilities play an important role in determining tech-
nology transfers from frontier countries (in the “North”) to developing economies
(in the “South”). After demonstrating the growth effect of FDI and reconciling the
findings in the FDI-growth literature, the second essay turns to investigating the
vertical spillovers from multinational firms to domestic firms in the host country.
By using the newly constructed measures of forward and backward linkages, we find
the differences in firms’ sourcing and supplying activities to be crucial in terms of
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the productivity spillovers from multinational firms to domestic firms. We provide
three alternative measures in which the assumptions applied in the existing liter-
ature are relaxed, and then we provide empirical evidence showing the robustness
of the three measures compared to the standard measures used in the literature.
In the last essay, we deal with the extensions needed to incorporate multinational
firms and firms’ production with respect to the concept of product range and prod-
uct scale and the tougher product-market competition induced by the multinational
firms based on the theories of multi-product firms. These potential mechanisms
have been much less emphasized in the FDI literature. Thus, the focus of this essay
is on identifying the mechanisms through which the presence of foreign ownership
influences the distribution of the host country’ firms in terms of productivity, core
varieties and markups. The results provide insights into how the presence of foreign
ownership affects the extent of the alterations in core varieties, competition, and the
subsequent productivity gains in the host country.
5.1 Summary of Findings
In Chapter 2, the results show that FDI enters the growth model significantly and
with positive estimated coefficients. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 1
that FDI promotes growth. In addition, the results indicate that the relative levels
of technology and human capital enter the model significantly at 1% level with a
priori expected signs. It indicates that the higher the relative level of a host coun-
try’s abilities, the more the knowledge is transferred into the host countries. We
find that our theoretical model fits well with the data. Based on our theoretical
prediction, FDI is instrumented by the relative levels of human capital and tech-
nology between the leader and follower countries to control for the endogeneity of
FDI in the model. We then compare the results provided by 2SLS with fixed-effect
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instrumental variable estimation and the system-GMM. We find that the estimated
coefficient provided by the GMM estimator is about ten times (or even more) lower
than the one provided by the two-stage instrumental approach. The findings suggest
that the general growth regression which has been used intensively in the early em-
pirical studies might underestimate the benefits from FDI due not addressing FDI’s
endogeneity properly. Our model is better able to mitigate this endogenous bias,
providing more consistent results regarding the growth effect of FDI on the relative
level of GDP per capita.
To further understand the benefits from FDI, Chapter 3 focuses on the FDI ver-
tical linkage spillovers on domestic firms’ productivity. As two strong assumptions
applied in the existing literature and measures of FDI vertical linkages remain at
the sectoral level, we create alternative measures of spillovers by using a rich dataset
containing firms’ sourcing and supplying behaviours from BEEPS, in which the FDI
vertical linkages are measured at the firm level. We split the whole sample into
two categories based on the types of firms, i.e., local and domestic firms, in the
empirical analysis, and the results show that the standard forward and backward
linkages are found to be statistically insignificant when assumptions 1 and 2 are
held simultaneously. We find statistically significant spillovers of backward linkages
on firms’ productivity when assumption 2 is relaxed and assumption 1 is held fixed.
Then when assumption 1 is relaxed but assumption 2 remains fixed, the result shows
that our alternative measures capture the positive spillovers on firms’ productivity
through forward linkages, while we find both linkages to be statistically significant
when assumptions 1 and 2 are relaxed. These baseline results suggest that the as-
sumptions applied typically in existing studies lead to biased estimates for vertical
linkages. We then focus on whether the spillover effects would be different for the
domestic firms in the host country compared to the whole sample. The results show
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both positive and negative effects of forward linkages on domestic firms’ productiv-
ity, while backward linkage spillovers are confirmed as positive on domestic firms’
productivity. We find that it seems to capture the variation among the inputs that
domestic firms obtain directly from the multinational firms when the proportion of
imported inputs is used as a proxy for the forward linkages. As the inputs may be
accessed freely by the domestic firms, forward linkages are therefore measured to be
positive in terms of domestic firms’ productivity. On the other hand, we find that
multinational firms might try to dominate market positions, which might lead to
higher input prices for domestic customers. Therefore, forward linkages are found
to be negatively associated with domestic firms’ productivity when the proportion
of firm’s foreign inputs is used as a proxy for the forward linkages.
The last essay utilizes intuitive predictions motivated by multi-product firms
and the trade literature. We present a number of testable hypotheses that describe
the mechanisms through which the within-firm productivity improvement occurs
via multinational firms in the host country. We focus on the case of a firm’s core
product competence and markups, acting here as two important mechanisms that
link to the within-firm productivity improvements via the presence of foreign own-
ership. Using a rich cross-sectional firm-level dataset, we first provide stylized facts
from the data. We plot the distribution of core product competence across foreign-
owned firms and domestic-owned firms and find that, indeed, foreign firms have
relatively higher core product competences compared to the domestic-owned firms.
Our mark-up estimation, overall, is also consistent with the literature. Moving to
the empirical analysis, our first step is to regress firms’ core product competences on
firms’ foreign ownership and the dummy variable for foreign-owned firms. The esti-
mated coefficients show that both the extent and incidence of foreign ownership are
statistically associated with firms’ core product competences. Next, the firm’s core
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product competence is instrumented by the foreign ownership and we then regress
the predicted value of the core product competence against firms’ productivity. The
results suggest that, on average, core product competence is positively associated
with firms’ productivity. The second set of results then regresses firms markups
against foreign ownership. The results suggest that the tougher competition effect
exists and is induced by the presence of foreign ownership in the host country. Then,
in order to see whether the tougher market competition would further skew firms’
production towards the core varieties, we again use 2SLS and regress the predicted
value of firms’ markups against firms’ core product competences. The results show
that this effect is passed onto firms’ core competences, as lower markups result in
firms becoming skewed towards the core varieties.
5.2 Implications, Limitation and Future Research
The results presented in Chapter 2 support the view that FDI is important in
terms of economic development for the developing countries. The implication for
policymakers in those developing economies is that government policies need to put
more effort into improving the stock of human capital and the level of technology,
as they are the key determinants of attractiveness for FDI inflows, whilst FDI can
bring in advanced knowledge from world-leading nations, and it is still one of the
best ways for developing countries to catch up the world’s developed economies. On
the other hand, as our results highlight that the growth effects of FDI will decrease
with the increase of relative level of human capital and technology, it suggests that
for those countries who have a relatively high-level ability might need to invest more
in innovation process and policy instead of entirely relying on attracting FDI. The
limitation of this chapter is that the estimates rely on a few data sources that shorten
the time dimensions and reduce the available observations. This limitation might be
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even magnified by other potential variations across countries. A new dataset with
more observations across a longer time period may be preferred in order to enable
the data to potentially provide new and interesting results, and these results could
perhaps be incorporated into the theoretical model. In addition, when estimating
the growth effect of FDI, researchers should understand clearly that the endogenous
determination of FDI exists and that to mitigate this bias is not an easy task.
Although the role of FDI in growth literature has been investigated for a long time,
it remains difficult to identify the contribution of FDI without having a clear idea
that guides us in alleviating the difficulty in addressing such biases. Therefore, future
work can aim to extend our theoretical model, modelling the countries’ innovation
and adaptation behaviours together with FDI, which might offer further alternatives
for identifying the growth effect of FDI.
In Chapter 3, our findings imply that the differences in sourcing and supplying
behaviours among firms are crucial in identifying spillovers arising from both back-
ward and forward linkages. To support this idea, our results demonstrate that the
standard measures, in which the variations in firms’ sourcing and supplying activ-
ities are assumed to be constant, do not provide evidence supporting the vertical
linkage spillovers for our data. In contrast, there is evidence supporting the exis-
tence of both forward and backward linkages when we consider the variations. Based
on the analysis, it may be appropriate to advise policymakers in developing coun-
tries to focus on policies aimed at attracting multinational firms, while encouraging
domestic firms to have more contact with multinationals in order to benefit more
from vertical linkage spillovers. Our findings might be particularly useful and in-
formative for those countries who have multinational firms operating but have seen
a lack of linkage between local suppliers and multinationals - namely the countries
Guatemala, FYROM, and El Salvador. It is important that these developing nations
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can improve firms’ local sourcing networks, ensuring local firms have the ability to
improve their production process so that the input quality required by the multina-
tional firms can be satisfied and so such spillover effects can occur. However, this
chapter is not without limitations. First, this chapter includes two important dif-
ferences between our work and that of Javorcik (2004) that pertain to the data and
the way we measure linkages. By applying our new methodology to Javorcik’s data,
we may be able to understand more about how such differences in firms’ sourcing
and supplying behaviours influence the benefits received from FDI through vertical
linkages. Second, it might be better if we could update our current dataset with
more firms observed repeatedly over time, as long-term panel data can eliminate any
firm-specific, time-invariant effects, perhaps resulting in a more precise estimation.
Thirdly, this study also makes a number of assumptions on the proposed measures
of forward linkages, and the forward measurement is limited since it is based on the
eight given sectors, which are not disaggregated entirely at the firm level. Therefore,
these limitations call for more research to follow our proposed measures with differ-
ent data and alternative econometric approaches to see whether it is the context,
the method, or the measurement that matters most.
In Chapter 4, the results suggest that the presence of foreign ownership is a
significant source in motivating domestic firms to skew their production towards
the better-performing products, while the skewness of their main products is also
attributed to the product market competition created by the presence of foreign
ownership. On the one hand, regarding the productivity improvement of domestic
firms, it is crucial that policymakers in the developing countries concentrate on creat-
ing policies that attract foreign multinational companies, as higher product-market
competition induces a highly skewed core product distribution and contributes fur-
ther to firms’ productivity. This concept is particularly important for those de-
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veloping countries who have more multi-product firms with few product varieties
produced across industries, as they might experience a higher productivity improve-
ment effect through foreign ownership compared with other countries who also have
multi-product firms operating but with more product varieties produced. Therefore,
it might be more important to focus on policies that link to production adjustments
between firms (foreign and domestic firms) and industries. On the other hand, the
importance of the product range adjustment and product-market competition in ex-
plaining and assessing the productivity gains from multinational firms shows that it
is important that researchers not ignore these potential sources when searching for
mechanisms for within-firm productivity gains from multinational firms, as doing
so may lead to underestimating the impact of FDI on productivity and overlook
some important theories arising from the estimation. However, this chapter also has
some limitations. Our empirical framework cannot distinguish whether the effect
of skewness towards core competence on firms’ productivity is contributed by the
high-quality varieties or simply by the basic-quality varieties. As highlighted by
Eckel et al. (2015), the quality of core products may be determined endogenously
by a firms’ profit decisions. The presence of multinational firms may, therefore, help
local firms to invest more in the quality of their core products, and the effect of
skewness towards core product competence induced by the multinational firms may
have two different effects - the “cost-based” and “quality-based” effects - on firms’
productivity. Also, our empirical analysis has not examined how the presence of for-
eign ownership alters firms’ performance and product market competition through
market expansion and product innovation. Analyses in these direction may provide
additional insights in terms of explaining productivity gains from multinational firms
and be able to provide important policy guidelines for governments seeking to pro-
mote FDI in developing countries. Also, considering the data limitation, it may be
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interesting, should a long-term panel data set become available, to better control
for other potential variations as well as firm-specific unobservable fixed effects and
provide more precise empirical analyses. All the points mentioned above will be
implemented in our future work.
Despite all the possible limitations in this thesis, some important contributions
to the methodology and theoretical knowledge concerning FDI and productivity
were presented.
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